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RECOVERING HYPERBOLE: RE-IMAGINING THE LIMITS OF RHETORIC FOR
AN AGE OF EXCESS
by
JOSHUA R. RITTER
Under the Direction of James Darsey
ABSTRACT
Hyperbole has a varied and contentious history, and its forms and functions are largely
ignored and dismissed today. Often misunderstood, hyperbole nevertheless offers critical
insights into our understandings of epistemology and ontology that cannot go unexplored.
In order to recover and reinvigorate a theory of hyperbole within the field of rhetorical
theory and criticism, I explore the history of this critical trope from ancient to modern
times. I then offer two functions and one meta-function of hyperbole based on this
historical survey: moving through impossibility towards possibility, asserting a lie on the
side of truth(s), and re-orienting one’s perspective through disorientation. Derived from a
historical survey of hyperbole, these two functions and one meta-function are vital for
understanding and constructing a theory of hyperbole that is productive and useful for
current theoretical discussion. Using these functions, I offer a variety of examples under
the purview of the epideictic and grotesque genres and show how hyperbole might be
employed within rhetorical theory and criticism. Overall, this project seeks to respond to
the gap that exists within current rhetorical theory regarding hyperbole, to explore why
hyperbole is often dismissed as a tropological expression of excess and exaggeration, and
to revitalize interest in hyperbole for critical use in areas such as rhetoric, theology, and
philosophy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
And, now, I will show you a more hyperbolic [υπερβολήν] way.
1 Corinthians 12:311
In Linnaean terms, excess is the order, bombast and hyperbole the genera, and within the
genus hyperbole, one finds various species: metaphoric hyperbole, discursive hyperbole,
hyperbole ruled by allegory, hyperbole as litote, and hyperbole that verges on irony,
catachresis, or paradox.
Christopher D. Johnson
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE
A HYPERBOLIC PROBLEM
Hyperbole (Lat: superlatio, Gk: υπερβολή) is an exaggeration, an excess,
literally meaning to “throw beyond.”2 It is a familiar and often used trope, e.g., “America
is a giant among nations” or “Capitalism is a colossus,” but its specific functions are
largely unexplored or even forgotten by current rhetorical theorists, which is surprising
considering the fact that hyperbole has a rich, though contentious, rhetorical history.
Moving through impossibility towards possibility and offering a deceit in order to push
beyond given interpretations of reality and meaning, the functions of hyperbole are
contradictory, complex, and often disorienting, but these functions have particular
importance for the current age of excess because of the epistemological and ontological
insights they can provide, e.g., disrupting notions of absolute truth in order to radically
1

1 Corinthians 12:31, my translation. This passage could also be rendered, “And yet, a way is
revealed to you according to hyperbole (or extravagance).”
2

Hyperbole (noun): 1) obvious and intentional exaggeration, excess, throwing over or beyond; 2)
an extravagant statement or figure of speech not intended to be taken literally; 3) a figure of speech in
which exaggeration is used for emphasis or effect
From the Latin: superlatio
From the Greek: υπερ-βολή
υπερ – meaning over and above, beyond, more than
βολή – from βαλλω, meaning to throw
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alter perspectives about that “truth.” As the most effective trope for expressing the
inexpressible and describing what is beyond description, hyperbole risks being misapprehended, and it stretches and strains facts and language so it might transcend the
“ordinary” and communicate as yet unimagined possibilities.
Unlike other tropes, hyperbole is exceedingly and intentionally epistemologically
and ontologically disruptive. It is paradoxical in the extreme. It repetitively shocks and
de-stabilizes with audacious claims that are meant to force one beyond the literal and into
the figural realm. It does not insinuate or offer subtle insights, though its path to these
insights might be sly and deceitful, and it offers no synthesis of thought. It offers
dissonance rather than resonance, and the resonance it does offer might be dissonance
itself. It brings blunt force trauma, it is brazenly deceptive, and its intent is brutality.
It is true that all tropes are types of conceits intended to bring one to a new and
perhaps surprising insight. The difference of hyperbole from other tropes is that it
amplifies this fact so it is more than apparent that what is being said is a falsehood. It
heightens the suspicion that more is being communicated than what is stated. Unlike
other tropes, hyperbole must be recognized as a hyperbole for it to be effective, and it
does not even attempt to go unnoticed. It privileges emotion over reason, and it often
verges on the edge of madness. Hyperbole blatantly, disorientingly, and traumatically
batters its audience and pushes it towards alternative ways of perceiving meaning and
being through extreme contradiction. It undermines at every tropological turn, and it
exorbitantly creates intense pathos that is often unsettling and disturbing. Confounding
in the extreme, hyperbole is used and mis-used, recognized and mis-recognized, and its
pervasiveness within discourse can make its importance hidden in plain sight.

3
Exaggeration and excess are common and familiar enough on the one hand. As
Quintilian writes, “[Hyperbole] is in common use, as much among the unlearned as
among the learned, because there is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or
extenuate what comes before them, and no one is contented with the exact truth.”3 On
the other hand, hyperbole becomes complicated when we are called to explain what the
use of exaggeration or excess or the definite forms and functions of hyperbole within
language mean or signify. What are the benefits of using an exaggerated or excessive
form of communication? Why suggest it is “a million degrees outside” when one could
simply note the numerical degree? What else is being indicated by this exaggerated and
excessive form of communication? I suggest that the excessiveness of hyperbole elicits a
constructive, transformative ambiguity for alternative possibilities of meaning and being.
However, as the contentious history of hyperbole indicates, fear and suspicion of excess
and exaggeration hinders its exploration leaving a significant gap in current rhetorical
theory regarding hyperbole.
As I will show, an unsure relation to excess exists from Plato to Augustine to the
current rhetorical context. Both necessary and denigrated, the excess and exaggeration
that are represented and displayed by hyperbole are negotiated along the margins of
moderation throughout hyperbole’s controversial history. The rhetorical and
psychological disruptiveness of hyperbole is indeed a significant concern of rhetorical
theorists, and it is paradoxically praised but also resisted. An uncertain understanding of
excess and exaggeration is a thread running through hyperbole’s history, but, as discussed
below, the epistemological and ontological benefits of hyperbole are considerable.
3

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.75, trans. Lee Honeycutt,
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (8 November 2009)
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Familiar genres such as parody, caricature, satire, the burlesque, and the grotesque
make use of hyperbole, and the four master tropes – metaphor, metonymy, irony, and
synecdoche – seek to extend and expand meaning, which is the main function of
hyperbole. Yet, hyperbole’s role is significantly unexplored in these varied genres and
tropological expressions, and its forms and functions remain largely obscure in the
current theoretical and critical context. Beyond academic theoretical discussions,
common parlance further masks the (mis)use of hyperbole. For example, referring to
President Obama as Hitler or to his health care plan as including “death panels” are
exaggerations.4 This assertion pushes the boundaries of reason towards impossibility and
expresses more than the “truth” warrants in order to constitute and to communicate
alternate realities.
One may consider these expressions and comparisons absurd, ridiculous,
irrational, or fanatical, but these references are not simple statements of description.
They are hyperbolic assertions of impossible possibilities and falsehoods on the side of
pushing truth(s) beyond conventional boundaries, i.e., an “elegant surpassing of the
truth.”5 More than descriptors of one’s given reality, these expressions tropologically
signify complex worldviews, perspectives, ideologies, and institutional frameworks.
Through the force of their exaggeration, these assertions attempt to indicate what is

4

For examples, see <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/may/08/chainemail/money-humanitarian-aid-not-emmigration-assistance> and <http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2009/aug/10/sarah-palin/sarah-palin-barack-obama-death-panel>.
5

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67, trans. Lee Honeycutt,
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (8 November 2009).
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beyond reality rather than what is beyond belief.6 One is indicating more than a literal
statement when describing Obama as Hitler.
Suggesting that Obama is Hitler is blatantly false, and this assertion immediately
shows the obviousness that Obama is not Hitler. When faced with this radical
contradiction that Obama is not literally Hitler while unabashedly referring to him as
such, one’s attention is arrested, and one is forced to consider alternate ways of
interpreting this statement. As the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium asserts, emphasis is
used to reveal and foster the suspicion that something more is being communicated than
what is stated, and the emphasis of hyperbole offers more than the given truth of a
situation warrants in order to increase this suspicion.7 While other tropes attempt to
avoid suspicion of being a trope, hyperbole flagrantly displays itself as such to
intentionally create suspicion and render itself suspect in order to force one to see beyond
a statement of “truth” or fact and discover alternative, re-interpreted truth(s) within the
statement itself.
An obvious and deceitful exaggeration, the lie of a statement such as Obama is
Hitler is not intended to deceive but to create a momentary suspension of reality and
reason, to disrupt typical synthesizing thought processes, in order to force one to
(re)consider other truth(s) a hyperbolic statement might indicate. Offering a range of
interpretations, the perspectival truth(s) revealed by a hyperbolic lie can vary widely
based on the hearer’s context because the intent of hyperbole is not to present one with
definitive “truth.” Through the disrupting, disorienting lie, a re-orientation of one’s
6
7

Ibid., 8.6.73, 8.6.76.

[Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan (London: Harvard University Press,
2004), 4.53.67.
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views and assumptions can occur. When employed effectively by the hyperbolist,
hyperbole as a transitional principle of contradiction imbues a disorienting perspectival
ambiguity and a paradoxicality upon its subject(s), but the intent is always transition or
re-orientation of one’s perspective.
It is the reception of the exaggeration upon which hyperbole succeeds or fails.
The positive or negative reception of hyperbole depends upon one’s predisposition
towards hyperbole. That is, based on how it is implemented, how it is received, and what
context it is used within, a failed hyperbole for one may be an effective hyperbole for
another. When the figural expression is viewed only as literal or too outrageous, then the
hyperbolist and the (re)interpretive work hyperbole can provide fail. Without viewing
the assertion as a tropological representation of excess that arrives at possibility through
impossibility and other truth(s) through falsehoods, the (il)logic of hyperbole’s assertion
is overshadowed, and even defeated, by the literal.
The promise of hyperbole is transition from one perspective to another, and its
risk is misapprehension as it communicates through contradiction and signifies
ambiguous and paradoxical assertions beyond the purview of logical argumentation. In
making a hyperbolic assertion, one does not rely on logical argumentation. Depending
upon affectus more than ratio and justified by the magnitude of its exigence, hyperbole
pushes the bounds of logic whereby logical thought forms are opened up to radical
perspectival expressions that evoke emotions, enthusiasm, and experiences. However,
this complexity of meaning and ambiguity is often overlooked, neglected, or
misunderstood in current theoretical discourse.
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The contentious history of hyperbole, which I will explore in chapter two, is
complex and variable because the attitudes about hyperbole and excess differ
significantly throughout its history. Sometimes, in Renaissance rhetorical theory, for
example, it is celebrated, though often tentatively. At other times, hyperbolic excess is
regarded with outright fear, suspicion, e.g., by Plato and Aristotle. Hyperbole is
discussed primarily within Romanticism as the vehicle for the “sublime.” Hyperbole is
also theoretically silenced and glossed by the privileging of irony in postmodern
discourse, often dismissed as a signal of religious fanaticism, and consistently ignored as
one of the master tropes.
I offer a history of hyperbole for two reasons. First, current rhetorical theory and
criticism is disconnected from hyperbole’s history because hyperbole is largely neglected
today. An exploration of how hyperbole is defined and viewed throughout its history will
thereby provide a foundation upon which to build a theory of hyperbole for current
discussion. Hyperbole does not need rescuing, but it does need to be re-presented and
recast for the current context as the forms and functions of hyperbole are all but
forgotten. Second, and closely related to the first, a historical survey will provide a basic
context from which to view and explicate hyperbole today. Without understanding the
ways this trope is historically defined and interpreted would make it difficult to offer a
fully developed theory of hyperbole.
What I offer, then, is a history intended to increase an understanding of how
hyperbole has been defined and perceived. Re-exploring hyperbole’s rich history reveals
the complexities and subtleties about this trope that may have escaped us today. Given
significant technical tropological attention at various times in its history, these
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discussions offer fertile ground for re-constructing a detailed theory of hyperbole for the
current context. Hyperbole’s history also clarifies the observation that an uncertain
relation to excess and exaggeration does exist and does affect our views regarding
hyperbole. Revealing this uncertainty is important because it offers insight not just into
the functions of hyperbole and how it operates effectively or ineffectively but also into
our indecisive fear and suspicion of excess itself.
Considering hyperbole is often used to describe events, thoughts, perspectives, or
experiences, it is striking that there is a significant lack of scholarship regarding
hyperbole in contemporary rhetorical theory as well as contemporary theory in general.
Indeed, the pithy and dismissive discussion of hyperbole in contemporary rhetorical
theory is an interesting occurrence since hyperbolic excess and the perspectival
ambiguity and paradoxicality it exerts upon the subject is such a complex and prevalent
force within discourse. For example, in contemporary rhetorical theory hyperbole is
often subordinated to an extension of metaphor and/or irony.
In the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, Hienrich F. Plett defines hyperbole: “It is
mostly a kind of metaphor or allegory that raises the referential object beyond
probability.”8 In Plett’s essay, rather than describing the complex tropological relation
among hyperbole, metaphor, and allegory, hyperbole does not receive any extended
consideration. In like manner, although the authors of The New Rhetoric do not describe
hyperbole as subordinate to metaphor, they do not offer an extended reflection on

8

Hienrich F. Plett, “Hyperbole,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 364.

9
hyperbole.9 Their brief explication of hyperbole does link hyperbole to an argument of
unlimited development that is always an argument of direction thereby assigning
hyperbole an argumentative form rather than simply dismissing it as an irrational
assertion. Yet, their analysis of this observation is insufficient for developing a
conceptualization of hyperbole that fully elaborates the implications of its role within
contemporary discourse. In addition, Katrin Ettenhuber10 and Goran V. Stanivukovic11
do offer several keen insights into the nature of hyperbole, but their scope is rather
limited since they are studying hyperbole only within the purview of Renaissance
rhetorical theory.
Outside of the realm of rhetorical theory, Mikhail Bakhtin notes the positive role
of hyperbole within grotesque realism and laughter during the Middle Ages and the
Renaissance, but he never offers any analysis regarding the specific functions of
hyperbole.12 Georges Bataille celebrates excess in his scatological philosophy of
heterogeneous expenditure without reserve, but the role of hyperbole is never
mentioned.13 Friedrich Nietzsche also often emphasizes excess and exaggeration in his

9

Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation,
trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), esp. 287292.
10

Katrin Ettenhuber, “Hyperbole: Exceeding Similitude,” in Renaissance Figures of Speech, eds.
Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
11

Goran V. Stanivukovic, “’Mounting above the Truthe’: On Hyperbole in English Renaissance
Literature,” Forum for Modern Language Studies, 43, no. 1 (2007) : 9-33.
12

See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984).
13

For example, see Georges Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1988); Georges Bataille, Guilty, trans. Bruce Boone (Venice: Lapis Press, 1988); and Georges
Bataille, Theory of Religion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1989).
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philosophy, though the role of excess in Nietzsche’s thought is uncertain since he
sometimes praises moderation as well,14 and Jean-Luc Marion relies heavily on excess
for his post-metaphysical phenomenological project.15 Yet, neither of these thinkers
addresses the role of hyperbole within their systems of thought. Jean-Pierre Mileur,16
Suzanne Guerlac,17 and Jacques Derrida18 all address the notion of hyperbole but do not
explore the functions historically ascribed to it, which often leads to assertions about
hyperbole that are inaccurate. Slavoj Zizek is another contemporary theorist who
frequently uses excess and exaggeration, not just in the content of his writing, but as a
form or style of thought. That is, his argumentative form regularly operates through
hyperbolic assertions rather than logical suppositions, but again, a thoroughgoing
discussion or examination of hyperbole is absent from his writing.19
The neglect of hyperbole by these theorists notwithstanding, hyperbole offers a
particular force of language that is not as obvious within other tropological formations.
For example, when Washington Irving describes Ichabod Crane as “tall, but exceedingly

14

For example, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber and
Stephen Lehmann (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R.
J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1982); and Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1966).
15

See Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and
Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).
16

Jean-Pierre Mileur, The Critical Romance: The Critic as Reader, Writer, Hero (Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
17

Suzanne Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime: Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautreamont (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1990).
18

Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1978).
19

For example, see Slavoj Zizek, On Belief (London: Routledge, 2001); Slavoj Zizek, The
Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London: Verso, 2000); and
Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997).
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lank, with narrow shoulders, long arms and legs, hands that dangled a mile out of his
sleeves,”20 Irving is describing Crane through the force of hyperbole. In a similar
example, when Garrison Keillor says in the voice of Guy Noir, Private Eye, “She [Miss
Moffett] was rather beautiful, tall, with raven hair and a red wrap dress that hugged her
hips so tight I could read the lettering on her underwear,”21 Keillor is also using
hyperbole. It is not that Miss Moffett’s dress was literally that tight, and Crane’s hands
did not literally dangle a mile out of his sleeves. These are falsehoods and impossibilities
on the side of truth(s) and possibilities. It is the exaggeration and excessiveness, which
moves the literal into figural descriptions of Moffett and Crane, that offers one a way of
viewing them that would be less forceful or imaginative if hyperbole were not employed.
In addition to these examples of hyperbole, religious rhetoric and theological
discourse tend to use hyperbole quite often. Various models of “God,” especially
classical Christian theistic models of “God,” are often premised upon Platonic ideals such
as the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, which are buttressed by hyperbole in their
attempt to express the impossible while still remaining bound to specific contexts of
possibilities. Neo-Platonic Christian writers, such as Plotinus, also ground their
arguments upon certain ideals assuming that the force of their hyperbolic assertions will
carry their argument along a clear and logical line of thinking, but it is the paradox of
hyperbole that offers a meandering path towards insight. Contemporary theological
scholars like Karl Barth (a neo-orthodox theologian) and Hans Urs von Balthasar (a
sacramental, aesthetic theologian) also rely upon these same idealist assertions and use
20
21

Washington Irving, The Legend of Sleepy Hollow (Filiquarian Publishing, 2006), 10.

Garrison Keillor, “Guy Noir,” A Prairie Home Companion,
<http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/programs/2007/06/23/scripts/noir.shtml> (10 September 2009).
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hyperbole to structure their arguments, and Mark C. Taylor’s postmodern a/theology of
“nots” is premised entirely upon the forms and functions of hyperbole.
Although hyperbole is a pervasive and significant force within thought and
language, the evidence suggests it is often overlooked, distrusted, and neglected,
especially in the current context. As one theologian theorizing about hyperbole argues,
“At best, when we hear hyperbole at all today it sounds ridiculous, foolish, absurd, even
fanatical. We are in danger of losing a dimension to language which stretches the
imagination, challenges ready-made assumptions, and forces unusual perspectives,”22 and
he further suggests, “Hyperbole is more than an occasional eruption or a useful tool. It is
a basic fact of language and action that commands attention and warrants understanding
on its own terms.”23 These statements each support my argument, and what they
highlight is twofold.
First, they assert that hyperbole’s forms and functions are misunderstood and
underappreciated. Second, these comments contend that hyperbole is a significant force
within thought and language. Implicitly, Erasmus offers a similar assertion, “By this lie
[of hyperbole], as Seneca says, we come to truth; for hyperbole says more than reality
warrants, yet what is true is understood from the false,”24 and Quintilian’s Institutes of
Oratory extensively, though indecisively, argues for the importance of hyperbole.
Examining hyperbole can shed new light on the ways scholars approach the study of
discourse in general because hyperbole pushes interpretation and thought beyond its
22

Stephen H. Webb, Blessed Excess: Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1993), xii.
23
24

Ibid., 150.

Desiderius Erasmus, On Copia of Words and Ideas, trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007), 35.
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normative limits through its uses of exaggeration and excessiveness. Yet, if we do not
seek to understand hyperbole, then its insights will go unnoticed.
Because the material of theology takes us beyond pedestrian experience, it should
not be surprising that hyperbole, an obvious vehicle for expressing the sacred, has been
given its most sustained attention in contemporary time by a theologian, Stephen H.
Webb. Thinking about the uses and meaning of hyperbole, Webb defines hyperbole as “a
trope that beckons but also warns; it accomplishes an intensification that does not result
in a metaphorical synthesis but brazenly both invites and distances the audience from the
height of an apparently unreasonable position.”25 Webb’s definition is certainly
ambitious in his positioning of hyperbole into such a vital rhetorical position; yet, he
often falls short in connecting his conclusions to the broader rhetorical implications of
hyperbole in relation to thought and language, meaning and being.
Webb’s aim is to connect hyperbole to theological discourse, e.g., terms such as
“grace” and “love,” but even here, his illuminating insights into hyperbole and theology
have broader rhetorical implications than his findings admit.26 For example, Webb does
note the rhetorical aspect of his analysis, but he does not significantly explore current
discussions regarding rhetorical theory or criticism. He offers no suggestion as to how a
hyperbolic perspective might aid in rhetorical criticism, or, how a hyperbolic style may
25

Stephen H. Webb, “The Rhetoric of Ethics as Excess: A Christian Theological Response to
Emmanuel Levinas,” Modern Theology 15, no. 1 (1999) : 3.
26

See Stephen H. Webb, Blessed Excess: Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1993); Stephen H. Webb, Re-Figuring Theology: The Rhetoric of
Karl Barth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Stephen H. Webb, The Gifting God: A
Trinitarian Ethics of Excess (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Stephen H. Webb, “The Rhetoric
of Ethics as Excess: A Christian Theological Response to Emmanuel Levinas,” Modern Theology 15, no. 1
(1999) : 1-16; Stephen H. Webb, “The Rhetoric of and about Excess in William James’ The Variety of
Religious Experience,” Religion and Literature 27 (1995) : 27-45; and Stephen H. Webb, “A Hyperbolic
Imagination: Theology and the Rhetoric of Excess,” Theology Today 50 (1993) : 56-67.
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be constructed by rhetorical theorists as a useful theoretical framework. Yet, changing
the way rhetorical scholars view hyperbole can alter the way they understand concepts
such as style, decorum, discourse, and subjectivity.
Webb also does not delve enough into the specific functions of hyperbole based
on an extended historical exploration of the term, and he often assigns functions to
hyperbole that are simply not accurate. He gives us a theological perspective about a
rhetorical term, but he does not necessarily give us a rhetorical perspective regarding
theological/philosophical concepts and ideas. In sum, Webb falls short of his own desire
to understand hyperbole completely on its own terms as a significant tropological
expression. However, his observations offer many points on which to build, and his work
clearly indicates the complexity one finds when exploring the forms and functions of
hyperbole. This complexity highlights the fact that the de-stabilizing nature of hyperbole
poses a significant problem, even a threat, to the way we relate to thought and language
because its force is so disruptive in regard to meaning and being.
Christopher D. Johnson is one scholar of comparative literature who does offer
extensive and clear insights into hyperbole’s forms and functions, but he limits himself
largely to Baroque literature.27 He also does not offer implications regarding his analysis
of the Baroque texts he examines. He simply moves from one author to the next without
offering any summary insights. He does present a thoroughgoing analysis of Quintilian’s
theory of hyperbole, but his significant observations frequently go unused in his actual
analyses of the authors he explores. His project reveals contemporary scholars’
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ignorance towards hyperbole as well as the importance of hyperbole for critical use, but
his conclusions leave much to be desired.
Despite these few authors’ attempts at explicating hyperbole and showing the
importance of hyperbole’s role within thought and language, their analyses are
insufficient in parsing out the intricacies of hyperbole. Although “excess” (the core of
hyperbole’s function) is explored in contemporary philosophical and psychoanalytic
discourse, and the “sublime” (closely linked but distinct from hyperbole) is analyzed as
an important rhetorical aspect/tactic, hyperbole is absent from these discussions. Thus,
its role and function are in need of re-exploration because hyperbole is such a pervasive
and uncertain force within thought and language itself, and hyperbole can shed new light
on the ways scholars approach texts and discourse.28 That is, our relation to hyperbole is
obscured by its excessively ambiguous role within thought and language because of its
ignored functions. Its meaning, its form and content, its role and function, all constitute a
vagueness with our relation to hyperbole itself.
THE SUBJECT OF HYPERBOLE
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY
Examination of as significant and overlooked a trope as hyperbole is a
complicated endeavor because of the questions it raises as well as the various ways it
expresses itself through discourse and subjectivity. Among the important questions that
our troubled relationship with the use of hyperbole puts into play are those related to
28
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epistemology and ontology. Our relation to excess and exaggeration – and to their
epistemological and ontological implications – is indefinite and often frightening.
Paradoxically, the disorienting heights that distorts our relation to this trope is one of its
main functions. The confusion that frustrates our relation to hyperbole can also offer one
a re-orientation to thought and language, to meaning and being, because ambiguity can
open up new ways of seeing and perceiving the world, but misapprehension is a
significant risk of this movement through vagary.
The ambiguity of excess is always a threat to the order, decorum, convention,
propriety, proportion, and hierarchy of being, which is why the excessiveness and
exaggeration of hyperbole is often resisted for its seeming irrationality. One reason for
restraining hyperbole in the ancient world (as well as later historical periods) is its
ontological disruptiveness. A fear of embodied hyperbole was directly connected to a
fear of rhetorical excess, and stylistic vices were synecdochally connected to excessive
forms of living. Plato and Aristotle, for example, are particularly harsh in their
condemnation of hyperbolic excess.
In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates launches an attack on all that is excessive about
rhetoric, i.e., sophistic rhetoric. At a linguistic level, he equates these excesses to flattery
and cookery, and he considers these not to be arts but excessive ploys intended to
deceive.29 Cookery only appears to be an art, but it is not. It is a device of appearance
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that deceives the hearer and lacks substantive knowledge. For Plato, the excesses of
cookery, flattery, and folly are “shameful,” and Plato is typically perceived as privileging
dialectic over rhetoric.30 Rhetorical excess only offers one the appearance of truth, but in
fact, appearance is not truth but deceit.
At an ethical level, Socrates compares the “intemperate man,” the vice of
embodied excess, to a leaky jar, and he argues that the orderly life, the virtue of
moderation, is better than the intemperate life.31 Linguistic and embodied excess are both
denigrated, even feared, while the ideal of Greek moderation is lauded. Excess
destabilizes the balance of moderation. More than a rhetorical flourish, Plato argues that
excessiveness is a vice, an ontological dissonance, to be avoided so that one may live
well. Excessiveness and moderation are thus linked to how one might live, how one
might “be” in the world, and this ontological duality is clearly established – the moderate,
moral life is good while the intemperate, immoral life is bad.
The same duality of moderation/excess can be seen in Plato’s philosophy of
rhetoric outlined in Phaedrus. Socrates argues that there are two ruling natures within
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humans: the desire of pleasures and that which aims at the best. He states, “Now then,
when opinion leads with reason toward the best and wins mastery, the name of the
mastery is moderation; but when desire without reason drags us toward pleasures and
rules in us, the name wanton outrage is applied to the rule.”32 The moderate, “good” and
reasonable soul is privileged over the excessive desirous soul that lacks reason and
pursues only pleasure.
Linking excess to wanton outrage also suggests that excess is equated with a lack
of emotional control and a disruption of order, which are two things hyperbole is almost
always associated with or accused of doing. Hyperbole is also typically described as
lacking reason, as irrational, and as excessive desire leading to pleasures. Thus, Plato
implicitly argues against hyperbole and its embodiment as irrational desire. He
establishes an ontological duality between moderation and excess, and moderation
implies a virtuous mastery over one’s life while excess implies a significant ethical lack
in one’s life. For Plato, the very nature and being of what it means to be human is at
stake in the moderation/excess dualism, and excess, as embodied hyperbole, is rejected as
something that must be avoided. This same concern carries over to Plato’s student,
Aristotle.
Ancient rhetorical theorists were not simply concerned with hyperbole’s
ontological disruptiveness, however. For example, there is an interesting epistemological
connection to hyperbole in Rhetorica ad Herennium: “Emphasis [significatio] is the
figure which leaves more to be suspected than has been actually asserted…The emphasis
is produced through Hyperbole [per exsuperationem] when more is said than the truth
32
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warrants [patitur veritas], so as to give greater force to the suspicion.”33 Similarly, the
author of On the Sublime states, “Hyperbole may tend to belittle as well as to magnify;
the common element in both is a strain on the facts.”34 Or, Quintilian says, “[Hyperbole]
is an elegant surpassing of the truth.”35 These are stimulating and complex passages not
simply because of the re-iteration of hyperbole’s link to a “surpassing of the truth” or “a
strain on the facts,” but because these passages suggest an interesting epistemological
relationship between hyperbole and “truth.”
Hyperbole is not a simple form of distortion because hyperbole works by being
recognized as a figural exaggeration. Hyperbole pushes one to think beyond given
“truths” and assumed versions of reality. The hyperbolist offers hyperbole to be
recognized as an exaggeration (either immediately or eventually), and this can become a
constructive, transformative ambiguity for alternative possibilities of meaning and being.
Or, it can fail in/as literality when it is mis-apprehended. Hyperbole can serve to
heighten a suspicion of “truth” in order to reveal a concealment and point to something
more, more than the truth warrants, and constitute alternative ways of perceiving a given
“reality.” In short, hyperbole is an important trope not simply for its exaggeration but for
its epistemological participation in the (re)constitution of meaning and its questioning of
given “truths” or “realities.”
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A more contemporary perspective of hyperbole’s epistemological contingency
reveals that the realm of postmodern and poststructuralist discourse, where moderation
itself is condemned and excessive transgression and disruption of epistemological and
ontological limits is celebrated,36 may have prepared the way for a shift to a more
positive conception of hyperbole. Hyperbole is seemingly the trope par excellence for
current discussion since hyperbole is such a de-stabilizing epistemological and
ontological force. For example, in his Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Foucault, Derrida,37 Allan Megill unintentionally argues that each of these figures is
engaged in the (epideictic) rhetorical strategy of hyperbole to “fiction” (pseudologia) the
past in order to “throw beyond” the present and the future (logos politikos).
Although Megill offers no discussion of hyperbole, his argument leads one to
conclude that attempting to say too much in order to say what can never be fully
articulated, which is one function of hyperbole, is precisely what Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Foucault, and Derrida were pushing the exploration of “truth” towards. Each figure
36
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employs the strategy of extremity in order to portray a certain position, and the
excessiveness of their claims is necessary to exert the full force of their argument that is
epistemologically and ontologically disruptive and de-stabilizing.
Hyperbole is ostensibly infinite in its intensification, and it is dangerously without
limit. As Derrida notes, hyperbole “cannot be enclosed in a factual and determined
historical structure, for it is the project of exceeding every finite and determined
totality.”38 Hyperbole’s excessive disruptiveness de-stabilizes epistemological and
ontological presuppositions. By throwing beyond every finite and determined totality,
hyperbole offers one a perspectival shift/mobility, which heightens one’s awareness of
how limits, norms, decorum, order, hierarchies, and conventions are constituted through
thought and language. Yet, as I will show, hyperbole is not without limit. It does throw
beyond given perceptions of reality, but it is not excess beyond all measure. Rather, it is
a purposeful measure of excess used for transition through contradiction.
Through ambiguity, hyperbole allows for a perspectival shift/mobility, and it
positions one’s interpretive lens in such a way, almost as looking awry, as to reveal what
one might miss without the perspective of hyperbole. As Katrin Ettenhuber, drawing
from her work on Renaissance writers, suggests, “By highlighting the limits of figuration
and productively destabilising the reader’s views of linguistic norms and conventions, it
[hyperbole] encourages active reflection on the different ways in which meaning is
constructed and communicated.”39 The problematic role of hyperbole, then, is also one
of its most important aspects for determining our relation to hyperbole. The nebulous
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role of hyperbole lends itself to constituting an excessive ambiguity, and it is this
ambiguity that allows hyperbole to work in relation to meaning, i.e., the disruption of
meaning as “givenness.”
One’s relation to that excessive ambiguity is problematic because ambiguity is
mysterious, uncertain, seemingly irrational, and frightening through its de-stabilizing
effects on our modes of existence and our systems of thought. A hyperbolic perspective
pushes the boundaries of decorum towards a style that is disruptive and often grotesque,
which is precisely the reason hyperbole is frequently mistrusted. Yet, it is this destabilizing and contradictory nature of hyperbole that makes it such an intriguing
tropological expression in need of re-exploration and re-consideration.
THREE FUNCTIONS OF HYPERBOLE
In order to make my argument that hyperbole is a contentious trope in need of reexploration because of the gap within current tropological theory and that hyperbole can
offer critical contributions to contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism, I offer two
consistent historical functions of hyperbole and one meta-function. After offering a
history of hyperbole, these functions will guide and structure my argument: impossibility
leading towards possibility, a lie on the side of truth(s), and a re-orientation out of
disorientation. The two functions and one meta-function also highlight the movement of
hyperbole to transition out of contradiction, to shift perspectives through the contrariety
of hyperbole’s paradoxical transformation(s).
The first two functions are historically ascribed to hyperbole, and the last one is a
meta-function of hyperbole that I derive from two one-sentence glosses made by Paul
Ricoeur upon which I will significantly expand. I discuss the meta-function last because
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explicating the first two functions will make it more apparent that re-orienting through
disorientation is hyperbole’s comprehensive, global purpose. That is, after exploring the
first two functions of hyperbole, I will then offer the final meta-function of
disorientation/re-orientation as an overall culminating function because the purpose of
each function of hyperbole is to disorient and disrupt in order to re-orient one towards
another perspective. Thus, after a discussion of hyperbole’s controversial history in
chapter two, I will offer an explication of these functions in chapters three and four.
IMPOSSIBILITY/POSSIBILITY AND TRUTH/LIE
In chapter three, I will explore the impossibility/possibility and truth/lie functions
of hyperbole, which also lead to questions of hyperbole’s justification, use of decorum,
and reliance upon kairos. It is Quintilian who offers a thoroughgoing examination of
these two functions of hyperbole, though Longinus, Demetrius, and the author of Ad
Herennium address these functions to a lesser degree. Seneca’s insights do highlight well
the impossibility/possibility function, but Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole is so profound
that it will influence the attitudes and uses of hyperbole throughout the history of
rhetorical theory. In the Renaissance, for example, when those like Erasmus view
hyperbole particularly positively, it is Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole they rely upon.
Even in current theorists’ hesitant and pithy statements about hyperbole, e.g., Derrida, I
will show that Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole continues to be operative.
As noted above, Quintilian writes, for example, that hyperbole is an “elegant [i.e.,
decorous] surpassing of the truth,”40 and he suggests, “It is sufficient to remark that the
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hyperbole lies, but not so as to intend to deceive by lying.”41 In complete contradiction to
normative ways of defining a lie, Quintilian’s epistemological assertion about hyperbole
is a confounding one. Ascribing this function to hyperbole, Quintilian alters typical
perceptions of epistemological inquiry and suggests that hyperbole operates within its
own type of (il)logic where given notions of truth can be expanded or exploded. He also
posits that lying hyperbolically on the side of truth(s) can be an “elegant,” even decorous,
tropological expression.
Regarding the impossibility/possibility function while also implying the truth/lie
function, Seneca writes, “Exaggeration never hopes all its daring flights to be believed,
but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it may convey what is credible.”42 Through
exaggeration one asserts “what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought
to be as much so as possible.”43 Expressing the possible through the impossible is
hyperbole’s forte in Seneca’s mind and is an important insight into hyperbole. Pushing
the bounds of belief and straining epistemological and ontological boundaries to a
breaking point for the purpose of transition holds a vast array of implications and uses for
hyperbole. Indeed, at a time when the impossibility of possibility and the possibility of
impossibility are common phrases within poststructuralist discourse, it seems that this
function of hyperbole is particularly hospitable to the current theoretical context.
Noted above, hyperbole is purposefully epistemologically and ontologically
disruptive and transformative, and these two functions particularly highlight this
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characteristic of hyperbole. Out of the contradiction of moving through impossibility
towards possibility and offering a linguistic lie on the side of hermeneutical truth(s), a
transition occurs from one perspective to others. This transition, and whether one
participates in it or not, is the crux upon which hyperbole will succeed or fail. If
hyperbole is not received well and a transition does not occur through hyperbole’s figural
force, then it is because hyperbole has become impaled upon the spear of the literal.
Despite hyperbole’s forceful push into the figural, it may still be accused of absurdity and
dismissed as a violator of decorum, insincerity, pretense, and faulty judgment, i.e.,
kakozelia.44
In order to parse out these two functions, I will examine the epideictic and
grotesque genres. Though completely absent from current rhetorical theory,45 epideictic
is historically connected to hyperbole, and grotesque theorists connect hyperbole to their
discussions but often unwittingly. These two genres exemplify the uses of hyperbole,
and I will use them to explore these two functions of hyperbole. I will also use these
genres to explicate the disorientation/re-orientation meta-function of hyperbole in chapter
four. I will mainly use epideictic in chapter three, and I will mainly use the grotesque in
chapter four, though there is definite overlap between the two in each chapter.
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In epideictic, where exaggeration and amplification (υπερβολή and αυχέσις)46 are
used either to praise excessively or to blame excessively, hyperbole is a formative and
crucial tool. Auxesis (αυχέ-σις: the process, state, or condition of increasing;
amplification), for example, is “magnifying the importance or gravity of something by
referring to it with a disproportionate name.” As we will see from Quintilian’s view, all
the types of amplification are species of hyperbole: incrementum, comparatio,
ratiocinatio, and congeries. Viewed from a hyperbolic perspective, the epideictic genre
engages hyperbole, especially through incrementum, to render an evaluation from one
perspective (pistis), or “given,” towards another perspective or thought, a transformation
of perspective.47
Affirming and critiquing a “given” perspective in order to transform thought
occurs through the use of hyperbole as it points towards an “invented great:” “[Epideictic
promotes] identification with a new or different vision of community through the
veneration of an ‘invented great.’”48 This invented great aids in emphasizing a critique of
a current context and points the audience towards an alternate view of the present and
future. It is an impossibility that points towards other possibilities of meaning and being;
a deceit on the side of truth(s). That is, hyperbole is used in order to alter one’s “given”
perception of reality and point towards another (contingent) ideal that is ambiguous
46
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“truth” as the free play of interpretation and signification, which may be deceptive in its
ateleology and transformative vision of what might yet come to pass. Thus, a rhetor’s
use of hyperbole allows for a celebration as well as a disruption of “givenness,” a moving
from one thing to something else through excessive contradiction. By exploring aspects
of the epideictic genre in this manner, the forms and functions of hyperbole will be
illuminated.
Out of this brief discussion of the epideictic genre an interesting relationship
among hyperbole, decorum,49 and kairos50 is discovered. I will discuss the issue of a
decorum of excess in chapter three, but I will significantly expand upon it in chapter four.
For example, I suggest that decorum and kairos together constitute a more fluid decorum
of excess where hyperbole functions both forcefully and appropriately. The contextual
aspect of hyperbole is governed by kairos,51 and the kairotic moment marks the excessive
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and disorienting path of hyperbole. Within these situations (kairois), the excessive
response of hyperbole can be perceived as the right measure or appropriate
proportionality (to prepon) – an adherence to decorum, i.e., a decorum of excess where
all is exaggerated and disproportionality is the proportionate and appropriate response.
The magnitude of a particular exigence or subject matter demands a timely response
equal to the task. The trajectory of hyperbole both exceeds and is dependent upon kairos
and decorum within a decorum of excess.
The epistemological and ontological disruptiveness of hyperbole functions as a
response to an exigence at a kairotic moment by throwing beyond a “given” rational
economy and highlighting the force of circumstantial contingency. For example, a
statement by William Falk highlights hyperbole’s relation to kairos and contingency:
Perhaps Abraham Lincoln made a mistake. When some Americans believe the
current president is a communist cult leader trying to brainwash the nation’s
schoolchildren, and other Americans want the last president to be dragged off his
ranch in handcuffs, it is time to reassess the state of our union. So may I make a
modest proposal. There is a way to end the bitter bickering over health care,
abortion, affirmative action, religion in the public square, taxation, torture, and the
proper role of government. It is called secession. Yes, I know: Splitting the
United States into two nations is a bit extreme. But extremism in the defense of
America’s sanity is no vice. And since we’re already segregating ourselves by
what we watch, listen to, and read, why not go all the way?52
As Falk’s statements and his reference to Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal” suggest,
he is being obviously hyperbolic, e.g., as hyperbolic satire, even going as far as actually
identifying his ideas with extremity. He offers a lie on the side of truth(s). His response
is both governed by the exigence of political and social unrest and exceeds the
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decorousness of logical argumentation. At the “right moment,” he goes beyond the
accepted rationality of political rhetoric, highlights the contingency of the situation,
pushes the boundaries of decorum, and makes a hyperbolic assertion of secession that is
forceful and disruptive to one’s national identity. The political exigence is his
justification for the use of hyperbole and guards against accusations of misuse and
absurdity. In sum, the hyperbolic rhetoric Falk employs is ontologically disruptive,
excessive, and still bound to its contextual exigence within a decorum of excess.
The contextual aspect of hyperbole is indeed an important one: “Hyperbole is
always located in a situation, a context, an economy [in order to disrupt that situation or
economy]. It is always of something and toward something else.”53 The excessive
trajectory of hyperbole operates within a decorum of excess, which includes kairos as a
guide because outside of the “opportune moment,” hyperbole is ridiculous. Hyperbole’s
excess loses its power and meaning when it is disconnected from its context. It is
unwarranted and unjustified. Not only does a weak connection to context hinder the
hyperbolist’s justification of hyperbole’s use, but it renders hyperbole almost
meaningless.
Relying on a decorum of excess in a particular context, hyperbole functions
effectively in all of its excessive ambiguity and irrationality. The pre-Socratic ethic,
especially in the Pythagorean school and Gorgias’s thought, of “Know the opportunity”
(kairon gnothi) is vital for the functioning of hyperbole.54 In response to a particular
exigence, “Extraordinary circumstances and unprecedented conditions compel one to
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resort to kairotic speech, that is, speech that risks violating established norms of propriety
and decorum.”55 Hyperbolic speech is a certain kairotic speech that seemingly violates
norms and decorum in order to respond appropriately to a particular exigence, and its
justification is the extraordinary, which is particularly evident in hyperbole’s
disorientation/re-orientation function.
DISORIENTATION/RE-ORIENTATION
The disorientation/re-orientation meta-function I will explore in chapter four is
not one that is historically associated with hyperbole, and it is a new contribution to the
theory of hyperbole. As I said above, the inspiration for this function comes from two
one-sentence glosses made by Ricoeur, and I will significantly expand upon his
assertions. The main statement from Ricoeur I will explicate is the assertion,
“[Hyperbole] reorients by first disorienting [the law of paradox and hyperbole]…[and]
makes the extraordinary break forth in the ordinary [the law of extravagance].”56
Ascribing both paradox and the extraordinary to hyperbole, Ricoeur states what I
suspected all along about hyperbole. Namely, that hyperbole is a trope specifically
designed to disorient the audience long enough in order to produce a re-orienting shift to
other as yet unrealized perspectives and realities. This is the meta-function, or “law,” of
hyperbole because each function of hyperbole is subsumed under this impetus to re-orient
through disorientation, and this is particularly evident in the grotesque genre.
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Typified in both the epideictic and grotesque genres, I will mainly use the
grotesque because it specifically highlights the disorientation/re-orientation of hyperbole.
Also, some theorists of the grotesque already tangentially associate the grotesque with
hyperbole. Suzanne Guerlac’s notion of the “impersonal sublime,” for example, relies on
both hyperbole and the grotesque. She suggests that the logic of excess, a
“hyperbologic,”57 is what guides the grotesque and that the grotesque’s rhetorical figure
is “accumulation, exaggeration, or hyperbole.”58 Within the grotesque, “The same and
the other are held together, ‘complicated,’ by hyperbole.”59 It is this complication that is
the uneasy pathos created through hyperbole within the grotesque, and it is what must be
traversed in order to arrive at new resonant, re-oriented possibilities.
In his illuminating work on the grotesque, Geoffrey Galt Harpham describes
grotesqueries as standing “at a margin of consciousness between the known and the
unknown, the perceived and the unperceived, calling into question the adequacy of our
ways of organizing the world, of dividing the continuum of experience into knowable
particles.”60 Although Harpham does not explicitly discuss hyperbole in his work, the
language here is similar to what I have identified as hyperbole’s role in thought and
language, i.e., standing disorientingly at the margin of consciousness between the known
and the unknown and calling into question the adequacy of our ways of organizing the

57

Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 111.

58

Ibid., 47.

59

Ibid., 64.

60

Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature
(Aurora: The Davies Group, Publishers, 2006), 3.

32
world. In Harpham’s understanding, the grotesque serves a positive function that
expands and re-orients our imagination rather than hindering imagination.
Bakhtin explicitly notes the positive role of hyperbole regarding the grotesque
image of the body in Rabelais’s writing. He writes, “The grotesque body…is a body in
the act of becoming. It is never finished, never completed; it is continually built, created,
and builds and creates another body.”61 He then argues that the outgrowing of the self
and the transgressing of one’s own body each play a leading role in the grotesque image,
which are both subject to “positive exaggeration, to hyperbolization.”62 In Harpham’s
and Bakhtin’s depictions, the grotesque serves a positive function of transformation,
which errantly transitions from one understanding of reality to another.
The grotesque offers fertile ground for explicating this meta-function of hyperbole
despite the varying interpretations of the grotesque by numerous theorists. No matter the
differing characteristics enumerated across the literature of the grotesque, the one
unifying concept is that of disorienting contradiction, paradox, or incongruity,63 e.g.,
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Kenneth Burke offers the grotesque as a perspective by incongruity.64 The main
hyperbolic function represented by the grotesque, then, is its disorienting contradictory
nature, which always (mis)leads towards some transition of thought, emotion, experience,
insight, or psychological state.
Viewing hyperbole through the lens of the grotesque also reveals its paradoxical
and transgressive characteristics that move one from dissonance to a newly created sense
of resonance in the audience. It is this resonance, this re-orientation, which carries the
audience through contradictions towards a transition. The dissonant force of hyperbole’s
aggressiveness is justified by its figural resonance. The attitudes about hyperbole and our
difficult relation with excess and exaggeration often stifle this transformative movement,
but hyperbole repeatedly offers a way to batter the literal into the figural and moves one
through paradox into partial apprehension.
Examining the contentious history of hyperbole as well as its three functions that
move within a decorum of excess, which are exemplified in the epideictic and grotesque
genres, leads to the conclusion that hyperbole is an important, though often
misunderstood, trope deserving of further attention and exploration. A gaping hole
within current rhetorical theory, this tropological representation of excess is in need of
critical re-exploration.
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF HYPERBOLE
There are two things upon which every treatment of the Scriptures depends: the means of
discovering what the thought may be, and the means of expressing what the thought is.
St. Augustine
God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
Anselm
The special goal of theologians is to expound Scripture wisely; to render its doctrine
according to faith, not frivolous questions; to discourse about piety gravely and
efficaciously; to wring out tears, to inflame spirits to heavenly things.
Erasmus
INTRODUCTION
Hyperbole has a rich and contentious rhetorical history. It is misunderstood,
celebrated, denigrated, treated with suspicion, extolled, disparaged as a “lowd lyer,” an
“overreacher,” and described as a vice that leads one away from the virtue of moderation.
“Some writers…argue that hyperbole can become a stylistic vice, and advise the orator to
dispense with its services altogether.”1 The main reason for this contentiousness is
because of the fear of rhetorical theorists, philosophers, and rhetorical theologians that
hyperbole will go too far – disrupting decorum and/or leading one to a life of vice, e.g.,
“sin,” vehemence, intemperance, or licentiousness.
The central assumption buttressing this fear is that the excessive ornamentation of
language, the overuse of rhetorical tropes and figures as a violation of decorum, will
enliven passions and desires and lead one to excessive forms of living, mistakes, and
error. Tropes are all forms of lies that attempt to magnify or expand meaning, but
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hyperbole is more blatant in this function. This is why some call hyperbole the “tropeproducing trope,”2 and it is why theorists link it to decorum. In fact, one’s view of
hyperbole is often contingent upon one’s understanding of decorum. In addition, for
most rhetoricians throughout history, stylistic and moral excess is considered to be a
transgression of virtue, decorum, and moderation, but for those like the sophists or the
Romantics, excess is preferred and celebrated within a certain decorum of excess. As the
tropological representation of excess, the explicit or implicit discussion of hyperbolic
excess and its protean forms is at the center of this controversy.
It is not that the excessive function of hyperbole changes throughout history,
though how it is (re)interpreted for epistemological purposes may change. Rather, it is
the form and attitudes about hyperbole that change at various times in history as well as
how excess can effect ontological conceptions. As the tropological representation of
excess, hyperbole’s epistemological implications and its relation to ontology within this
historical framework are explored but only insofar as they prove my thesis for this
chapter, which is the contentious history of hyperbole. Hyperbole’s definition, form, and
functions are all ambiguous and protean in divergent, conflicting ways, e.g., its
paradoxical nature, its violation/adherence to decorum, its stylistic vices/virtues, and its
contextual contingency. As such, hyperbole’s de-stabilizing rhetorical function as it is
related to stylistic and moral decorum is significantly interrelated with epistemological
and ontological concerns about excess.3 The epistemological function of hyperbole is
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related to its embodied ontological (ethical) form as a way living, and the characterization
of hyperbole reveals important aspects of the ways one’s relationship to hyperbole
interacts with meaning and being; thereby, revealing its debated place in thought and
language.
Many philosophers, rhetoricians, and theologians refer to the dangers and vices of
excessive living as well as stylistic vices and superfluous eloquence without mentioning
hyperbole. Although hyperbole is not always specifically referenced, the attitudes and
expressions about excess, ornament, appearance, desire, and superfluity can be linked to
“embodied hyperboles.” That is, hyperbole is a trope as well as a figure of thought.4 As
the tropological representation of excess expressed as a figure of thought, hyperbole can
be interpreted and portrayed in an embodied form as a type of hyperbolic praxis.5 Quite
simply, embodied hyperboles are those ways of living that re-present excessive behavior
or transgress conventional limits, either in abundance or in paucity. Throughout history,
embodied hyperboles are referred to in various ways, e.g., sin, intemperance, impiety,
vice, adolescence.
It is true that hyperbole is technically a trope, but today, rhetorical theorists
recognize tropes as being generators of meaning and being. In this sense, hyperbole
represents: 1) the tendency of all tropes towards excess, i.e., “the trope-producing
4
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trope,”6 2) the tropological and figural representation of rhetorical excess, and 3) the
bodily expression of excess, i.e., embodied hyperbole. As generators of meaning and
being, tropological language and being are intimately tied together. As such, hyperbolic
excess is either denounced as a stylistic vice that always violates decorum and results in
“sin” or a derivative thereof; or, hyperbolic excess is viewed as an epistemological virtue,
a “beauty,” and “elegant” when it adheres to a decorum of excess. Excess is often
viewed in terms of a moralistic good/bad (and even evil) binary, and this binary tension is
continually (re)negotiated. These views of hyperbole lead to the conclusion that
hyperbole has a controversial history, both in rhetorical theory as well as rhetorical
theology and philosophy.
A history of rhetoric often overlaps with a history of theology since many
theologians are also rhetoricians and vice versa, and I will make theological observations
about hyperbolic excess along the way, though the main focus will remain on hyperbole
and its history. Furthermore, theological discourse fairly consistently privileges
metaphor and analogy explicitly, but implicitly, theology relies heavily upon hyperbole
for its assertions about theological terms and doctrines, e.g., grace, love, Christology,
eschatology, theories of atonement, and the incarnation, as well as within many of its
argumentation strategies.
In the present project, I offer a survey of hyperbole’s significant and controversial
history to provide a more thorough understanding of hyperbole for current discussion.
Except for the four master tropes, particularly metaphor, current rhetorical theorists are
not as inclined to think in serious theoretical terms about figures and tropes, as rhetorical
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theorists were in other times. That is, we currently do not often consider the range of
figures and tropes about which previous theorists explored, and we do not typically
examine the precise, nuanced distinctions they maintained. Thus, this history will
recover some of this discussion regarding hyperbole.
I limit this historical survey to show how hyperbole is defined and to show how
the attitudes about hyperbole change. An analysis of why these attitudes shift based on
political, religious, or socio-economic contexts is not explored in depth because my
purpose is simply to offer a backdrop from which to better understand this trope and its
functions for contemporary rhetorical theory rather than to present the contextual
dynamics from which the attitudes toward hyperbole emerge, though this is another much
needed work to foster a greater understanding of hyperbole.
I also limit this historical overview of hyperbole to the Western rhetorical
tradition while incorporating Western theological and homiletic observations about
hyperbole as examples when appropriate. I will not examine every text or thinker who
mentions hyperbole, exaggeration, or amplification, but I will engage those rhetoricians
and rhetorical theologians who have contributed to the development of hyperbole,
positively or negatively. I will offer a more detailed analysis of hyperbole in GrecoRoman rhetorical theory, including the “Church Fathers,” than at other times because all
other discussions and definitions of hyperbole are premised upon the writings of these
theorists, especially Quintilian. Some contemporary philosophers also offer insights into
hyperbole, but I will save a detailed analysis of those philosophers for later chapters since
they have less to do with the history of hyperbole and more to do with parsing out
hyperbole’s functions.
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I will first examine the views of hyperbole by Greco-Roman rhetorical theorists,
including the Latin “Church Fathers,” and I will then explore the Middle Ages, the
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and contemporary rhetorical theory. I
will proceed, then, along a rhetorical trajectory through a history of hyperbole that will at
times be influenced by and influence theology. Thus, this history is a history of
hyperbole’s prescriptions and proscriptions within rhetorical theory, rhetorical theology,
and the preaching traditions within Western Christian discourse, and what I will find is
that hyperbole’s excessively disruptive force is sometimes scorned, sometimes
celebrated, often misunderstood, and always treated with suspicion.
ANCIENT WESTERN RHETORICAL THEORY
“PAGAN” RHETORIC
The contentious history of hyperbole can be perceived as a significant ontological
threat, and this fear is expressed through the dualities of intemperance/temperance,
excess/moderation, vice/virtue, deceit/truth, and irrationality/rationality. Hence, one
reason for restraining hyperbole in the ancient world is its ontological disruptiveness.
From Plato, to Aristotle, to Demetrius and Cicero, the forces of excess are resisted, even
vilified, in favor of a more stable, moderate order founded upon unarguable “first
principles” and logos.7 David Bentley Hart, an Eastern Orthodox theologian, writes,
“The cosmos and the city, the city and the soul: this is the golden thread of analogy
running through ancient Greek metaphysics; the serene lineaments of rational form are
7
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always engaged in a struggle with the tragic depths they comprise with the turmoil that
surrounds them as fate and as the infinite.”8 The Greek cosmos for many of its
philosophers is viewed as fragile, and its analogous ontological assumptions require a
constant synecdochal striving for equilibrium that only the virtue of moderation can
guarantee.9 Hyperbole, through its excessiveness, disrupts that equilibrium and
moderation through paradox and contradiction and threatens the presumed balance of
order, unity, and beauty. Expressions of hyperbolic excess like grotesqueries,
monstrosities, chimaeras, amalgams, and duplicitous combinations are often resisted as
imperfections of appearance and mysteries of ambiguity. A certain harmony is attempted
through philosophical, theological, and mythological systems of thought, but hyperbolic
assertions are not entirely concerned with harmony. Thus, it is not a simple distrust of
hyperbole as flagrant, deceitful, or distasteful that one encounters but an aversion to its
extreme disruptive metaphysical, specifically ontological (in its analogical
differentiations), implications.
A common theme of Greek rhetors, as well as Roman orators, is to condemn the
excessive eloquence, vices, intemperance, ornate speech, and mere appearance of the
sophists because sophistic excess diverged from the ideal of moderation they sought to
uphold. James J. Murphy asserts that the entire Greco-Roman world often attacked the
sophists of the “Second Sophistic” for their rhetorical excess. 10 The contempt for the
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sophists and their employment of hyperbole is reflected in Thomas E. Ameringer’s
statement that oxymoron and hyperbole “form one of the most objectionable and
unartistic traits of sophistic rhetoric.”11 The connection of hyperbole to sophistic rhetoric
is made more explicit when he writes, “The hyperbole is another trope much in vogue
with the sophists…The sophist orators often employed it to give to topics which were
trivial or commonplace an air of grandeur and importance.”12 Sophistic excess is
explicitly linked to hyperbole. Even before the second sophistic, the sophists were
chastised for their excess, and this condemnation of sophistic excess is twofold. It is a
denunciation of rhetorical excess as a stylistic vice tropologically and figurally
represented as hyperbole as well as embodied excess, i.e., embodied hyperbole, as a
moral vice. Rhetorical excess is synecdochally connected to embodied excess. Hence,
allegations against rhetorical excess in sophistic discourse are also ethical allegations
against the sophists in terms of intemperate living. Hyperbole as the tropological
representation of excess is thereby also condemned. The avoidance of stylistic vices,
therefore, is a significant concern for ancient rhetoricians because it synecdochally
represents the embodiment of excess.
Isocrates, for example, condemns the sophists in Against the Sophists and in his
Encomium of Helen. In Against the Sophists, Isocrates argues that the sophists are
deceivers who live a life of careless indolence instead of devoting themselves to serious
study. He calls them liars, and he asserts, “Oratory is good only if it has the qualities of
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fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment.”13 In contrast to a
good orator, he views the sophists as speaking about absurdities and violating the rules of
decorum through their excessive speech as well as their excessive living. His
condemnation of the sophists occurs as a stylistic rebuke that is also a renunciation of
their lives as expressions of figural excess. One’s oratory is considered a reflection of
one’s life, and because hyperbole is the tropological representation of excess, hyperbolic
speech is rejected for its destabilizing epistemological and ontological effects. Although
Isocrates himself is often characterized as a sophist for his use of an ornate or grand
style,14 he attempts to distance himself from the excessive style of sophistic discourse
and, mutatis mutandi, the lives they lead. What Isocrates rejects is hyperbole the trope
and figure of thought that leads to embodied hyperbole. The rhetorical and ethical
allegations Isocrates brings against the sophists for their excess are also particularly
evident in Plato’s writing where he vehemently critiques the sophist’s excessive style as
well as intemperate living. The same is true of Aristotle.
Although Plato clearly establishes a moderation/excess duality in Gorgias and
Phaedrus, it is Aristotle who is often referenced by other rhetorical theorists when
discussing hyperbole. I will, then, forego an explication of Plato, and move directly to
Aristotle. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he lays out his proposition for the virtues
of moderation over and against the excesses of appetites, pleasures, intemperance
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(akolasia), and desires. He equates intemperance, either in excess or deficiency, with the
irrationality of children’s desires and things that are shameful,15 which explicitly equates
the vice of excess with irrationality, shame, and unreasonableness. Just as for Plato,
excess is an ontological deficiency, a lack, that necessitates a corrective ethical and moral
obligation to moderation. Indeed, Aristotle argues that the intemperate person, i.e., one
who embodies excess, exhibits irresponsibility for others.16
Not only does Aristotle consider excess to be irrational and contrary to reason, he
also suggests that it lacks any ethical dimension. He believes that the intemperate person
is one who disobeys and lacks the “right nature.”17 Anything intemperate or immoderate
is to be rejected and “expelled” because it is contrary to the “right nature,” the “right”
way of being in the world. Many theorists, as will be shown, also characterize hyperbole
as irrational, shameful, unethical, and lacking the right nature for expressing ideas within
language. In this sense, Aristotle is describing embodied hyperbole, and he is arguing
against the ways moral and bodily excesses lead one away from the ethical position of
moderation and virtue. Though only implied here, this connection to hyperbole is overt
in On Rhetoric.
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In On Rhetoric, Aristotle equates hyperbole with metaphor, and he explicitly
dismisses hyperbole as “adolescent” and “vehement.”18 He links hyperbole to
adolescence because “All the mistakes they [adolescents] make are in the direction of
excess and vehemence…for they do ‘everything too much.’”19 For Aristotle, hyperbole
is an (overly) exaggerated metaphor and is equated with the mistakes and passions of
youth suggesting that the young are easily angered, disregard limits, and are given to
excessive expression – a psychological intensity of feeling expressed through language –
which is certainly not in accord with Greek notions of moderation. In his terms, “It is
inappropriate for an older [wiser] man to speak [in hyperbole].”20 What was only implied
in Ethics is now made explicit. Hyperbole is the tropological and figural representation
of excess, and using the irrational and shameful trope in language violates decorum and
reflects one’s deficient character. The “adolescent” embodies hyperbole while the “older
man” embodies a decorum of moderation, which is violated by excess. Hyperbole is
simply too risky because it risks doing “everything too much.” It is intemperate and
uncontrollable, which leads to rhetorical as well as ethical mistakes in the direction of
excess-as-lack. What hyperbole lacks, however, moderation is able to manage and
contain, and these mistakes and excessive vices in one’s life and within discourse are
regulated.21 Thus, Aristotle’s view of hyperbole becomes clearer. It is too excessive, too

18

Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 3.11.15.
19

Ibid., 2.12.14.

20

Ibid., 3.11.15.

21

Michael Harrawood writes, “The thing hyperbole exhibits or exposes, what Aristotle calls
vehemence, is the speaker’s will to dominate the imaginative content of the verbal exchange by imposing
upon the listeners a hyperextended figure as an element of argument enclosed by logos and thus both
obvious and containable within shared discourse.” See Michael Harrawood, “Overreachers: Hyperbole,

45
irrational, and ethically inept, and using hyperbole reflects a lack of appropriate,
moderate character because it is used primarily by those who cannot control their
passions and desires, which paradoxically suggests that excess reveals a lack rather than
abundance.
Pseudo-Longinus, henceforth referred to as Longinus, offers a more amenable
description of hyperbole than Aristotle, and he discusses it primarily as a trope of
language used in the elevated style thereby emphasizing its rhetorical function rather than
its embodied form. Largely abandoning logos and ethos, Longinus’s elevated style
appeals exclusively to pathos to move his audience, to “transport them.” To achieve this
goal, Longinus employs the use of hyperbole, but Longinus’s main concern is that
hyperbole might blend with the “true Sublime.”22 He writes of hyperbole, “The
hyperbole is sometimes ruined by overshooting the mark. Overdo the strain and the thing
sags, and often produces the opposite effect to that intended.”23 Distinct from the
sublime, Longinus contends that hyperbole may be ruined by its precise function to
enlarge and exaggerate, which is the primary fear of all rhetorical theorists regarding
hyperbole. For Longinus, as for others, this fear is a stylistic concern because the risk of
hyperbole is that it might be amplified beyond the elevated, or sublime, style thereby
disrupting the decorum of this style. Hyperbole is necessary and appropriate when
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discussing sublime topics because it is a breaker of boundaries, but it must be inhibited so
as not to violate the decorum of the elevated style or blend into the Sublime.
To further aid in regulating the excess of hyperbole, Longinus argues, “The best
hyperbole is the one which conceals the very fact of its being a hyperbole. And this
happens when it is uttered under stress of emotion to suit the circumstances of a great
crisis.”24 Hyperbolic excess must be concealed as well as limited to certain situations,
e.g., those of psychological duress, in order for it to be effective and justified. Overall,
then, hyperbole is appropriate when discussing sublime topics as well as during moments
of extreme duress. Hyperbole must adhere to a certain decorum because the incident (or
the content of one’s argument) does not exist for the sake of hyperbole, but “the
hyperbole for the sake of the incident”25 – “The intensity of feeling justifies the excess in
language.”26 The use of hyperbolic excess, the force of its phenomenological and
psychological power, must be appropriate to the situation or the content being discussed.
As almost all rhetorical theorists will reiterate, using hyperbole effectively is contingent
upon its adherence to a certain decorum of excess. Longinus is clearly favorably inclined
towards hyperbole as long as decorum is maintained so it will not be too disruptive or be
confused with the sublime. Hyperbole must not “overdo” its intended purpose. Thus,
Longinus utilizes hyperbole as a breaker of boundaries to “throw beyond” the limits of
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language and knowledge, but he also struggles with establishing a type of decorum in
which hyperbole does not go too far.27
Demetrius offers a less favorable definition of hyperbole, which is also discussed
primarily in stylistic terms.28 For Demetrius, all forms of hyperbole are characteristically
impossibilities and are “frigid,” i.e., “that which exceeds its appropriate form of
expression.”29 Although impossibility is the specific function of an adynaton, which is
one form of hyperbole, he conflates the two terms rather than parsing out the distinctions.
In so doing, he dismisses the “frigidity” of hyperbole as a stylistic vice, and he relegates
it to being used only in comic poetry and to evoke laughter. This is not an uncommon
tactic used to discredit and demean hyperbole, but it is also not a wholly negative
association. Because Demetrius rejects the use of hyperbole, he makes a distinction
between force (hyperbole) and grandeur (the eloquence of the grand style).30 Here, a
simplistic binary of excess is established. Hyperboles, as brute force, are considered
distasteful and result only in laughter and jest because they signify nothing of importance
and produce a “frigid” style, but grandeur is considered eloquent. Hyperbole is
denigrated through impossibility, and its “frigid” style is separated from the eloquence of
the grander style. Whereas Longinus appropriates hyperbole’s excessive and disruptive
27
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functions for certain contexts and subjects, Demetrius seemingly rejects it outright,
though this picture of Demetrius’s interpretation is somewhat complicated in the next
chapter.
The contentious and controversial history of hyperbole is already evident, and this
trend continues within Roman rhetorical theory where hyperbole is viewed more
favorably. Cicero, however, takes a rather ambiguous stance on hyperbole. On the one
hand, Cicero offers his ontological position on the subject of excess. In Cicero’s early
work, De Inventione, the ontological concerns regarding moderation persist,31 and his
stance against excess is abundantly apparent. He repeatedly extols the four major virtues
– wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance – that are to be nurtured while their opposites
should be avoided. There is no mention of hyperbole specifically, but like Aristotle, the
vices of excess can be viewed as embodied hyperboles that are to be avoided for their
disruption of moderation. In like manner, in De Oratore the virtue of moderation as civic
virtue is consistently privileged over excess and vice, and how knowledge is ethically
communicated in practical and civic matters becomes more important. The form of
embodied hyperbole as intemperate, unethical, excessive living stands in direct
opposition to the moderate virtues of Cicero’s ideal orator.
On the other hand, Cicero offers his epistemological position on the subject of
excess. In De Oratore, he defines hyperbole as “exaggeration and overstatement of the
truth for the sake of amplification or diminution.”32 This is a telling statement because
31
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hyperbole is shown to operate so the truth might be amplified, elaborated, or expanded
upon in either vertical direction. Far from a negative view of hyperbole, Cicero appears
to regard this trope as fostering epistemological inquiry, a playfulness with meaning, and
the pursuit of knowledge by exaggerating or overstating the truth for a particular effect –
the effect of elaborating and expounding upon the truth and meaning. Thus, Cicero’s
view of excess is ambiguous. Embodied hyperbole is denigrated while hyperbole the
trope is productive for engaging epistemological concerns. This latter view of hyperbole
is more explicitly outlined in Ad Herennium.
In Ad Herennium (thought to be authored by Cicero for centuries), the
epistemological connection to hyperbole is evident. The author, like Cicero, defines
hyperbole as “a manner of speech exaggerating the truth, whether for the sake of
magnifying or minifying something.”33 Later, the author writes, “Emphasis [significatio]
is the figure which leaves more to be suspected than has been actually asserted…The
emphasis is produced through Hyperbole [per exsuperationem] when more is said than
the truth warrants [patitur veritas], so as to give greater force to the suspicion.”34 Neither
observation condemns excess or intemperance. In the latter one, hyperbole’s
epistemological playfulness with and (re)constitution of meaning is highlighted.
Hyperbole is portrayed here as emphasizing a truth that is already known35 thereby giving
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greater force to the suspicion that something more may still be revealed than what is
explicitly stated. Hyperbole does not conceal in deceit but reveals through truth, and
exaggerating the truth to reveal more than the truth warrants suggests that a plasticity of
meaning is present in this discussion of hyperbole.36 Hyperbole does not simply
emphasize a truth that is already known in order to confirm one’s already held beliefs, it
surpasses the truth and states more than the truth warrants to highlight the complexity of
meaning. Hyperbole reveals the malleability of truth, and this playfulness with meaning
is precisely what Seneca observes in his discussion of hyperbole.
In On Benefits, Seneca offers a similar epistemological position regarding
hyperbole when he posits, “The purpose of all exaggeration is to arrive at the truth by
falsehood,” and he suggests that through exaggeration one asserts “what could not
possibly be in order that they might be thought to be as much so as possible.”37 In this
commonly (re)interpreted passage by rhetorical theorists, Seneca states that the
paradoxical function of hyperbole is to arrive at truth through a lie – to suggest
impossibility as possibility and possibility as impossibility. The paradox of all language
is that it lies while attempting to signify or accurately represent the truth, and hyperbole
exploits this paradox productively. Hyperbole must point towards the impossible, the lie,
in order to arrive tentatively at the possible, an assertion of truth: “Exaggeration never
hopes all its daring flights to be believed, but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it
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may convey what is credible.”38 The lie of hyperbole is not a falsehood intended to
deceive but a concerted effort to destabilize perceptions of meaning in order to reveal
alternative conceptions of truth and knowledge. Hyperbole is not simply a lie, but an
excessive figural distortion on the side of truth. It is an exaggerated mis-recognition that
leads to recognition and a theoretical method of epistemological inquiry that highlights
the fragility of meaning through excess. In this theory of excess, affirming the incredible
through exaggeration in the pursuit of knowledge is necessary because the known is not
capable of expressing the as yet unknown, the as yet unrealized within knowledge itself.
Thus, contrary to Aristotle and Demetrius, Seneca implies that a deficiency in our
perceptions of reality and knowledge requires the disruption of excess, and hyperbole is
the vehicle of this disruption. Quintilian explores these same views about hyperbole in
Institutes of Oratory.
Only implied in Cicero, the author of Ad Herennium, and even Seneca, Quintilian
offers several interesting explicit descriptions of hyperbole that carry stylistic and
epistemological implications, and his more developed descriptions offer the most
complex theory of hyperbole thus far. Indeed, Quintilian’s theory is the most influential
theory of hyperbole in the history of rhetorical theory, and I will explicate his theory in
more detail in the next chapter. On a stylistic level, he views hyperbole as a “bolder sort
of ornamen [sic],” and he says, “It is an elegant surpassing of the truth and is used
equally for exaggerating and extenuating.”39 Rather than a vice or a lack, hyperbole is
considered elegant, but this elegance can go awry if, at least the appearance of,
38
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moderation, i.e., decorum, is not maintained. For example, he states, “But even in the use
of hyperbole, some moderation must be observed, for though every hyperbole is beyond
belief, it ought not to be extravagant, since in no other way do writers more readily fall
into…’exorbitant affection.’”40 Here again, decorum is used to regulate hyperbole’s
excesses that can move “beyond belief.” For Quintilian, elegant hyperboles are decorous
while extravagant hyperboles push the boundaries too far, and when they move beyond
moderation into “exorbitant affectation,” he considers them “absurdities.”41 Again, a
binary of excess is posited, but Quintilian’s binary is more complex than Demetrius’s.
On the one hand, Quintilian argues that hyperbole is an elegant ornament and
excess is viewed as a good, but on the other hand, he also suggests that it should not
become an extravagant ornamentation, which can be viewed as sophistic artifice. This is
a stylistic distinction that hinges on decorum. Hyperbole is “a beauty” when the subject
it is describing is appropriate and “extraordinary in nature.” There is a certain
justification for hyperbole wherein hyperbole is effective when the form matches the
subject matter discussed. When decorum is maintained, literal departure from the truth is
“pardoned” because the figural falsehood is not affirmed but recognized.42 Thus, an
inhibitory caution is placed upon hyperbole because of its excessive disruptiveness, but
its epistemological function remains a significant force in his theory.
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On an epistemological level, Quintilian defines hyperbole stating, “It is sufficient
to remark that the hyperbole lies, but not so as to intend to deceive by lying, and we
therefore ought to consider more carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which
is not believed.”43 Like Seneca’s definition, hyperbole is paradoxically not a lie intended
to deceive but to reveal.44 “A lie, expressed in linguistic terms, becomes truth on a
hermeneutical level. Hyperbole thus acts a generator of meaning.”45 Quintilian’s theory
of language suggests that hyperbole is a redeeming figure that leads to an abundance of
meaning rather than a lack. Peter William Shoemaker posits, “Implicit in this theory is
an assumption that ordinary language is flat and banal, and therefore inadequate to
describe the abnormal, the unusual, and the marvelous.”46 Hyperbole breaks the bounds
of language and attempts to describe the unbelievable and incomprehensible. It
tropologically articulates what cannot be articulated through “ordinary language.”
Quintilian’s definition of hyperbole gives it an epistemological playfulness that allows
for a (re)constitution of meaning and being through a transcendence of language. By
exaggerating meaning, one comes to the truth, but Quintilian also suggests something
more than Cicero and Seneca. He contends that excess and exaggeration are inherent and
productive forces within “human nature,” language, and one’s conception of these given
realities.
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Quintilian asserts that the excessiveness of reality itself requires the use of
hyperboles on a regular basis and that humans have a “natural propensity” to
exaggerate.47 He notes that when one speaks of something that transcends the normal
limits of nature, it is better to go too far than not far enough since “no one is contented
with the exact truth.”48 Language, in fact, is more effective when it goes beyond its
limits and the “exact truth” because the orator can then offer “a rich terrain for stylistic
invention and play.”49 Thus, the utilization of hyperbole is more than tropological or
stylistic. It is a figure of thought. It is an epistemological theory of excess that
acknowledges the propensity for excess and deceit in language as well as being, and it
harnesses this excess to explore truth claims that may lie outside the bounds of ordinary
language, “exact truth,” and accepted knowledge. Overall, the daring heights and risks of
“elegant hyperbole,” i.e., good hyperbole, lead to an abundance of meaning rather than a
lack of moral character, and the lie of hyperbole leads paradoxically to an assertion of
truth. In this sense, hyperbole is a redemptive figure of virtue, stylistically and
epistemologically, rather than a vice. However, the “extravagant hyperbole,” i.e., bad
hyperbole, leads to a violation of moderate living as well as decorous speaking.
Quintilian advises caution, but he also offers a justification for hyperbole that might
operate within a decorum of excess where ordinary language is not enough to express the
extraordinary nature of a particular situation or subject matter and epistemological
inquiry is furthered by exceeding the truth it seeks to discover.
47
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From these descriptions and characterizations of hyperbole by various theorists,
we see that hyperbole is a contentious term from the beginning. It is described as an
impossibility evoking a “frigid” style, adolescent, a vehicle for the sublime, and a lie on
the side of truth. It is mistrusted and rejected by some for its lack of value, violation of
decorum, shamefulness, and proclivity towards excessive desires. It is explored by others
as a useful trope, a productive mode of inquiry, and an elegant ornament that enhances
one’s style.50 These observations indicate that hyperbole can be viewed on three different
levels: 1) an excessive trope of language, 2) the tropological representation of rhetorical
and embodied excess, and 3) a “trope-producing trope”51 that pushes all tropes and
figures toward excess and a possible violation of decorum. As such, hyperbole is often
associated with sophistic discourse for its excess and artifice,52 and even when hyperbole
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is celebrated, moderation is still privileged over excess. 53 A typical way to inhibit this
excess is by suggesting it must always adhere to decorum in order to be effective. This
inhibition by decorum is not necessarily a negative position to take because it responds to
those who attack hyperbole as a stylistic vice, which I will discuss below as well as in the
following chapters.
Christian rhetoricians are heavily influenced by these contentious conceptions of
hyperbole as well as its association with sophistic discourse, and this is evident in the
writings of the “Church Fathers” like Tertullian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Augustine.
These rhetorical theologians rarely, if at all, reference hyperbole specifically as a trope,
but their overall attitudes about excessive vices, excessive eloquence, excessive living,
ornament, and appearance suggest an adamant resistance to all things hyperbolic. Their
treatises explicitly denounce excess as “sin,” i.e., embodied hyperbole, and ornate speech,
but the rhetorical arguments they construct, as well as their advice about the uses and
misuses of rhetoric, suggest a more ambiguous relationship with excess.
HYPERBOLE AND CHRISTIAN RHETORIC: TERTULLIAN TO AUGUSTINE
When Christianity began to spread throughout the Roman Empire, many
rhetoricians converted to Christianity but did not leave their rhetorical training behind.
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Some Christian converts did reject their rhetorical training altogether, but other Christian
rhetoricians began blending Christianity with rhetoric even as they attempted to distance
themselves from their rhetorical training. George A. Kennedy writes, “It is a remarkable
fact that of the eight greatest Latin Fathers of the Church, five (Tertullian, Cyprian,
Arnobius, Lactantius, and Augustine) were professional teachers of rhetoric before they
became Christians, while the other three (Ambrose, Hilary, and Jerome) had been
thoroughly trained in the rhetorical schools.”54 He further argues, “What dialectic is to
rhetoric in Aristotelian rhetoric, hermeneutics is to homiletics in Christian rhetoric.”55
What Kennedy is highlighting in these statements is the conversion of rhetoric to
Christianity. Rhetorical issues became transposed theological and homiletic issues. The
task, then, is to baptize rhetoric into Christianity.
It is important to note that Christian rhetoricians at this time (loosely conceived
here as the second through fourth centuries) are largely influenced by Cicero’s writings.
Christian rhetoricians lauded the ideal of “Ciceronian moderation” over and against the
excessive ornamentations, pleasures, values, and vices of the sophists as well as pagan
culture. Murphy states that Ambrose of Milan “recognizes the need for training of
preachers and condemns not rhetoric itself but its sophistic abuses,”56 and he continues,
“Although attacks upon rhetoric had an ancient tradition, the Christian writer often saw in
the rhetoric of his time that taint of a worldly, pagan culture which could lead men away
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from God.”57 Christians viewed the excesses of pagan culture and their values to be antiChristian, and the rhetorical expression of this attitude resonated through the excessive,
artificial eloquence of the sophists. In contrast, many Christian rhetoricians equated
Ciceronian rhetoric with the moderate teachings and values of Christianity through his
blending of eloquence with wisdom, i.e., form with substance. The baptism of rhetoric
into Christianity was thus largely a conversion of Ciceronian rhetoric to Christianity.
It is not surprising that rhetorical theologians would reject excess. The influence
of Ciceronian moderation coupled with the Christian conception of “sin” made a rejection
of excess and hyperbole a foregone conclusion because hamartia (“sin”) in the New
Testament literally means “a missing of the mark,” as an arrow might miss its mark.
Theologically, sin is viewed as an excessive moral divergence from the truth. In like
manner, hyperbole literally means “overshooting the mark” or “throwing beyond” it.
Thus, a rhetorical device such as hyperbole that intentionally seeks to miss the mark and
diverge from given truths is easily equated with the sins and vices of pagan culture.
Although hyperbole is rarely explicitly mentioned, the attitudes of the “Church
Fathers” toward excess are unequivocally negative. As the tropological and figural
representation of excess as well as an excessive “trope-producing trope,”58 hyperbole is
thereby also rejected. Additionally, excessive language is intimately tied to excessive
living, and as Alexandre Leupin writes, “The troping of values creates an anti-Christian
excess,”59 i.e., sin. The stylistic and embodied excess of the sophists as well as pagan
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culture becomes a theological issue through sin, and the soteriological troping of pagan
values is viewed as anti-Christian because of its penchant for excess. Hence, it is a small
step to move from viewing sin as excess to viewing sin in one’s life as the very
embodiment of hyperbole. It is the excessive aspect of hyperbole that does too much,
says too much, embellishes too much, and exaggerates the use of eloquence that these
rhetoricians denounced because the “too much” led to vice and away from the “right
amount” of Christian truth and virtue.
Paradoxically, some rhetorical theologians like Tertullian denounce as well as
embrace excess, and they argue for a type of divine excess as distinct from sophistic
excess. What occurs in rhetorical theology at this time is a theological (re)interpretation
of the hyperbolic excess binary. Soteriologically, if sin and/as pagan excess is the
embodiment of hyperbole, then only the lie of hyperbole is emphasized without its
redeeming quality of lying on the side of truth. Hyperbole as sin, i.e., pagan excess, is
viewed negatively as “evil” while hyperbole as divine excess, i.e., redemptive excess, is
viewed positively as “good.”60 The redemptive hyperbolic circuit of a lie on the side of
truth must be completed so it does not result in sin. Christologically, Christ is often
viewed as the excessive expression of God’s divine grace. This divine logos of excess is
the very embodiment or incarnation of God that is the expenditure without reserve of
God’s love for creation. Christ is the figural representation of ideal excess that is always
pointing beyond himself to the ideal of God, and thus, a hyperbolic figure.61 Hence,
60
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Christ is the figural representation/embodiment of God’s love as “good,” i.e., an elegant
hyperbolic figure of thought, while sin is the figurative expression/embodiment of “evil,”
i.e., extravagant hyperbole. Rhetorical theologians of this time struggle with this
rhetorico-theological binary of excess, and this paradox highlights again the contentious
historical development of hyperbole, especially when converting rhetoric to Christianity.
For example, the founder of Latin Christianity, Tertullian, is one of the first
rhetorical theologians to attempt this conversion. What is interesting for my project is his
implied attitude towards hyperbole, which culminates in a theological condemnation of
the sins of pagan culture through a rejection of the empty eloquence and the excessive
artifice of sophistic discourse. However, his use of the ornate, “Asiatic” style as well as
his argument for “Christian ornament” – a Christian decorum of excess – often relies
upon the very excess he condemns. These excesses also aid in establishing a Christian
rhetoric through the conversion of tropes and figures for Christian purposes, which is
often paradoxical and ambiguous.
SECOND CENTURY: TERTULLIAN
Septimius Tertullianus, the founder of Latin Christianity, is a rather obscure
figure who writes during the time of the “second sophistic,” and his influence is quite far
reaching.62 Although Tertullian was not the first Christian to write in Latin, he was one
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of the first Christian theologians to write extensively in Latin,63 and his Latin terms
played a considerable role in changing the writings of Western theological scholarship
dramatically.64 In addition, Robert Dick Sider suggests that Tertullian's extensive
theological works largely address the rhetorical debates of his time.65 It is, in fact, only
recently that scholars laud Tertullian as one of the greatest Christian rhetoricians of his
time.
Like the other “Latin Fathers,” Tertullian’s view towards moral excess resided
closely to his view of rhetorical eloquence and style – the synecdochal connection
between excessive speaking and excessive living, between hyperbole as trope and as
figure of thought. Sider argues that Tertullian's style was similar to that of Asiatic
rhetoric,66 an excessive style of rhetoric, and Leupin posits that tradition actually
attributes the Asiatic, or “African,” style to Tertullian.67 Rhetorical style was a major
concern for Tertullian, as it was for Cicero and Quintilian,68 and Tertullian struggled with
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the proper place and delineation of style.69 Tertullian emphasized the need for rhetorical
style, but only in moderation. Like others before him, his concern with eloquence and
style was tied to the excesses of the sophists, and it is his critiques of the style of the
second sophistic that offer insight into his view of hyperbolic excess, artifice, and
appearance.
Perhaps his most extended critique of sophistic excess is found in On the Apparel
of Women. While this treatise is typically interpreted theologically to argue for Christian
moderation in adorning oneself (men are also included in this argument), it can also be
interpreted rhetorically as a response to the declamations of the sophists. Leupin argues,
“Rhetoric’s conversion to Christianity is nowhere more clear than in On the Apparel of
Women,” and he posits, “On the Apparel of Women becomes a point-by-point countertext to the pagan vision of ornament.”70 And he continues, “On the Apparel of Women is
more than a simple denunciation of the feminine body and its adornment. It also attacks
the pagan art of appearances along with the entire civilization conceived of as perverted
by the false, by artifice, and by the obfuscation of nature.”71 For Tertullian, sophistic
ornament, excess, and pagan culture are false, perverse, and empty in contradistinction to
what he calls “Christian ornament,” which can be viewed as “true eloquence” maintained
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within a Christian decorum, and he uses the apparel of women to make his argument and
his critique of pagan culture as well as sophistic rhetoric. Thus, his theological position
on ornamental apparel and Christian modesty is also a rhetorical position regarding
sophistic excess and the troping of pagan values, which becomes translated and viewed as
“anti-Christian excess,”72 i.e., hyperbole as a figure of thought.
Tertullian contends that perverse pagan values as well as sophistic ornament and
artifice are to be avoided. Against the sophists, he argues that self-aggrandizement and
eliciting applause from the audience through ornate language and stylistic devices are not
enough. A Christian ornamentation for effect must arise from being itself – an
individual’s “modest” Christian life. Tertullian argues that Christian excess and
ornamentation must differ significantly from pagan excess and sophistic eloquence.
Appearance must appropriately reflect interiority, not simply project one’s desired
perception of the self.73 In a turn Augustine will also make, the use of rhetorical devices
must re-present one’s inner, moral self and God’s truth. Christian ornament, for
Tertullian, concerns excess as figure of thought more than a tropological re-presentation
of excess, and this Christian ornamnetation is grounded ontologically in Christian
modesty and morality, which results in rhetorical abundance. “To Christian modesty it is

72
73

Ibid., 185.

For example, “To Christian modesty it is not enough to be so, but to seem so too. For so great
ought its plenitude to be, that it may flow out from the mind to the garb, and burst out from the conscience
to the outward appearance; so that even from the outside it may gaze, as it were, upon its own furniture, (a
furniture) such as to be suited to retain faith as its inmate perpetually. For such delicacies as tend by their
softness and effeminacy to unman the manliness of faith are to be discarded…Clothe yourselves with the
silk of uprightness, the fine linen of holiness, the purple of modesty. Thus painted, you will have God as
your Lover!” See Tertullian, On the Apparel of Women, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4, ed. Philip Schaff,
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf04.iii.iii.ii.xiii.html> (26 October
2009).

64
not enough to be so, but to seem so too.”74 Interiority “flows out” and “bursts out” into
exteriority.75 Similar to Isocrates and Aristotle, Christian ornament is a reflection of
one’s inner life expressed appropriately through language, which establishes a Christian
decorum where excess is entirely appropriate – a Christian decorum of excess moderates
and inhibits sophistic excess. Thus, sophistic ornament as excessive rhetorical artifice as
well as pagan excesses are rejected, but Christian ornament (“true eloquence”) as the
appropriate rhetorical expression of embodied divine excess and God’s truth nurtured in
one’s modest inner life is encouraged.76
Paradoxically, Christian ornament as rhetorical excess, as trope and figure of
thought, is derived from Christian moderation. Theologically, moderation regulates
excessive living and the sins of pagan culture, i.e., embodied hyperbole. Rhetorically, on
the other hand, moderation results in a decorous, Christian, ornamented style as well as
an expression of one’s inner life that is presented and used for communicating the truth of
Christianity. Embodied sophistic excess is avoided, but an ornate style, with its tropes
and figures, is good when it is distinct from sophistic style and adheres to a Christian
decorum of excess. Thus, Tertullian, in like manner to Quintilian, offers a binary of
excess and thereby a binary of hyperbole as the tropological and figural representation of
excess. On the one hand, he argues against the vices/sins of pagan culture and excessive
ornamentation as empty eloquence and a stylistic vice – hyperbole as the “trope74
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producing trope” – as well as embodied hyperbole as sin that leads one astray from the
Christian life. On the other hand, he highlights the necessity of tropological excess and
ornamentation in order to communicate the truth of Christianity, and he does this by reinterpreting excess for a Christian context and developing a Christian decorum of excess.
Tertullian’s re-interpretation suggests that rhetorical excess is appropriate when it
reflects an inner, modest life devoted to God, which establishes a Christian decorum of
excess, and this implies a positive view of hyperbole in Tertullian’s writing. If pagan
culture and sophistic ornamentation are excessive and deceitful both tropologically and as
figure of thought, i.e., extravagant hyperboles that lie, then Christian ornaments are
falsehoods on the side of truth, i.e., elegant hyperboles, which appropriately reflect inner
devotion to God as divine excess and then exaggerate the truth in an attempt to reach the
impossibility of this divine truth. Thus, his rhetorical concerns regarding style and the
appropriate expression of excess are also theological concerns regarding one’s inner
devotion to God and Christian modesty. These theological concerns can be interpreted
and resolved rhetorically through hyperbole as trope and figure of thought as well as
through a Christian decorum of excess; a complex and paradoxical position indeed.
THIRD AND FOURTH CENTURY CHRISTIAN RHETORIC
After Tertullian, the tone of a Christian rhetoric and its response to the decadence
of pagan culture as well as the excess of sophistic discourse becomes fairly well
established, but Christians remain skeptical and even fearful of rhetoric overall,
especially eloquence (the “seductress”). The power of rhetoric and its tropological and
figural devices are very real threats to early Christians because of the persuasive power
through eloquence these devices provide an orator to move as well deceive the
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audience.77 Christian rhetoricians want to harness the power of eloquence to move their
audiences to conversion, but they are afraid the excess and deceit of eloquence will taint
their message of Christian truth. They know that eloquence can lead one to deceit and sin
just as easily as it can move one to truth because eloquence contains no moral certitude.
As a result, some Christian rhetoricians at this time will completely reject eloquence, and
others will tentatively court it for Christian purposes.
As a way to accept parts of rhetoric, e.g., eloquence, and reject others, all that is
feared about rhetorical excess is equated with the artificial deceit of sophistic eloquence
as well as pagan values, which is perceived to stand in direct opposition to the substantive
truth of Christianity. Noted previously, almost any critique of the sophists is also a
critique of hyperbole, and vice versa, since tropological and discursive excess is
inherently structured by hyperbole as the “trope-producing trope” as well as the
representative tropological representation of excess itself. Ergo, the condemnation of
sophistic eloquence is the implicit condemnation of hyperbole, but it is also a necessary
reclamation of eloquence, “true eloquence,” for Christian purposes, which will not reach
fruition until Augustine. Thus, the development of a Christian eloquence begins with a
rejection of the excessive trickery and deceit of sophistic eloquence, i.e., a rejection of the
hyperbolic function of/within sophistic discourse.
Tertullian begins this conversion of pagan eloquence to Christian eloquence by
displacing the excessive form of sophistic eloquence and replacing it with an excessive
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form of Christian eloquence through appropriate ornamentation – a binary of hyperbolic
excess. However, Christian writers beginning in the third century either reject all
eloquence for simplicity, or significantly restrain its uses. In both instances, it is
simplicity and not excess, even “Christian excess,” that is considered to be appropriate
for Christian discourse and preaching. A simple style and an undiluted form of language
with few or no embellishments are preferred over an excessive style because the
substance of Christian truth alone is believed to be sufficient to persuade, i.e., convert,
one’s audience. As shown below, there is a hyper-vigilance against the stylistic excesses
of eloquence as well as excessive living for its obfuscation and/or dilution of the truth.
Stylistic embellishments are equated with sinful excess, and the rhetorical issue of
eloquence is again shown to be a soteriological issue for rhetorical theologians.
Christian rhetoricians know the power of eloquence to persuade, desire to harness
that power but also fear it, often reject it as deceitful and sinful, and summarily view
sophistic eloquence – as the unnecessary, deceitful, and excessive over-embellishment of
language, i.e., sinful – to be an obfuscation of truth. Christian rhetoricians, then, must
negotiate the tension between rhetorical, Ciceronian eloquence (“true eloquence”)
utilized to communicate Christian truth for the purpose of conversion and sophistic
artifice that only deceives. This negotiation occurs through decorum – substance and
form, truth and its appropriate expression. Through decorum, rhetorical theologians
moderate the excessive, i.e., hyperbolic, tendency of all tropes and figures in order to
regulate sophistic excess as well as the hyperbole of embodied excess they view as sin.
In opposition to sophistic and/or pagan excess that is deceitful and sinful stands the
substantive, moderate nature of Christian truth.
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Third century “Church Fathers” reject sophistic style in favor of a simple style
that highlights Christian “continence” and “virtue.” Cyprian’s treatise, for example, “On
the Dress of Virgins,” is an argument against ornamental excess as well as pagan culture
that connects one’s use of language to one’s moral life. Similar to Tertullian, though
harsher in his treatment of eloquence, Cyprian engages in a rhetorical critique of sophistic
ornament through theological arguments for Christian modesty and purity as opposed to
the flagrance of pagan culture. He argues for a Christian discipline that includes fleshly
purity and a “seemliness of dress and ornament”78 – a rejection of embodied as well as
rhetorical excess. More explicitly, Cyprian writes in Ad Donatum, “A full eloquence may
be the pride of vocal ambition, but in speaking of the Lord God, a pure simplicity of
expression…which is convincing depends upon the substance of the argument rather than
upon the forcefulness of eloquences.”79 The “forcefulness of eloquences” as the troping
of pagan values represented through sophistic excess and hyperbole, as the representative
trope of this excess, is replaced with a simple style that is “convincing.” A simple
decorum that privileges substance, i.e., scripture, over form is preferred out of a fear that
all rhetorical embellishment may deceive and lead to a “pride of vocal ambition.” For
Cyprian, excessive eloquence and excessive living are replaced by a simple “convincing”
style and Christian discipline. This rejection of excess on two levels implies again the
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connection of language to being, and excess must be rejected for its disruptiveness and its
deceit.
In the fourth century, the same basic attitude towards the excesses of eloquence is
maintained, and the need for establishing a more Christian society by abolishing
paganism of all types is more pressing. To accomplish this goal, an intellectual
foundation for Christianity is a necessity.80 Integral for developing this intellectual
system is rhetoric, but it must be a Christian rhetoric that is distinct from the sophists.
Hence, in the fourth century, with a turn towards the education of Christians that was
only beginning in Tertullian’s time, epistemological inquiry and its appropriate
expression are brought to the forefront of the discussion about rhetorical eloquence.
Certainly, ontological concerns about Christian piety are still important, but
hermeneutical issues about the interpretation of scripture within third and fourth century
Christian treatises begin to focus more on movere in preaching and the use of “sacred
eloquence” to elicit conversion-as-persuasion. Inherent in this rhetorical concern is the
continued tension between rejecting artificial sophistic eloquence and utilizing “true
eloquence” and a Christian decorum of speaking and living to encourage virtuous living.
The debate about eloquence is a complex rhetorical and theological issue that
hinges on a perception of hyperbolic excess. Lactantius, for example, is considered the
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“Christian Cicero” for his eloquence, but he vehemently rejects the use of eloquence in
his writings. In Divine Institutes, “Of Religion, Wisdom, and the Chief Good” and “Of
Restraining the Pleasures of the Senses,” Lactantius suggests that virtue is a “beauty”
while pleasure, a well known vice of excess as sin, is “not even a good,” is dangerous,
and is not honorable.81 Pleasure, as a hyperbolic figure of thought leading to embodied
hyperbole, is to be despised for bringing the very feeling of excess, of “satiety,” and
when the excessiveness of pleasure is itself in excess, it is “injurious” and a “deformity”
– “Nothing is so hateful to God as an unchaste mind and an impure soul.”82 He then
equates pleasure with eloquence, which reinterprets pleasure tropologically and figurally
thereby linking embodied excess itself to eloquence, and rejects excess/eloquence as
dishonorable, injurious, and a deformity. He suggests those who are eloquent do not seek
truth but pleasure and the appearance of truth, “which soothe[s] the ears” and captivates
“by the sweetness of discourse.”83 Thus, the issue of excess as pleasure/eloquence is a
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rhetorical as well as theological concern, and rejecting excess on both levels of thought
can be viewed as a stylistic resistance to figural depravity reflecting a concern regarding
embodied hyperbole as sin in one’s Christian life. The danger Lactantius highlights is
that rhetorical excess, i.e., “an unchaste mind,” might lead one to be “carried away by
hearing” and “led aside to impious worship,”84 i.e., “an impure soul.” As the tropological
representation of excess, hyperbole at the rhetorical or embodied level is rejected as
sinful, and to escape the sin of excess, Lactantius denigrates eloquent artifice and pagan
pleasure for substantive truth and virtue.
Unlike Tertullian’s view of divine excess leading to the rhetorical abundance of
“Christian ornament,” Lactantius follows the more common view that all excess leads to
a moral lack and vice, and he rejects eloquence-as-excess as sinful depravity outright.
Gregory of Nazianzus, however, takes a different stance regarding eloquence, though not
excess. He writes several encomia that show the structure and topics of the sophists, and
Kennedy asserts that his encomium of Basil is “probably the masterpiece of sophistic
Christian oratory.”85 Within the encomium, however, he (excessively) praises Basil for
his restraint when utilizing eloquence, and he asserts the importance of eloquence when
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communicating ideas.86 In a letter to Younger Nicobulus, Gregory again extols the
importance of eloquence, a certain “grace,” that is to be restrained by moderation.87 In
the letter, Gregory is solely concerned with the ways Christian truth is communicated.
He suggests that writings and orations should not be unadorned, but language must be
“sweetened” through figures of speech that are “few and modest” and not “abused,”
which “shews [sic] insatiability” and association with the sophists.88 Gregory does not
reject eloquence or its rhetorical devices, but he suggests that it must be used moderately
and appropriately. Thus, decorum is shown again to be the vehicle for regulating
rhetorical excess, and a Christian eloquence that relies only on a simple style further
emerges.
Unlike the pagan rhetoricians who utilized various styles, only a simple style can
enhance the substance of Christian truth because rhetorical excess reveals “insatiability”
in one’s life. The fear, as with those before Gregory, is that figures and tropes in/of
excess, the deceits of eloquence, may disrupt the moderation and balance one should
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hope to achieve through one’s way of being in the world. This concern with eloquence is
also observed in John Chrysostom’s writing (“John the Golden-Tongued”).
Like Gregory, Chrysostom understands the need for eloquence within Christian
rhetoric. In On the Statutes, Chrysostom posits that an eloquence of style is helpful for
avoiding tedium and creating variety, and he asserts, “The sermons must be varied and
embellished; it must contain comparison, proofs, paraphrases, and the like, so that we
may select what will profit our soul.”89 In this revealing passage, the importance of
eloquence and figural embellishment is evident, and he states that “sermons must be
varied and embellished” in order to “profit our soul.”90 There is a certain desperation in
this passage that shows how important Chrysostom believes eloquence is for
communicating the Christian message. The form and force of one’s epistemological
assertions must move one to a profitable way of being in the world, i.e., the Christian life,
a particular ontological position. Thus, eloquence is not viewed as an excessive stylistic
device but as a necessity, which is also revealed in Ambrose of Milan’s distinction
between secular eloquence (sapientia saeculi) and sacred eloquence (sapientia
spiritualis). As is evident, the debate over eloquence is a controversial one, and the
hyperbolic nature of language and ornamentation is feared for its de-stabilizing
epistemological and ontological effects.
In reaction to sophistic eloquence and its excesses, rhetorical theologians reject
excess in fear of rhetorical excesses leading to excesses of living. This threat of
eloquence and its tropes and figures of excess, and thus hyperbole as the representative
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tropological and figural representation of this excess, is equated with excessive pagan
values that are disdained as sins, which results in the necessity of a Christian decorum of
moderation when using eloquence at all. The troping of pagan values results in an antiChristian excess that leads to a rejection of embodied excess as well as sophistic excess
and, mutatis mutandi, hyperbole. In rhetorico-theological terms, the form of expression
(the lie) is denigrated for the substance of the argument (the truth), and the fear of sin as
an embodied hyperbole collapses the redemptive function of hyperbole into a
soteriological misapprehension of ornamentation and eloquence, which makes the
acceptance of eloquence in preaching a tenuous theological position that must be
moderated through decorum. For many, the only “proper” manner to communicate the
truth of God is through a simplicity of language that is viewed as undiluted by vice,
untainted by sin, and free of obfuscation. Thus, the simple style of preaching known as
the homily developed.
The homily became a popular style of sermon during the fourth century because it
often lacked any figural expressions or attempt at a pleasing arrangement of ideas
whatsoever.91 Augustine, however, disparages the homily, and although he also shows a
concern about eloquence and/as excess, he argues that eloquence is necessary when
preaching in order to teach, to please, and move the audience. Thus, he does not connect
eloquence to deceit or vice but to virtue. Eloquence and its rhetorical devices are not
deceptions leading one to excessive living. Rather, eloquence and its tropes and figures
are tools to be utilized in service to expounding upon and communicating Christian

91

Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 55.

75
virtue, but eloquence is much more than just a tool for Augustine. It is a psychohermeneutical and spiritual necessity.
AUGUSTINE
Although these previous Christian rhetoricians all contributed to the blending of
rhetoric and Christianity, the most well known figure for his melding of Christianity and
rhetoric is Augustine, and his complex contributions to rhetoric and Christianity merit an
extended discussion. Much has been written of Augustine from a rhetorical perspective,
and I will not recount those studies here.92 For my argument, Augustine’s stance
regarding excess significantly differs from the other Christian rhetoricians of his time, but
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not from Tertullian. This is not surprising since, as I noted earlier, Tertullian was a major
influence on Augustine.
On the one hand, like Tertullian and other Christian rhetoricians, Book IV of De
Doctrina Christiana is a response to and an attack on sophistic excess – clarity is
preferred to ornate, excessive speech. Augustine is also largely influenced by Cicero,93
especially Cicero’s Hortensius,94 and Calvin L. Troop suggests that Augustine attempted
to become Cicero’s “ideal orator,”95 which includes Cicero’s stance against the sophists.
On the other hand, like Tertullian and in contrast to other Christian rhetoricians,
Augustine fully accepts the use of eloquence and rhetorical devices, as he re-interprets
them for a Christian context. Augustine also incorporates the three different styles of
speaking – plain, moderate, and grand – into his homiletic theory, and he suggests that
rhetorical excess and the grand style, where hyperbole may be employed, may be used
with clarity when speaking about the extravagant things of God and in order to be
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persuasive, i.e., a Christian decorum of excess.96 His integration of eloquence into
preaching is, if not a replica, certainly an updated version of Tertullian’s project.
Augustine does develop a more complex Christian decorum of language, self, and
preaching where rhetorical excess can be used effectively that is more influential than
Tertullian’s theory, but Augustine’s view of excess is fairly identical to Tertullian’s.
For Augustine, as for Tertullian, excess is both accepted/justified and rejected
based on the context and the way it is used, and re-interpreting excess for a Christian
context is a significant concern. For example, Augustine’s interpretation of Ambrose’s
“sacred eloquence,” a taming of sophistic (excessive) eloquence, has a prominent place in
Augustine’s rhetorical theory97 and can be viewed as similar to Tertullian’s argument for
“Christian ornament.” In both instances, sophistic excess is rejected, but a Christian
rhetorical excess is accepted, which establishes a binary of hyperbolic excess and thereby
a Christian decorum of excess.98 Analogously, Augustine’s sacred eloquence,
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Tertullian’s Christian ornament, and Quintilian’s elegant hyperbole stand in opposition to
sophistic excess and/as extravagant hyperbole that violates decorum.
Augustine and Tertullian both argue that sophistic ornament is a “deceitful
cosmetic,” and they propose a Christian ornamental/sacred eloquent form constituted
from and influenced by the substance of Christian truth as well as inward devotion to
God – a unity of substance and form, eloquence and wisdom.99 A telling passage
regarding Augustine’s view of excess occurs when he, like Tertullian and Cyprian,
parallels sophistic eloquence with the ornamentation of women. Tertullian and
Augustine engage in a troping of pagan values in order to discredit those values.
Augustine cites Cyprian’s “On the Dress of Virgins,” and he says that those who have
“discolored their faces with paint” are worse than adulterers.100 He does not go so far as
Cyprian who calls the vagina a “devil’s gate,” but he does write vehemently against the
ornamentation of women’s faces.
Augustine’s concern is to establish a rhetorical Christian decorum while also
psychologically connecting it to an embodied moral Christian decorum. For example,
Augustine writes, “That you consider yourself adorned and beautiful, this is an insult to
the divine work, a violation of truth,” and he continues, “But can sincerity and truth
remain when what is sincere is polluted, and when what is true is turned into a lie by
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immodest coloring and deceitful cosmetics?”101 This statement is certainly reminiscent
of Tertullian’s treatise On the Apparel of Women, and it is also a now familiar view of
sophistic excess polluting the truth and distorting one’s moral life – truth comes from
God, and the adornment of humans is superfluous. Immodest and excessive cosmetics, as
a violation of decorum, are deceitful and distort truth into a lie – the typical view of
Christian rhetoricians regarding hyperbolic excess – hyperbole as figure of thought, e.g.,
pleasure, pollution, desire, moves towards a hyperbolic praxis as embodied hyperbole.102
Just as for Tertullian, Augustine’s view of sophistic excess is entirely negative; however,
associating truth with sincerity (an ethical expression of interiority emerging from the
divine excess (desire) of charity and grace)103 is an interesting psychological move that
distinguishes Augustine’s position from Tertullian’s.104 This move also establishes a
Christian decorum of excess as distinct from sophistic excess.
Augustine’s connection of truth and sincerity to its rhetorical expression suggests
that what one discovers hermeneutically is psychologically connected to the very
expression of one’s spiritual interpretation. In this view, and in contrast to Tertullian,
sophistic ornamentation does not just hinder or obfuscate communication, but it pollutes
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and alters the very substance of one’s argument as well as one’s inner self. Truth is
actually “turned into a lie” through immodest ornamental deceit, and sincerity ceases to
be sincere when “polluted.”105 Different from his predecessors who argued that sophistic
eloquence, i.e., overblown and excessive speech, only deceives and hinders the
communication of truth, the subtle argument Augustine makes is that sophistic excess
actually alters one’s inner life. Form is not simply a reflection of substance and one’s
life, but it can be a substantive distortion of truth and one’s inner being. As a response to
sophistic excess, and a critical redemptive turn for Christian excess, Augustine argues
that maintaining decorum through sacred eloquence, i.e., “Christian ornament,” is vital
for one’s preaching as well as one’s Christian life since the hermeneutical process
(substance) and its delivery (form) will generate the epistemological/ontological path to
truth or ruin.
Augustine comes to this position on sacred eloquence, i.e., Christian excess, from
two levels of thought/justification: decorum and an inner moral ethos. Michael C. Leff
notes the first level in Augustine’s thought when he writes, “The use of eloquence is
justifiable, but only on the condition that it supports respectable ideas. Truly eloquent
style has its origin in the message itself.”106 Eloquence, even with its excesses, is
justified by substance, and the only eloquence that is worthy of a Christian orator comes
from the message of truth itself, i.e., scripture. Establishing this sacred decorum is
important for Augustine because, like Tertullian, it allows him to establish a sacred
105
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eloquence that utilizes rhetorical excess without falling into sophistic vice. Murphy
writes, “Augustine postulates the existence of a new type of eloquence, ‘fitting for men
most worthy of the highest authority and clearly inspired by God.’”107 This new type of
eloquence, with its tropes and figures, is the direct opposite of sophistic eloquence, and
the same as Tertullian’s argument for a “Christian ornament.” Additionally, Augustine’s
sacred eloquence posits the view of interpretation as “inspired by God” – a
moral/psychological conception of invention as revelation – which suggests that form is
not only derived from the substance of one’s argument but from an interior spiritual life,
an inner moral ethos.
Augustine’s second level of thought regarding sacred eloquence – an inner moral
ethos – is highlighted by Schaeffer. Contra Leff, and others like Christine M. Sutherland,
Thomas O. Sloane, and Stanley Fish, Schaeffer argues that eloquence and style also come
from the interiority of the speaker. Like Tertullian, Augustine contends that the interior
life, a certain moral ethos, of the speaker is essential for developing the style of
sermons.108 Tertullian argues that a moderate inner life will lead to an exterior
expression of Christian ornamentation (a Christian decorum of excess), and Augustine
makes a similar argument.109 It is the interior life, suggests Schaeffer, that is essential in
Book IV. He writes, “Style may be adapted to the audience, to the subject, or to the
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effect desired, but it is always an authentic reflection of the preacher’s interior state,
which is achieved through a life of meditative reading and prayer.”110 The excesses of
style, eloquence, and the passions are all to be governed by a moderate inner life (a
psychological foundation for style) formed through reading and prayer.111 The inner
“noetic quest” of the spiritual life leads to knowledge, as faith, through the desired object
that is God (logos), which results in a cultivation of the emotions (pathos or affectus),
e.g., love.112 Not only does substance affect form and vice versa, form is also governed
by one’s psychological spiritual life, which must be communicated appropriately (and
passionately). Through sacred eloquence, form and substance are governed ontologically
through an interior emotional life that leads to revelation of the excessive mysteries of
God.
Augustine, like Aristotle, connects rhetoric to the emotions,113 and these emotions
must govern one’s (excessive) speech through divine inspiration – language is a
reflection of interiority. Because of the importance Augustine gives to emotions in
general and hyperbolic emotions like charity or love in particular,114 he must prove that
the emotional aspect of rhetoric will aid in (re)orienting one’s self towards the desired
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object, i.e., God.115 The linking of emotion and reason occurs because, for Augustine,
passions (pathos) are derived from truth (logos) and the divine logos of excess (Christ).116
Shuger writes (regarding the influence of Augustine on Renaissance rhetoric),
“Affectivity, instead of being an irrational perturbation, thus moves into the center of
spiritual experience.”117 Thus, excess is appropriate when it is a divine excess
communicated through language, but excess is inappropriate when it substantively
distorts the revealed truth of God. In this sense, excess is not just a stylistic vice or an
ornamental tool, but excessive emotion/passion can be redemptive or it can become a sin
against the truth of God if one does not adhere to decorous expression.
Sacred eloquence is fostered and excess is inhibited by decorum and one’s inner
spiritual life, i.e., one’s emotional state, and this interiority is connected to excessive
passions like love and charity (hyperbolic terms), which all must come from God as well
as substantive invention as a type of revelation derived from scripture.118 For Augustine,
excess can only come from God. This excess must be communicated effectively, and the
most appropriate tropological expression of this excess is hyperbole, within a Christian
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decorum of excess. God, the divine logos of excess as redemptive, is the excess that
erupts into one’s eloquence from interior devotion and prayer that inspires revelation.
This divine excess is internalized and embodied in order to communicate one’s revelation
persuasively and appropriately. Interiority influences one’s style, or form, and form
alters substance while also being derived from substance. From this complexity, sacred
eloquence emerges in contradistinction to sophistic eloquence. The embodiment of
divine excess and its expression must be communicated appropriately and eloquently in
one’s sermonic oration, and the tropological representation of this excess is hyperbole.
All of the “Church Fathers” affect the attitudes of Christian preachers toward
excess and thereby hyperbolic tendencies of thought and language in the centuries to
come, but none as much as Augustine. In the Middle Ages, however, theological views
of excess related to style and eloquence are replaced with the rational discourse of
dialectic. Those like Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, for example, take dialectic to
new depths leading up to the Scholasticism of Anselm of Canterbury. Inventio, not
eloquentia, becomes the only path of theology. Through Boethius, an abyssal opposition
arises between eloquence as deceit and invention as certitude,119 and eloquence is given
over to dialectical inquiry and logic. The divine excess and sacred eloquence of
Tertullian and Augustine is replaced with the calculated reason of logic. The tension
between inventio and eloquentia is significant for hyperbole because tropes of excess like
hyperbole and figures of excess like embodied hyperboles are largely abandoned for the
definitive logic of dialectical truth. There is simply no room for hyperbolic excess in the
realm of dialectic.
119

Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1990), 100.

85
HYPERBOLE BEYOND AUGUSTINE: THE PREACHING TRADITION OF THE
MIDDLE AGES
Beyond Augustine into the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, preaching using a
simple or plain style becomes rigorously instantiated, though preaching still maintained a
certain pathos in order to persuade. A preacher’s purpose is to convert and inflame
passion in the audience, i.e., a conversion of emotions, but only through a plain style that
jettisons artistic language and relies on psychological (Augustinian psychology) and
theological argumentation guided by the Holy Spirit. Emotion and the effects of
language come only from God,120 which must not be contaminated by rhetorical excess.
As with Augustine, excess erupted from a divine excess (a divine logos of excess), but it
was contained, or controlled, within a plain, unadorned style.121 Paradoxically, the use of
emotions to persuade results in what some would call a grand plain style, but here,
argument and dialectic are still privileged over eloquence and style. Rhetoric is
denigrated, and dialectic is celebrated for its argumentative certitude. Eloquence and
tropes are certainly considered to be useless since truth needs no adornment.
Despite the belittlement of rhetoric, the distrust of eloquence as deceitful, the
disdain of rhetorical excess in preaching and more technical rhetorics, and the fear of
excess in one’s moral life, hyperbole is not altogether absent from the conversation.
Ernst Robert Curtius asserts that a discussion of the link between hyperbole and
epideictic, which is also noted by Greco-Roman rhetors, occurs in the Middle Ages
regarding the ethical implications of “hyperbolical panegyric,” or “panegyric ‘outdoing,’”
which leads to an “outdoing” topos. Curtius concludes that during the Middle Ages,
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especially in Christian rhetoric, “[The panegyric’s] chief trope is the hyperbole. The
hyperbolic style is authorized not only by the pagan writers but also by the entire
Bible.”122 Again, there seems to be a binary of excess where “pagan” excess, i.e., secular
eloquence, is rejected but Christian excess is accepted, i.e., sacred eloquence.
Mystical and apophatic theologians certainly employ the use of hyperbole within
their discourse. Other medieval rhetorical theologians offer excessive arguments for the
praise of God, panegyric sermons and poetry about the divine, and a defense of
scripture’s rough rather than eloquent style. It is true that many theologians of Latin as
well as medieval Christianity, e.g., Origen and Augustine, view scripture figuratively
rather than literally and argue for a certain scriptural eloquence that reveals the mysteries
of God, but their preferred figure is overwhelmingly metaphor rather than hyperbole.
Perhaps the most overt link to hyperbole in medieval rhetoric is the use of amplificatio,
but it remains disconnected from elocutio,123 which serves to underscore again the
distrust of deceitful eloquence as the lie of hyperbole.
Cassiodorus, Boethius, Priscian, Pope Gregory the Great, Isidore, Saint Bede,
Alcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, Gerbert of Reims, Notker Labeo, and Alain de Lille all
privilege argument over eloquence to prevent embellishment from distorting the
substance of one’s argument. In fact, the Church’s attitude towards rhetoric at this time
is that it should not be used in preaching at all.124 Although rhetoric is still a subject of
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study at his time, it is only one of seven arts: the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and
dialectic) and the quadrivium (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music). The trivium
is particularly for younger students.125 It is not until the ars praedicandi of the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, leading into the Renaissance, that preaching begins to change
from the homily to the “thematic” sermon and eloquence regains some importance.126
The Dominican and Franciscan monastic preaching orders of the thirteenth century begin
to develop more fully the treatises devoted to the arts of preaching, which are decisively
more Ciceronian than Boethian.127 The Cistercians also revive preaching somewhat by
developing a more simplified liturgy.128 Scholastic commentators beginning with
Abelard remain loyal to Boethius through their construction of unadorned university
the Scripture without a preaching of the Word.” See Stephen H. Webb, The Divine Voice: Christian
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sermons, but these more practical monastic preachers and teachers promote the eloquence
of the Ciceronian ideal.
Medieval rhetorics continue to struggle between excessive passions and
eloquence, but discussions of elocutio largely disappear from more technical discussions
of rhetoric and are replaced by a concern for the ethical behavior of the orator, which is
tied more to dialectical argumentation than rhetoric.129 Passions do not move but
contribute to intellectual argumentation. It is not eloquence that persuades but a
psychological mindset driven by simple, passionate expression within the substance of
argument itself.130 The excess of passions is thus suppressed through the intellectual
dialectic of Scholasticism, and elocutio is separated from inventio. This position changes
in the Renaissance where tropes and figures like hyperbole and amplification are not
largely viewed as stylistic vices but as generators of imagination, inspiration, and the path
to God,131 and the Augustinian psychology of the will and emotion is dominant.
Outside of the purview of the preaching tradition, there are interesting theological
and social developments regarding excess. First, a fascination with martyrdom,
asceticism, mysticism, and saintliness becomes more extreme during the Middle Ages as
well as fantastical descriptions of hell and divine retribution, e.g., Dante’s hyperbolic
poetry (part of the “outdoing” topos described by Curtius) and Dionysus the Areopagite’s
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use of the “hyper-negative” to describe and argue theologically for the
incomprehensibility of God.132 Paradoxically, while rhetorical excess is frequently
rejected in discourse, its embodiment is often praised through rhetorical excess, e.g., the
“hyperbolical panegyric.” To be sure, martyrdom was also praised by those like
Tertullian and Cyprian, and it was a significant concern while Christians were sought out
and persecuted. Yet, the writings of the Middle Ages transition from martyrdom to
Christian asceticism (askesis), i.e., embodied hyperbole as the extreme training of the
body and the soul. A significant interest in prophecy and apocalyptic discourse
contribute to this development and call for those obedient to Christianity to prepare, or
train (askesis), themselves for the coming apocalypse. Through asceticism and
apocalyptic discourse, excess is given a positive teleology that was previously only
reserved for moderation.
Second, a fascination with the grotesque (discussed in chapter four) leads to
hyperbolic actions such as the carnival and the carnivalesque described by Mikhail
Bakhtin133 as well as hyperbolic literary forms such as the exaggerated grotesque of
burlesque literature. These hyperbolic forms occur in the Middle Ages but gain
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momentum in the Renaissance, the Baroque, and Romanticism. Geoffrey Galt Harpham
describes grotesqueries as standing “at a margin of consciousness between the known and
the unknown, the perceived and the unperceived, calling into question the adequacy of
our ways of organizing the world, of dividing the continuum of experience into knowable
particles.”134 In Harpham’s understanding, the grotesque (a type of hyperbolic form)
serves a positive function that expands one’s imagination rather than leading to vice. In
like manner, Bakhtin argues that the carnival inverts social hierarchies when grotesque
bodies are positively exaggerated, “hyperbolized,” to assert the impossibility that the
poor are royalty in order to reveal the truth (the possible) that all hierarchies are based on
social fictions. Embodied hyperboles and exaggerated concepts, e.g., the gargantuan, the
colossal, the titanic, serve a positive role to reveal truths typically unacknowledged.135
Third, more complex theological arguments on the doctrine of God begin to
develop, and they all must address God’s place or role in the universe and creation,
especially in regard to other theological doctrines such as Christology, atonement, and
eschatology. This ontological emphasis on transcendence and immanence as well as
incarnation and telos leads inexorably to the question of excess in theology, e.g., God as
excess in and/or through Creation, Christ’s sacrifice as excessive atonement for excessive
sin, God as beyond description. A significant concern of theologians at this time is to
attempt to prove the existence of God through logical argumentation. For example,
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Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century offers the ontological proof of God’s
existence suggesting, and parroting Quintilian, that God is that than which nothing
greater can be conceived.136 This is an interesting argument of incrementum that is a
species of auxesis, which is a species of hyperbole (discussed in detail in the following
chapters).137 Yet, those like the Scholastic theologian Thomas Aquinas refute Anselm’s
argument.138 Influenced by the rhetorical writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Ambrose, and
Augustine, Aquinas offers an interesting view of excess, and as an example, I will briefly
note Aquinas’s view of excess towards sin and worship – a Christian binary of hyperbolic
excess.
In “Whether Ambition is a Sin” of Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, he asserts, “The
desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will
be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason.”139
Reason is the mean, and any deviation from the mean is excessive, i.e., sinful. Even the
virtue of honor may become sinful through excess. As stated previously, equating sin
with excess is not surprising since sin “misses the mark,” and hyperbole “overshoots the
136

Quintilian writes that incrementum can “proceed at once to something than which nothing
greater can be named.” See Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.4.7.
137

One might also conceive of this argument as an argument of unlimited development that
terminates at the ideal term. Only hyperbole, and litotes, can rescue the development from infinite
expansion according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New
Rhetoric, 290-292.
138

Anselm’s argument holds sway for some time, but those like the Benedictine monk Guanilo in
the late eleventh century argue against Anselm’s argument. In Guanilo’s “The Reply on behalf of the
Fool,” he asserts that if Anselm’s argument were applied to any other topic, then it would seem ridiculous.
Thomas Aquinas also refutes Anselm’s argument, though somewhat more eloquently, by offering five
“proofs” in which the existence of God might be demonstrated. One could argue that the refutation of
Anselm’s argument actually occurs because it ends the project of theology itself by terminating at the ideal
term and dispensing with superfluous hyperbolic expressions about the ideal term.
139

Aquinas, “Whether Ambition is a Sin,” in Summa Theologica, Christian Classics Ethereal
Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS_Q131_A1.html> (14 November 2009).

92
mark.” Viewed rhetorico-theologically, sin is a hyperbolic figure of thought that
becomes an embodied hyperbole. More precisely, sin is the lie of hyperbole and a
negative excess. Reason is the truth, and embodied hyperbole-as-sin is a lie intended to
deceive. If hyperbole is a lie on the side of truth, as Seneca and Quintilian assert, then
the function of hyperbole is to assert what is incredible to arrive at the credible, but for
Aquinas, this redemptive hyperbolic function is denied. However, when speaking about
God rather than human desires, Aquinas has a very different view of hyperbole’s
excessive function.
In “Whether there can be any Excess in the Worship of God,” Aquinas offers a
brief explication of excess – dividing it between absolute quantity and quantity of
proportion – and he concludes by stating that there is no excess in worship.140 What
Aquinas reveals in this statement is the inverse supposition that there is actually nothing
but excess in worship. Worship is completely hyperbolic thereby establishing a decorum
of excess for worship. Excess is appropriate for worship because worship (form) is
contingent upon the object being worshipped (subject matter, substance)141 and the
internal state of one’s soul, or mind. Not surprisingly, Augustine’s theological argument
about rhetorical eloquence is almost exactly like Aquinas’s theological argument about
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God and worship, which indicates that eloquent speech for Augustine is a type of worship
as praise to/of God through speaking. For Augustine and Aquinas, a certain decorum as
well as an inner spiritual state must be present for proper worship, or sacred eloquence.
Aquinas argues that “a moderate curbing of the concupiscences” is a prerequisite for the
worship of God, but nothing offered to God is enough since one can never exceed the
quantity or proportionality of the object being worshipped. Yet, as I have noted,
hyperbole is not intended to throw beyond all reason and knowledge, which is more the
function of the sublime or adynaton.
Hyperbole asserts the incredible to arrive at the credible; it lies on the side of
truth. In Aquinas’s argument, God (the truth) is the impossible, and worship (the
unrecognized falsehood) is the possible. He argues, within a classical theistic paradigm,
that there is no excessive form of worship because excess itself is the appropriate and
proportional response to the ideal concept of God, i.e., only hyperbolic assertions about
God are possible. The lies of hyperbole are attempts to describe God, which is
impossible, but these falsehoods are not intended to deceive. The lie of hyperbole
functions here to reveal truths about God through language, which makes worship
hyperbolic. Just as Anselm makes God the amplified term, i.e., through incrementum, in
his ontological argument for God’s existence, Aquinas makes the same move. God is the
extraordinary subject matter requiring excessive amplification in Aquinas’s decorum of
excess. Hyperbole is a bridge between transcendence and immanence, infinity and finite
assertions. Thus, Aquinas’s argument hinges on the function of hyperbole to assert the
impossible in order to arrive at the possible.
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As asserted earlier, these are subtle arguments regarding the excess of hyperbole.
From the Church Fathers through the Middle Ages, hyperbole is rarely specifically
referenced. Implicitly, either the error of sin and vice – embodied hyperboles – is
discussed; or, divine excess as hyperbolic excess that must be appropriately expressed is
posited – worship, martyrdom, and asceticism, and a paradoxical binary of excess is
revealed. It is the misapprehending of hyperbole’s function that causes hyperbole to be
equated with sin. If the lie of hyperbole is taken on its own, then it is viewed as sin, but
when hyperbole is allowed to function at its full potential, it is viewed as sacred excess
for purposefully revealing truths and correcting moral ineptitudes. The misapprehension
of hyperbole distorts its purpose, and it is viewed only as a lie.
A renewed interest in hyperbole as a trope does not occur until the Renaissance
when the trope is explicitly discussed by numerous writers. In the Renaissance, much
from the Middle Ages is overturned and reversed, including a renewed importance of
rhetoric.142 In rhetorical theory, tropes and figures regain prominence, and style and
eloquence are again preferred over the cold logic of dialectic in order to impassion one’s
audience and move them to conversion. A Christian grand style is developed, and
hyperbole is elevated to a status that is second only to metaphor. In fact, Christian
rhetors argue that it is only through hyperbole that one can glimpse the beauty of God. It
is to the Renaissance that I now turn.
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HYPERBOLE IN RENAISSANCE RHETORICAL THEORY (AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT)
The Renaissance is an important era for rhetorical theory as well as Christian
theology and preaching through a renewed interest in Classical texts and rhetoric, “true
eloquence,” that defined the humanism of the time.143 Christian rhetoricians contribute
significantly to theology, rhetorical theory, and the overall culture and aesthetic of the
Renaissance. This “sacred rhetoric,” argues Debora K. Shuger, “is not a narrowly
specialized compartment of the history of Renaissance rhetoric but its most vital and
reflective branch.”144 Rather than simply Ciceronianizing religious discourse like the
Church Fathers, sacred rhetorics exhibit “a theoretical concern for language, making
them articulate witnesses to the sacred aesthetics of the Renaissance.”145 By linking style
to passion, renewing an interest in sophistic discourse, and suggesting that “passion with
its figures and tropes is also the language of divine disclosure,”146 sacred rhetorics offer
fertile ground for hyperbole. A significant influence for sacred rhetoricians’ view of
excess is Augustine’s combination of divine wisdom and sacred eloquence as well as his
concern for emotion and Christian inwardness.147
Most of Renaissance rhetorical theory, especially sacred rhetoric, is based upon
Augustinian psychology that unites the passions and the will thereby associating style
with interiority rather than exteriority. As noted previously, Greco-Roman pagan rhetoric
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views style, generally speaking, as only external ornamentation to be added appropriately
to one’s substantive argument, i.e., to be decorous, in order to teach, to please, and to
move the audience. The sophists exceed this stance and view ornamentation as useful to
gain applause by bringing pleasure to the audience, and in the process, the sophists
engage in self-aggrandizement for their own sake. For Augustine, ornamentation is
viewed as an external expression of internal passions that are nurtured through prayer and
the Holy Spirit, which is a sacramental view of language: “Passionate discourse thus
imitates the movement of thought and feeling, the contours of the speaker’s inner life.”148
The proof of the orator’s power is replaced with the power of the object of desire to
inspire. The human artist is diminished so that the glory of God may be revealed. An
orator in the service of God, Thomas Traherne writes, “Can never Exceed, nor be too
high.”149 The use of rhetoric and its figures and tropes is not to be used for selfaggrandizement but to teach, to please, and to move one towards an emotional, inner
conversion inspired by God thereby providing a positive place for hyperbole in
persuasive discourse. As many Christian Renaissance rhetoricians iterate, the end of
persuasion and preaching is conversion, i.e., persuasion is conversion and vice versa.150
As Kenneth Burke might put it, identification is persuasion.
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The real boon for rhetorical theory at this time is the privileging of eloquence over
the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, who Erasmus allies with the animals.151 For
Renaissance humanists, the abstract, speculative intellectualism of the Scholastics failed
to engage the relevant, practical matters of life.152 The humanists view Scholasticism as
an act of dialectical logic through the intellect, judgment, and comprehension, and its
religious end is contemplation.153 In contrast, rhetoric seeks a movement of emotions
(affectus) and the will to gain assent.154 Through rhetoric and decorum, an extravagance,
sublimity, and tropological fecundity are expressed through the ideal of eloquence and
the theological virtue of charity.155 Excessive tropes like hyperbole are given a pride of
place, and metaphor, considered at times even by Aquinas to be “chaff,”156 is almost
dethroned as the predominant trope in rhetorical theory.157
These developments offer a space for the re-interpretation of hyperbole in a more
positive way. Renaissance rhetorical theorists are still concerned with the view of
hyperbole as a lie, but they re-shape this conception into a decorum of excess where
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hyperbole becomes an appropriate literary virtue, a lie on the side of truth. Stanivukovic
writes, “Renaissance writers often turn the deception implied by hyperbole into a literary
virtue. Based on the manipulation of lie and truth within the very form of the trope,
deception through hyperbole helped Renaissance writers explore the problem of
appearance and reality, not only in large structures but in a compact stylistic form as
well.”158 Rather than being equated with mere appearance and ornamentation, i.e., a
linguistic lie, hyperbole actually helps Renaissance writers to explore the problem of
appearance and reality, i.e., hermeneutical truth(s).159 Renaissance writers construct a
theory of hyperbole that is more complex, and as with Quintilian, the deceit of hyperbole
is epistemologically necessary. The alleged vice of excess thus becomes a virtue, though
still in moderation.
In 1777, Joseph Priestley writes, “The reason why the hyperbole is, in appearance,
a greater violation of truth than most other figures, is only this, that in the hyperbole the
untruth lies in the affirmation itself.”160 In this sense, hyperbole is a tropological short
circuit that carries the listener directly to the recognition that all tropes and figures carry
an element of untruth within them since they are not literal but figurative statements.
Other tropes and figures are eventually revealed as lies intended to reveal some truth, but
hyperbole is a “lowd lyer” that shocks the audience into the untruth of the lie in order to
take them to another alternative truth or version of reality. Renaissance writers reexplore the intricate functions of hyperbole; however, caution is still encouraged when
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using hyperbole and excess in one’s style. Hyperbole is celebrated, but it is also
mistrusted. The productive excessiveness Renaissance writers perceive in hyperbole can
be too excessive even when exploring the transcendence of the divine, the sublime, the
magnificent, and the wondrous through language.
The key for these writers is the attempt to communicate the “beyond” of thought
and language – to make the transcendent immanent and define the infinite in finite terms.
To do this, a heightened style, eloquence, and rhetorical ornamentation must be
proportionate to the excellence of the subject being discussed. Decorum must be
maintained. Yet, more than adhering to a grand style, these writers re-contextualize the
functions of hyperbole to develop a type of hyperbolic style or decorum of excess often
expressed through the epideictic genre.161 Connecting hyperbole to epideictic is not an
uncommon (discussed in the following chapter). Greco-Roman theorists note this
connection, Augustine views sacred eloquence as praise of God through language, and
Aquinas realizes the necessity of excess for worship, but Renaissance writers make the
link of hyperbole to epideictic explicit and more intricate theoretically.
In this section, I will offer an explication of hyperbole during the Renaissance,
and I will explore the views of excess held by the sacred and secular rhetorics of
humanist writers. What I will find is that hyperbole continues to be a contentious term as
well as a trope that offers epistemological and ontological playfulness within rhetorical
theory and rhetorical theology.
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“SECULAR” HUMANIST RHETORIC AND HYPERBOLE
Although Christian rhetoricians argue for the uses of amplification, magnitude,
passionate speech, and hyperbole in the grand style, other rhetoricians discuss the
function and form of hyperbole more explicitly. George Puttenham, in his hugely
influential Arte of English Poesie (1569), asserts of hyperbole:
I for his [hyperbole] immoderate excesse cal him the ouer reacher right with his
originall or [lowd lyer]…and this maner of speach is vsed, when either we would
greatly aduance or greatly abase the reputation of any thing or person, and must
be vsed very discreetly, or els it will seeme odious, for although a prayse or other
report may be allowed beyond credit, it may not be beyond all measure.162
Puttenham’s caution is to use hyperbole “discreetly.” He also places it in the genre of
epideictic oratory, which makes the use of hyperbole context specific thereby limiting
hyperbole’s scope. Classical manuals of rhetoric also note the use of panegyrical
hyperbole, but Puttenham’s connection is overt.163 For Puttenham, hyperbole is to be
used discretely when the appropriate situation arises, e.g., a situation that calls for
epideictic oratory, but even when praising or blaming, Puttenham is not favorably
inclined towards hyperbole. The problem with hyperbole for him is not that it lies but
that it is a “lowd lyer.” For Puttneham, as for Longinus, the deceit of hyperbole should
be concealed and used discretely. Discretion and moderation must be used to temper the
effect of hyperbole because praise may not be “beyond all measure;” or, as Quintilian
says, beyond belief.
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In The Garden of Eloquence (1593), Henry Peacham also connects hyperbole to
epideictic, but more subtly, and Peacham asserts that hyperbole must be employed when
describing things that are beyond description.164 Not only does hyperbole succeed by
drawing attention to itself, contra Puttenham, but it translates figurative language into
emotional meaning – moving an audience through excessive praise.165 Hyperbole bridges
the gap between what is spoken and what is meant, as Thomas Wilson also posits in Arte
of Rhetorique (1553).166 Stanivukovic asserts that “an incredible, exaggerated utterance
interrupts the language and logic of the existing argument,” by shifting “one level of
meaning to another, re-invented meaning.”167 In this sense, hyperbole is abstract and
ambiguous through its description of something that cannot be described, i.e., the
attempted apprehension of something that is beyond thought and/or language. Attaining
the ideal is impossible. Hyperbole attempts this feat, but it does not intend to reveal
complete comprehension of the ideal, which would devalue the thought or feeling
hyperbole evokes. For Peacham, this attempt at comprehending the incomprehensible is
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a strength of hyperbole because it furthers one’s imagination by asserting what is “almost
incredible” through a type of “functional ignorance.”168
Puttenham and Peacham are representative examples of the positive and negative
views regarding hyperbole in the secular rhetorics of the time. Philip Sidney, in Defence
of Poesy, argues that hyperbole can transform the audience.169 John Hoskyns, in
Directions for Speech and Style (1599) and Gabriel Harvey, in Ciceronianus (1577), also
discuss hyperbole and amplification,170 and they suggest that the use of tropes and figures
must be appropriate to the substance of the argument. As with most rhetorical theorists
discussed thus far, arguing for a decorum of excess is one way theorists attempted to limit
as well as to give hyperbole a proper place within discourse.171 Hoskyns echoes the
definitions of hyperbole by Seneca and Quintilian by suggesting that hyperbole’s
articulation “beyond the truth” (the incredible) will descend to the truth (the credible), or
that the “flat impossibility” of hyperbole may highlight “the unspeakableness than the
untruth of the relation.”172 Noel Malcolm writes of the use of hyperbole in “nonsense
poetry” of the Renaissance: “It makes reference to impossible things not because it is
trying to describe an impossible world…but as a rhetorical figure, to emphasize and
168
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dramatize impossibility itself.”173 For Renaissance writers, hyperbole does not assert
impossibilities and absurdities for their own sake, but to reveal the function that
impossibility may have for meaning itself. The attempt by all of these theorists is to
utilize the function of hyperbole to extend and play with meaning as well as to attempt to
describe the impossible and create a sense of “wonder” by over-reaching the bounds of
language.
Others write of the uses of hyperbole in Elizabethan drama and poetry as well as
Tudor poetics,174 which is beyond the scope of this project, but the overall attitude
towards hyperbole in the Renaissance is that paradox, obscurity, and ambiguity all serve
to avoid the trite and obvious in order to reveal life, force, wonder, and energeia.175 The
same is true for Christian rhetoricians, and I will now focus on the sacred rhetorics of the
Renaissance. If the secular rhetorics of the Renaissance were concerned explicitly with
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hyperbole as a figure of thought via amplification, then the sacred rhetorics can be
characterized as exploring the form and function of amplification within the grand style
of Christian preaching.
SACRED RHETORIC: CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND HYPERBOLE
The primary concern of sacred rhetorics during the Renaissance is the use of
emotion to move its audience to conversion – to teach and to move the audience from one
set of values to another religious set of values through a heightening of emotion – which
Shuger suggests establishes a Christian grand style. Influenced heavily by Quintilian,
Erasmus also “shifts the relationship of style and invention to promote the influential
ideal of copia as eloquence, an ideal that effectively encourages Christian humanists to
cultivate forms of hyperbolic excess.”176 The product of this style constitutes a Christian
aesthetic (including a Christian view of the sublime) and a theory of language within the
overall context of Renaissance rhetoric.177 In developing this Christian humanist style,
the influence of Augustine can hardly be over emphasized, and through his psychology of
the self, the tropes and figures of rhetoric are used not as decoration but as “the
appropriate expression of the psyche in its attempt to apprehend and articulate
transcendence.”178
As noted above, this represents a significant shift from the Greco-Roman view of
tropes and figures as external ornamentation, to a view of tropes and figures as outward
expressions of inner emotions, devotion, and the will – a sacramental, incarnational view
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of language. “The program was the transformation of speech into act, of oratory into
flesh, just as Speech had become incarnate.”179 John Donne, for example, views Christ as
a rhetorical act, Erasmus considers “Christ as Speech” and Luther asserts that the Holy
Spirit is a rhetorician.180 In this sense, God is viewed as a rhetorician who is: 1) moving
one’s inward emotional state, i.e., persuading humanity, 2) communicating and being
communicated figurally through language itself, and 3) the incarnated logos in the
“figure” of Christ. From the abstract intellectualism of the Scholastics, the Christian
humanists emphasize an incarnational view of language and an Augustinian psychology
that connects the emotions to rhetorical power. The Christian grand style and its
epideictic proclivity uses a sacramental theory of language that emphasizes the
inner/moral life of the speaker, the excessiveness of tropological description as it is
appropriate for its subject matter, and the inventional process of the speaker that is guided
by the Holy Spirit.
Developing a theory of language that is sacramental is a significant contribution
of Christian humanists. Through magnitudo and praesentia, the purpose is to move the
emotions (affectus) by making absent things present in order to combine the “excellent
object with sensuous immediacy.”181 Those absent, divine things of grandeur must be
communicated with equal grandeur and incarnated into language and eloquence, i.e., a
179
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decorum of excess. The excellent object inspires an inward passionate response, which is
then translated into external figurative language, especially heightened tropes and figures,
whereby words incarnationally signify supernatural truth,182 which includes hyperbole
and sublime discourse. The incredible is made credible through the incarnation of the
imagination and the divine into language, and hyperbole is suited particularly well to
achieve this goal.183 Attempting to communicate, to incarnate, what is incomprehensible
is the main (paradoxical) function of hyperbole; thus, it is utilized in the sacred rhetorics
to “shore up faith” and speak of those divine things that are beyond one’s ability to
comprehend.
Perhaps the view of hyperbole Shoemaker derives from Balzac’s writings best
summarizes hyperbole’s raison d’etre in the sacred rhetorics, though Balzac himself was
unconcerned with sacred rhetoric. Shoemaker writes, “Hyperbole expresses precisely
that which we have difficulty believing. By going beyond the truth, it attempts to
reproduce in language the sense of marvel that one experiences before the divine, the
spectacular, and the unbelievable.”184 Here again, one encounters the paradoxical and
ambiguous nature of hyperbole that arrives at the truth by lying (in excess). The deceit,
however, is only meant to be believed up to the limits of its own unbelievability.
Because of the limits of language, impossible heights must be asserted in order to attempt
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to describe the experiences of transcendence. The overall goal of using hyperbole is not
to lie, but to, paradoxically, speak/praise the truth through that which is unbelievable. In
epideictic and sublime discourse, even the grotesque discourse of the Renaissance,
hyperbole functions particularly well because affect (affectus) replaces argumentation
(ratio),185 and the audience loses itself in the emotive language of the orator.186 In the
context of sublime discourse, the unbelievable becomes believable with little difficulty.
The Protestant rhetorician John Prideaux, in Sacred Eloquence (1659), argues for
“Sublime Hyperboles” in his Christian rhetoric and seeks to establish a decorum of
excess. Ettenhuber suggests of Prideaux’s writing and Christian rhetorics in general,
“But for Christian theories of eloquence, hyperbole shores up faith and points the way to
God precisely because it defies the laws of probability.”187 Traherne demonstrates a
similar feeling when he writes, “All Tropes are Clouds; Truth doth itself excel. /
Whatever Heights Hyperboles can tell,”188 and again, he writes of excess related to God:
What bound may we assign,
O God, to any work of thine!
Their endlessness discovers thee
In all to be Divine ;
A Deity
That will for evermore exceed the end
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Of all that creature's wit can comprehend.189
The excess of hyperbole points to incomprehensibility, which is celebrated in the
Renaissance rather than avoided or displaced by certitude. As for Anselm and Aquinas,
God is the ideal, elusive term implicitly buttressed by the amplification (auxesis) of
hyperbole, but for Renaissance writers, hyperbole is explicitly recognized to be the
vehicle for communicating this divine ideal. When speaking of God, language is inept
and limited, but hyperbole as trope and figure of thought defies the laws of probability,
replaces argumentation with affect, pushes the bounds of language, strains human
knowledge to the point of shattering, and offers one the closest utterance of transcendent
experience. In line with Quintilian and Seneca, most Renaissance writers understand that
hyperbole is a “special kind of language, which goes beyond normal speech…in order to
express a supra-normal idea or experience.”190 The implication of this statement is that,
like religious discourse in general, hyperbole is a special kind of language that attempts
to express supra-normal, supra-rational, or super-natural ideas or experiences. The
heights of hyperbole take the listener beyond normal experience. The abjected orator or
writer must simply speak of the divine to communicate the improbable.
In sum, Christian humanist rhetoric of the Renaissance seeks to transcend the
boundaries of thought and language through the use of hyperbole within a decorum of
189
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excess, heightened speech, and epideictic discourse, and they replace the view of
ornamentation as a vice by emphasizing passionate and redemptive discourse that is
sincere. The purpose is to move the hearer to conversion through a conjunction of power
and luminosity emanating from one’s passions.191 In Erasmus’s last work, Ecclesiastes
sive concionator evangelicus (1535), he explicitly connects psychology and religious
expression to elocutio to highlight the theological and artistic aspects of sacred
eloquence.192 It is this spiritualized view of emotions and a sacramental view of language
coupled with an intense awareness of decorum that inhibits hyperbole’s use but also
fosters a grand style and the productive use of hyperbole within sacred rhetorics. The
subject matter discussed (divine discourse) must be proportionately elevated through
language in order to create a suitable emotional response.193
From Aurelio Brandolini, Rudolph Agricola, Nicholas Hemmingsen, Melachthan,
William Perkins, and Tridentine Rhetoric to Sturm, Vossius, Keckermann, Caussin, and
Alsted, the Christian grand style uses incarnational theology, Augustinian psychology, a
sacramental theory of language, and a decorum of excess in order to move the hearer to
conversion through emotion. Christian epideictic preaching, noted earlier to be explicitly
connected to hyperbole, reaches its greatest eloquence in the seventeenth century through
those like Francois Fenelon, Robert South, James Arderne, Rene Rapin, and Robert
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Ferguson. Yet, even within these traditions, extremism is viewed as absoluteness, 194
which those like Erasmus and Lamy try to avoid by calling for moderation and a
cautionary use of hyperbole.195 Thus, figures and tropes like hyperbole are viewed
positively within the secular and sacred humanist rhetorics of the Renaissance, but
moderation is still encouraged to inhibit its excesses. Hyperbole is still distrusted for its
de-stabilizing, paradoxical, and ambiguous rhetorical power, and it remains a contentious
term.
Beyond the Renaissance, a distrust of hyperbole is particularly present through the
development of Ramism, which has a significant effect on Continental philosophers and
rhetoricians of the Enlightenment. Influenced by Agricola, Ramus separates rhetoric
from dialectic by absorbing decorum and style, including amplificatio, into a dialectical
structure thereby viewing rhetoric as only the ornamentation of tropes and figures.196
Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes share a similar distrust of excessive ornamentation,197
though Descartes utilizes the function of hyperbole through “hyperbolic doubt” for his
system of thought.198 Bacon views rhetoric positively and as a great art, but he separates
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invention from rhetoric, though he is not a Ramist.199 Bacon also opposes the excessive
ornamentation utilized by Ciceronians of his day,200 and he favors using hyperbole only
when speaking about love.201 In favor of reason, scientific Skepticism, the Cartesian
method, and ideal scientific discourse, those like the “enthusiasts,” for example, are
critiqued for their ‘unclear and overblown language.”202
In addition, the sacramental view of language is rejected by those philosophers
like Locke and Hume (an admirer of Demosthenes)203 because words are viewed as signs
of things and not the things themselves embodied in language. Language is seen as
imprecise and cannot convey knowledge accurately.204 In fact, Locke’s and Hume’s
epistemology is derived from sense perceptions (not testimony or revelation) as
independent of language, which is the opposite view of a sacramental theory of language
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that considers knowledge and faith to be an outward expression of an inward experience
and knowledge derived from God.
In response, Giambattista Vico argues against Cartesian philosophy and in favor
of rhetoric as a superior philosophy of knowledge.205 However, he is the first to create
the concept of the “four master tropes,” later echoed by Hayden White and Kenneth
Burke, and he excludes hyperbole from this conception thereby implying that it is a trope
of lesser importance; 206 even linking hyperbole at one point to the thoughts of children as
did Aristotle.207 Interestingly, it is Kantian philosophy that offers the most productive
use for hyperbole in the Enlightenment, but it is only implied since he has little regard for
rhetoric.208
Those in the Scottish Enlightenment did reflect rhetorically on hyperbole briefly,
though they simply took the negative rather than the positive Greco-Roman view
regarding hyperbole, i.e., they distrust its excessive force and/or equate it with vice.
Hugh Blair, for example, dismisses hyperbole suggesting that only young people and
those with lively imaginations use it profusely – by lively imagination, Blair means
“Orientals” and those he perceives as belonging to lesser developed cultures than
Europeans.209 He states that hyperboles are difficult to manage, a resource of an author
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of a feeble mind, and must be used with caution.210 Although he has a negative view of
hyperbole, he does note its frequency of use, and he observes that “our common forms of
compliment are almost all of them extravagant Hyperboles.”211 In addition, Blair often
conflates the sublime with hyperbole, George Campbell discusses hyperbole only in
passing,212 Richard Whately does not discuss hyperbole explicitly but refers to excesses
and vices,213 and John Henry Newman equates an excess of emotions with sin.214
Overall, Renaissance writers are positively inclined to use hyperbole in their
writing, and they find it a productive trope in epistemological terms. They are concerned
with the transcendent and the supra-rational, and they use hyperbole to explore the
“beyond” of language and the plasticity of meaning. Unlike the rhetorical theological
theories of Latin and medieval rhetorics, hyperbole in the Renaissance is explicitly
referenced, defined, and its function is extensively examined. It is not denigrated or
misused, but it is inhibited for its unbridled excessiveness. In the Enlightenment, rhetoric
and hyperbole are viewed negatively, and these concepts are often equated with religion,
irrationality, and the “fairer sex.” A revolution in thinking about language and
knowledge occurs, and there is little place for excess in the new scientific paradigm. A
very different view of hyperbole occurs within Romanticism via the sublime.
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HYPERBOLE IN ROMANTICISM AND CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC
What is important to note about Romanticism is that the overall tone of
Romanticism leading into post-Romantic and contemporary theoretical discourse lends
itself to a constructive development of a theory of hyperbole because of the tendency to
exaggerate or offer extreme assertions, e.g., about the sublime. The penchant for excess
in Romanticism heavily influences the thought of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Rudolf Otto’s mysterium tremendum et fascinans as well as the ethical positions of
Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas are often hyperbolic, and much postmodern and
poststructuralist discourse is also hyperbolic. For example, such concepts as différance,
the trace, dissemination, the more, alterity, aporia, heterology, expenditure without
reserve, and Dasein215 all exhibit hyperbolic characteristics.
A “present absence” or an “absent presence” are equally hyperbolic because these
assertions break the bounds of language and reasoning proper, they throw beyond thought
and language in order to arrive at an alternate version of “reality” or “truth.” In this
sense, hyperbole is similar to the “double death” of Maurice Blanchot, “death as
possibility and as impossibility.”216 Indeed, the “possibility of impossibility” and the
“impossibility of possibility” are common hyperboles in postmodern as well as premodern discourse, e.g., Seneca and Quintilian, though the epistemological
presuppositions in each are often significantly different. Hyperbole’s very function is to
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assert the impossible to arrive at the possible while knowing full well the impossible is
not possible, but the possible must always strive towards and move through the
impossible. Postmodern theorists often make these hyper-qualified hyperbolic statements
without actually exploring hyperbole explicitly. They prefer, instead, to pursue
explications of irony and catachresis. On the other hand, Romantic writers as well as
contemporary discussions about Romantic writers, offer explorations of hyperbole that
are more abundant, e.g., “vertige de l’hyperbole” of Victor Hugo.
In this section, I will briefly note the interaction between hyperbole and the
sublime within Romanticism, and I will explore conceptions of hyperbole in
contemporary rhetorical theory. I will not explore these time periods extensively because
I will explicate their theoretical insights into excess and hyperbole in the next chapter.
ROMANTIC HYPERBOLE
In the late eighteenth century a reaction to Enlightenment philosophies comes in
the form of Romanticism. Wordsworth and Coleridge are noted to be the founders of
Romanticism, and hyperbole is often employed within their writing. There is no
specificly extended theory of hyperbole that develops during Romanticism, but the uses
of hyperbole during this time cluster around the sublime, which is also popular during the
Renaissance, through the writing of Longinus. On the Sublime was translated into
French by Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux in 1674 along with Boileau’s essays on the
sublime. From discussions of the sublime and the aesthetics of the Renaissance, an
aesthetic theory of Romanticism developed, largely influenced by the writing of Edmund
Burke217 and his discussion of the sublime in terms of terror.218
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The sublime itself has a contentious history, and it is beyond the scope of this
study to note all of the possible influences of hyperbole during Romanticism since the
sublime (via hyperbole) affected art, literature, musical composition, poetry, and
architecture. Suffice it to say, the hyperbolic pursuit of the sublime, the ideal, and the
absolute are similar to the sacred rhetorics in their search for divine transcendence. If
language is the outward expression of an inward devotion to and reflection on God in
Christian humanist rhetoric, then the same is true for the Romantics. The difference is
that instead of seeking “God,” the Romantics seek the authentic expression of inner
individuality, sense perception, and the imagination through their own interior sacred
power.219
The clear distinction between the sacred rhetorics, really all of rhetoric, and
Romanticism is not just its object of study. Whereas the sacred rhetorics are concerned
with communicating their experiences to an audience they seek to move towards
conversion and/or persuasion, the Romantics are focused wholly inward and are little
concerned with planned discourse and moving others’ will through reason and passion.220
“The supersensible becomes the [inner, individual] medium for the supernatural.”221
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Interiority, one’s sense perceptions, is the medium – not oratory.222 Although many
Romantics often ignore the rhetorical aspect of the sublime, those in the Renaissance are
fascinated with its rhetorical function, e.g., the “Hyperbolic Sublime” of Prideaux in
Christian preaching and theology.
Despite all of the disagreements regarding the sublime and Longinus’s intentions
about the sublime during Romanticism,223 what is important here is the rhetorical
function of hyperbole and its interaction with the sublime. A theory of hyperbole is
rarely developed at length in relation to the sublime, the two terms are often conflated,
and rhetoric, in fact, is not viewed positively by Romantic writers. What does occur is a
link between hyperbole and discussions of “dream,” “astonishment,” “terror,” and the
222
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Romantic sublime, including the religious sublime.224 The use and defense of hyperbole
is pervasive, e.g., in Baudelaire and Hugo.225 Hyperbole is the vehicle, both
ontologically and epistemologically, for the sublime. In this sense, hyperbole is a
redemptive figure for Romantic writers.226 Hyperbole is “the trace of a movement
towards the ideal.”227 Whether this ideal can ever be communicated is a heated debate
for Romantic theorists like Samuel Johnson, but certainly the most obvious trope for this
task is hyperbole in its attempt to make the incredible seem credible, i.e., to translate the
ineffable into language.
Through a defense of hyperbole, one of the predominant characteristics of
Romantic writers is the connection and conflation of hyperbole with the sublime. Louis
Wirth Marvick, like Longinus, fears this blending of hyperbole with the sublime, and he
suggests that hyperbole must be regulated by irony so the hearer is able to recognize
hyperbole as hyperbolic. Marvick asserts that Romantic writers tend to forget that the
hyperbole is not the ideal, and carried away by emotions, they take the hyperbole literally
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rather than figuratively. Rather than noting the distance between the ideal and the real,
many Romantics cannot distinguish hyperbole from truth.228
Other Romantic theorists like Harold Bloom also view hyperbole in terms of
sublime representation, and he sees hyperbole as an emptying out of metonymy.229
Suzanne Guerlac notes hyperbole’s connection to the sublime as well, but not in such
negative or overt terms as Marvick. She even suggests that criticism is praise (panegyric)
through exaggeration (hyperbole) of the critical term, which Jean-Pierre Mileur also
suggests when he says that difficulty arises as a kind of hyperbole that is the medium of
the critic’s existence.230 Discussing the sublime in Hugo’s writing, Guerlac asserts,
“Hyperbole speaks a double language…It overstates…Hyperbole is intensive…it
operates as a figure through its intensification of the literal, its maximization of it,” but
she continues, “The maximum is nonliteral, nondemonstrable, at the limit.”231 As noted
previously of theological discourse, hyperbolic assertions comprise discussions of the
ideal. In a similar though distinct move from both Marvick and Guerlac, Paul de Man
suggests that irony actually tends towards hyperbole. Discussing Baudelaire, he posits
that irony often begins as litotes and moves towards the absolute through and beyond
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hyperbole, and he suggests that irony is the “unrelieved vertige” of “vertige de
l’hyperbole” (Baudelaire’s phrase).232
From Romanticism, it is again evident that hyperbole has a contentious history.
Viewed to possess a significantly positive function in Romantic writing through its
connection to the sublime, hyperbole is still misconstrued and conflated with the sublime.
Romantic writers and theorists both delimit and explore the ambiguity and paradox of
hyperbole as a critical trope. As Mileur notes of this complexity, “Hyperbole challenges
its own identity as a trope – at times, it seems to harden into a characteristic of language;
at other times, it seems to describe a movement of consciousness, to constitute a
subject.”233 This protean and amorphous quality of hyperbole is tentatively explored in
contemporary theory, and it is to contemporary rhetorical theory that I now turn.
HYPERBOLE IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORICAL THEORY
I will finish this chapter by examining the few discussions of hyperbole in
twentieth and twenty-first century rhetorical theory. Although many philosophers,
philologists, theologians, and theoreticians outside the field of rhetorical theory briefly
examine or utilize excess in their arguments – Mikhail Bakhtin, Søren Kierkegaard, Karl
Barth, Rudolf Otto, Mark C. Taylor, Willard R. Espy,234 Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul
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Ricoeur, Christopher D. Johnson, Jacques Derrida, Slavoj Zizek, Jean-Luc Marion, Paul
de Man, among many others who I will discuss further in following chapters – the focus
here is on hyperbole within rhetorical theory.235 Despite hyperbole’s common use –
“Hyperbole is so steadily droned into our ears that most of us have ceased to think of it as
a figure of speech”236 – few rhetorical theorists and critics endeavor to explore the form
and function of hyperbole on its own terms. Instead, they opt simply to dismiss it as
unimportant, a lie, of little value, or an aspect of metaphor and irony.237 Marvick writes
of hyperbole’s low standing, “If twentieth century critics have not appreciated the full
meaning of hyperbole, it is doubtless because they have clung too tenaciously to their
ability to see through it.”238 With a few exceptions, the rhetorical critics and theorists
who examine hyperbole do not develop a theory of hyperbole, view it negatively and
with reservations, or so benign as not to warrant attention, which again highlights the
contentious history of hyperbole.
For example, Edward P. J. Corbett cautions the use of hyperbole with restraint,
but he also posits that inventing new hyperboles can “produce the right note of

1983), 98. He defines hyperbole as “the boldest figure of rhetoric,” and it “enables us to describe what
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emphasis…or humor.”239 Richard A. Lanham offers a pithy, though insightful, entry on
hyperbole defining it as “exaggerated or extravagant terms used for emphasis and not
intended to be understood literally; self-conscious exaggeration.”240 James Jasinski, in
Sourcebook on Rhetoric, places the entry for hyperbole under the broad entry on style.
He utilizes Robert J. Fogelin’s portrayal of hyperbole as “a moment of excessive
exaggeration”241 and also links it to conspiracy theories. The subtle shift here is from a
trope to a “moment,” which places a greater importance on hyperbole because it indicates
a significant moment within discourse rather than a passing rhetorical flourish for effect.
Indeed, Fogelin’s entry on hyperbole in Argumentation portrays hyperbole in a positive
way. He writes of hyperbole, “Here I say something stronger than what I have a right to
say with the intention of having it corrected away from the extreme, but still to something
strong that preserves the same polarity.”242 Here is Seneca’s and Quintilian’s definition
again. Fogelin also considers hyperbole, as well as irony and meiosis, to be figurative
modes of discourse with the intent of offering a corrective judgment non-literally and
indirectly.243 Fogelin’s view of hyperbole is quite positive, and describing it as a
figurative mode of discourse elevates hyperbole’s status from a tropical ornament.
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The authors of The New Rhetoric posit a more complex view of hyperbole and
offer a longer though terse discussion of hyperbole. Their brief but dense section on an
argument of unlimited development includes hyperbole and litotes within it and requires
some explication. Unlimited development, quite literally, is an argument that proceeds in
a direction without limit, an argument towards infinity, and it is structured hierarchically.
An ideal term, or “god term,”244 is posited as unrealizable, and the terms below that ideal
term are utilized to describe and push towards the ideal term in an excessive way.
Unchecked, the argument goes beyond reason. Paradoxically, the ultimate term is not the
center of the argument and not the term the audience is interested in hearing. It is those
certain terms that fall short of the ultimate term that are actually being debated.245
Hyperboles are the terms at the center of the argument.
As a term of unlimited development, hyperbole serves an important function. The
indictment of the argument by unlimited development is that it is impossible to proceed
indefinitely in the direction indicated because it dead-ends at an absolute thereby making
any further progress untenable.246 Hyperbole serves to regulate this development. It
gives a direction to thought through a “shock” that is “fired with brutality,” which intends
to give an indication of the ultimate term.247 Hyperbole exploits the weakness of the
argument of unlimited development by offering a self-reflexive check on infinity. It
delimits the limitlessness of unlimited development. Hyperbole aims at unlimited
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development, and it always has a purpose, which is to point towards the ultimate term
without going beyond it to the point of absurdity. Hyperbole asserts the impossible to
arrive at the possible.
This is, in fact, one way theology operates. If one were to make an unqualified
statement that God is inscrutable, then theology would end with that statement.248 The
incomprehensibility of God must be modified by the qualifier of hyperbole because the
ultimate term can only be debated through the limiting effect of hyperbole, i.e., asserting
the impossible (God) to arrive at the possible (statements about God). Hence, in this
view, theology is contingent upon hyperbole as a qualifier of theology’s intent. For
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, hyperbole is the cautionary figure that inhibits the
unlimited development of an argument thereby serving a positive function.249
However, relegating hyperbole to an argument of unlimited development limits
the scope of hyperbole. Always equating hyperbole with the ideal also limits its critical
range. Marvick, Guerlac, and Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca restrain hyperbole within
the purview of unlimited development and the ideal because, outside of these limits,
hyperbole may become “too wild and unrestrained.”250 Webb, another contemporary
theorist of hyperbole as well as a theologian, offers a critique of this view by suggesting
that limiting hyperbole also limits its potential. Releasing hyperbole’s extreme
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possibilities, it need not “further an argument of unlimited development; instead it can
serve to end all arguments, to freeze all developments.”251 This is an extreme position to
take, and it oversteps the functions of hyperbole. It is not that hyperbole ends all
arguments but transforms them into other ways of perceiving the world. As we saw in
the Renaissance, it is a playful trope that expands meaning. Freezing all developments is
actually what occurs in the argument of unlimited development, i.e., the argument ends at
the ultimate term. Hyperbole is what prevents this from occurring. While I agree that
hyperbole need not be limited to the ideal, the conclusion Webb reaches also limits the
function of hyperbole by forcing functions onto hyperbole it does not possess.
Webb is an interesting author because of his work in rhetoric as well as theology,
and he can be credited with offering the most extensive theory of hyperbole in
contemporary theological and rhetorical discourse. Although he is a theologian and not a
rhetorician, his work merits attention. He traces hyperbole through Karl Barth, Søren
Kierkegaard, Georges Bataille, Friedrich Nietzsche, Flannery O’Conner, Emmanuel
Levinas, and G. K. Chesterton. Webb’s project is to connect hyperbole to theology and
argue that theology relies on hyperbole to function effectively. This is a commendable
endeavor since (rhetorical) theologians, e.g., Paul Ricoeur and David Tracy, often discuss
the excess of God, the excessive gift of grace, and the excessive sacrifice of Christ
through metaphor and analogy without discussing the function of hyperbole within these
arguments. Webb’s insights into hyperbole, though often inaccurate or perhaps overzealous, are helpful for understanding how hyperbole might be utilized in contemporary
rhetorical theory.
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He defines hyperbole as “a trope that beckons but also warns; it accomplishes an
intensification that does not result in a metaphorical synthesis but brazenly both invites
and distances the audience from the height of an apparently unreasonable position.”252
This definition provides a constructive view of hyperbole, and it also fits into the overall
characterization of hyperbole up to this point. Yet, Webb often forces hyperbole into
precarious positions it may not be able to occupy. For example, Webb also argues,
“Hyperbole allows one to say more than is strictly appropriate to the expectations set by
the subject matter, the speaker, and the situation.”253 Contrary to much of hyperbole’s
rhetorical history, Webb asserts that hyperbole violates decorum, which is the same
accusation theorists who view hyperbole negatively make. The attempt to inhibit
hyperbole historically occurs through decorum, but a decorum of excess is often utilized
to allow for the productive use of hyperbole in thought and language.
Webb also writes, “Hyperbole vertiginously suspends the logic of language, and
therein lies the origin of its danger and power.” 254 Hyperbole simply does not suspend
the logic of language, nor is this the origin of its power. As shown in this chapter,
hyperbole pushes the limitations of language and logical reasoning to a breaking point
through its own critical illogical function in order to reveal the ineptitude of language and
undermine logical argumentation, similar to Derrida’s notion of différance. Hyperbole
does not suspend the logic of language but asserts impossibilities as possibilities and
possibilities as impossibilities to push language beyond its own limitations. It actually
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heightens the logic of language in order to undermine it. Thus, Webb’s contributions are
numerous, but his conclusions about hyperbole are often tenuous in ways that deflate his
overall argument.
Outside of the realm of rhetorical theology, contemporary rhetorical theorists and
critics often examine and utilize the form and function of hyperbole but do not discuss it
explicitly or even acknowledge its existence. For example, the “enthusiasms” of the
Awakenings are analyzed by rhetorical critics, “purple prose” is treated rhetorically, and
“god terms” and ideographs are important rhetorical contributions that have not delved
into the ways hyperbole actually enables those terms to function effectively. Fantasy
theme analysis could benefit from a theory of hyperbole (perhaps renewing its
usefulness), conspiracy theories are examined (sometimes noting hyperbole’s uses), and
prophetic and apocalyptic discourse as well as Christian fundamentalist rhetoric is
extensively explored without a mention of the obvious hyperbolic nature of those
discourses through their tautology and eschatological teleology. Even the brilliant
analysis of Joe McCarthy’s “fantastic moment” is discussed in hyperbolic terms without
addressing hyperbole at all. Additionally, the hyperbolic assertions of postmodern and
poststructuralist discourse regarding language, subjectivity, alterity, hospitality, and
sacrifice are adopted for rhetorical purposes without noting their most significant
rhetorical function, i.e., exaggeration.255 Most confounding of all, epideictic discourse is
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extensively explored without ever mentioning its most vital and historically foundational
trope.
There are also numerous expressions of hyperbole in popular culture and
language, but these expressions are not examined rhetorically from a hyperbolic
perspective.256 Noted above, one could interpret the Awakenings as hyperbolic
expressions of “enthusiasms.” One might even suggest that Jonathan Edwards’s “Sinners
in the Hand of an Angry God” is an example of an intentionally hyperbolic sermon.
Other examples of hyperbole in popular culture might include the “tall tales” of the
American West, the political commentary of Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert, the
comedy of Brian Regan, the exaggerated tactics of advertisements, certain elements in
science fiction literature/film, the heavy metal music genre where everything is
exaggerated, the comic book genre that often relies solely on hyperbole, and “end times”
or apocalyptic discourse, which is almost entirely hyperbolic. These and other examples
of hyperbole’s absence in rhetorical theory and criticism serve to highlight the lack of
hyperbolic analyses in contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism thereby revealing the
inherent distrust or off hand dismissal of hyperbole as an unimportant trope that is
unworthy of attention. Of course, the very tradition of rhetoric largely distrusts and
dismisses hyperbole, and it is not considered one of the “master tropes” originally posited
It is true that much of Derrida’s own positionings inherently rely upon a hyperbolic style in order
to reveal the limits he is exploring and that his descriptions of excessively hyperbolic concepts like “trace,”
“dissemination,” and “différance” are hardly a conservative approach to hyperbole. Yet, his privileging of
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economy he seeks to exploit and explode.
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by Vico. Contemporary theorists and critics can hardly be blamed for the centuries-old
ambiguous and paradoxical perception of hyperbole, but it is time to begin exploring
hyperbole in new ways that offers productive insights into rhetorical “texts” and theories.
CONCLUSION
In this historical overview, the rich and contentious history of hyperbole is
evident. Throughout much of its history, hyperbole is distrusted and/or dismissed as an
insignificant trope that serves no critical tropological function within language and
discourse. There are numerous times when hyperbole is viewed in a positive way, but
even then, caution is suggested when using the trope. Overall, the form and function of
hyperbole assigned to it by Greco-Roman rhetorical theorists, especially Quintilian, is
simply repeated by later rhetorical theorists, and the protean form of hyperbole as an
embodied excessive vice is warned against for its deviation from the ideal of moderation.
The synecdochal connection between language and being is an important concern of
rhetorical theorists and rhetorical theologians, but this important ontological function of
hyperbole is typically not discussed positively, e.g., embodied hyperbole as sin or vice.
The epistemological fluidity and playfulness of hyperbole is utilized more predominantly,
but it is still resisted or inhibited in favor of a more stable system of meaning and being.
In sum, hyperbole has never shed the tone of suspicion derived from its de-stabilizing
effects.
From this historical overview, one gets a sense of the typical characteristics of
hyperbole even if attitudes about it differ. It is regarded with caution because of its
excess, but this aspect of hyperbole is often viewed as useful. It is accused of violating
decorum, and it is also used to constitute its own decorum of excess, which often places it

130
into the categories of epideictic discourse and the grand style. To establish a decorum of
excess, hyperbolic excess is often divided into a binary of excess where one type of
excess – extravagant hyperbole, sin, or sophistic eloquence – is negative and the other
type of excess – elegant hyperbole, divine excess, or Christian ornament and sacred
eloquence – is positive. Hyperbole is also sometimes confused with the impossible or the
ideal, which places hyperbole in the precarious position of a term that is easily conflated
with other terms. In addition, hyperbole is typically understood to be a lie on the side of
truth, though it is also considered simply a lie by some.
Perhaps the most important and misunderstood function of hyperbole, it is also its
most re-interpreted function. For Seneca and Quintilian, hyperbole’s deceit is figural, but
its effects are literal and hermeneutically advantageous. For many other theorists and
theologians, hyperbole’s deceit is moral, and its effect is corruption. Yet, the figural
deceit is simply the function of all tropes to offer alternative ways of perceiving the
world. Hyperbole, however, heightens this function, which makes it a tenuous and
distrusted trope for its audacious assertions. Significantly, hyperbole is most vehemently
resisted when it is literally half-understood. Hyperbole is often rejected as a lie, which is
only partly true, because it is a lie on the side of truth. It is not a falsehood intended to
deceive but a pretense intended to reveal a larger truth, an alternative truth, and in this
sense, hyperbole is a redemptive figure. Misunderstanding this aspect of hyperbole leads
one to mis-perceive it as only a lie, but understanding its overall redemptive function
allows one to (mis)recognize that the lie is intended to reveal other truths as well as
correctives in judgment. Overall, the most consistent claims made of hyperbole are that it
should be regarded with fear (the implicit claim) and suspicion (the explicit claim).
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In order to offer a counterbalance to this fear and suspicion, I will explore the
specific functions of hyperbole largely derived from its history in the following chapters.
In chapter three I will examine the impossibility/possibility and truth/lie functions of
hyperbole. In chapter four I will explicate a disorientation/re-orientation meta-function
of hyperbole. I will argue that these are the three main functions of hyperbole that make
it a critical trope for current theoretical discussion, and I will use the epideictic and
grotesque genres to exemplify these claims.
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPOSSIBLE LIE OF HYPERBOLE
The historicity proper to philosophy is located and constituted in the transition, the
dialogue between hyperbole and the finite structure, between that which exceeds the
totality and the closed totality, in the difference between history and historicity, that is, in
the place where, or rather at the moment when, the Cogito and all that it symbolizes here
(madness, derangement, hyperbole, etc.) pronounce and reassure themselves then to fall,
necessarily forgetting themselves until their reactivation, their reawakening in another
statement of the excess which also later will become another decline and another crisis.
Jacques Derrida
When fascism comes to America, it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying the cross.
Sinclair Lewis
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I offered an exploration of the rich and contentious history
of hyperbole, and from this survey, it is evident that hyperbole has clearly defined
functions but is a highly contested trope that is sometimes celebrated as well as
misapprehended and marginalized. In contemporary rhetorical theory it receives neither
the critical exploration nor the attention that other tropes like irony and metaphor are
given, but it remains important for rhetorical discussion because of its theoretical
contributions. As Christopher D. Johnson writes, “The hyperbolist perceives an
extraordinary, outrageous, ridiculous, or ineffable res (thing, event, feeling, idea), while
his or her verba (words, speech, language) strain discursive limits, analogical
frameworks, and literary and rhetorical conventions, to represent that res.”1 Here,
Johnson highlights the importance for exploring hyperbole from its attempt to express the
ineffable and extraordinary to its effect of stretching the limits of conventions and reason.
All the while, this attempt is made despite the inadequacies of language and speech to

1

Christopher D. Johnson, Hyperboles: The Rhetoric of Excess in Baroque Literature and Thought
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 2.
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communicate such an incommunicable and incomprehensible res. Thus, I will parse out
the complexities and functions of hyperbole derived from its history in this chapter and
the next and suggest various characteristics of this “master trope,” the “trope of tropes,”2
in order to revive its importance as a critical tropological contribution to rhetorical theory
and criticism.
Gerard Genette poses a crucial question for hyperbole in his essay, “Hyperboles.”
He asks, “Does not this hyperbolic mode of thought (wit) have its reasons, which
commonsense ignores and which reason wishes to know?”3 The answer to this question
may come in Genette’s own definition of hyperbole: “One may call hyperboles the
effects by which language…draws closer through contrast and discontinuity, as if by
burglary, realities naturally far-removed.”4 Hyperbole holds extremities in tension. It
represents the extraordinary and attempts to force the audience beyond the literal into the
realm of the figural. It stretches the literal and maximizes it so that literal and figurative
signification overlaps.5 The “reason” of hyperbole is to force one beyond the normality
of conventional thought by bringing that which is contradictory into view. “The same
and the other are held together, ‘complicated,’ by hyperbole” because “Hyperbole speaks
a double language…It overstates.”6 This complicated double language of contradiction,
i.e., vertige de l’hyperbole, fosters transition. More precisely, and aligned with Genette’s
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assertion, hyperbole is a double-dealing gesture of “duplicity.”7 Driven to teach and to
move, hyperbole is a double-cross for the purpose of transition, and this motive behind
hyperbole occurs via three main functions.
The three tropological and figural functions of hyperbole I will explore in this and
the following chapter are: 1) the relationship between impossibility and possibility, 2) a
lie expressed on the side of truth, and 3) a disorientation leading to a re-orientation. The
first two are explicit functions given to hyperbole during its history, and I will explore
these two functions in this chapter, which I will use as a structuring guide. This will also
illuminate the basic structure of hyperbole.
The first function is derived from Demetrius’s, Quintilian’s, and Seneca’s
discussions of hyperbole where the purpose of hyperbole is to move through the
difficulty of impossibility and transition towards other as yet unrealized possibilities. It is
a play with epistemological and ontological assumptions that disrupts conventions and
norms. The second function comes largely from Quintilian’s complex theory of
hyperbole where he argues that hyperbole is a lie but not one intended to deceive.
Paradoxically, he portrays a hyperbolic lie that leads towards truth(s), and he offers
hyperbole as a rich tool for epistemological inquiry. In a sense, hyperbole is a selfreflexive conceit, a mask, which unmasks the lie of the truth that only masquerades as the
truth. In each case, I will use the epideictic and grotesque genres as examples that
highlight these functions of hyperbole. I will use these genres to exemplify the functions
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of hyperbole, and I will mainly use epideictic in this chapter and the grotesque in the next
chapter, though there is definite overlap.
Epideictic is historically linked to hyperbole, and it is continually suggested by
rhetorical theorists that this genre is where hyperbole belongs. The grotesque is a
conceptual realm where excess and exaggeration are repeatedly used without mention of
hyperbole. For each function of hyperbole, these two genres will serve to highlight the
various functions of hyperbole. The two genres each exemplify in their own way some
critical aspect of hyperbole, and they share two persistent themes of hyperbole –
contradiction and transition; the energeia of hyperbole. That is, each function of
hyperbole offers a contradictory position that operates as a critical transitional principle
of epistemological and/or ontological importance.8 These genres emphasize these two
themes that pervade the three functions of hyperbole, but before exploring these themes
and functions, I briefly return to Quintilian.
Quintilian’s often uncertain theory of hyperbole is the defining moment for
hyperbole within the history of rhetorical theory. As discussed in the last chapter, it is
mainly Quintilian who sees the significant potential of hyperbole, and it is his theory of
hyperbole that remains influential for rhetorical theorists and critics throughout
hyperbole’s contentious history. In contemporary rhetorical theory his insights are all but
lost, and hyperbole is typically viewed as a lie that serves no critical rhetorical function.
As his theory of hyperbole is the most influential but is now occluded from view,
it is only by going back to Quintilian that I can construct a foundation for a meaningful
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theory of hyperbole. I will use his insights as a foundation on which to build a theory of
hyperbole, and from this foundation, I will re-explore and expand upon the functions of
hyperbole. I will clarify Quintilian’s insights throughout the chapter and offer a detailed
analysis of different aspects of his theoretical contributions, but this first section will
serve as a general overview of Quintilian’s theory to prepare for the following analysis of
hyperbole.
QUINTILIAN REDUX
It is Quintilian’s ambivalent theory of hyperbole, and his rhetorical theory in
general, that is significantly influential for rhetorical theorists throughout history. Indeed,
it leads to Erasmus’s theory of copia as eloquence that became so important for Christian
humanists of the Renaissance, and Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole is pervasive
throughout the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Baroque, and Romanticism. One
might further argue that it is not Aristotle’s but Quintilian’s summarizing clarification of
rhetorical theory and its connection to philosophy that is so influential today. However,
Quintilian’s views regarding hyperbole are largely disconnected from hyperbole at
present. Thus, it is Quintilian that I now briefly re-visit to elucidate some important
aspects and issues of hyperbole such as decorum, ethos, pathos, kakozelia, and kairos,
which will guide the overall discussion of hyperbole’s functions.
To begin, hyperbole often requires the use of amplification (auxesis). Quintilian
suggests that auxesis (Gk. αυχέ-σις: the process, state, or condition of increasing; Lat.
amplificatio: amplification) is a species of hyperbole,9 and the four species of auxesis
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Quintilian offers are incrementum (augmentation), comparatio (comparison), ratiocinatio
(reasoning), and congeries (accumulation). He also adds ratio minunendi (attenuation)
under congeries.10
Incrementum may slowly build step by step towards or proceed all at once to the
highest point or beyond it – “Every particular is an advance on that which precedes”11:
To vomit from excessive drinking would have been of itself disgusting, even if
not before a public assembly; it would have been disgusting before a public
assembly, even if not of a whole people; before a whole people, even if not the
people of Rome; even if he had held no office, or not a public office, or not that of
master of the horse.12
Through a series of “even if” clauses, Quintilian’s example builds numerically and
spatially step by step to amplify the “disgusting” in an extraordinary situation.
Comparatio “seeks to raise itself on something lower”13:
Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius, having related that a woman of Miletus had
received a bribe from the heirs in reversion to cause abortion in her own person,
exclaims, of how much greater punishment is Oppianicus deserving for a crime of
a similar nature? The woman of Miletus, in doing violence to her own body,
tortured only herself; Oppianicus effected a like object by violence and torture to
the body of another.14
Oppianicus is compared to a woman who gave herself an abortion for a bribe. By
comparing Oppianicus to a woman and highlighting the violence done was only to
herself, the rhetor amplifies the offensive violence of Oppianicus done to others.
Hyperboles, 48-52. “More than just being another way of increasing or diminishing the value of a res,
hyperbole may encompass or control…various kinds of amplification” (52).
10

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.4.1-8.4.28, trans. Lee Honeycutt,
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter4.html> (12 April 2010).
11

Ibid., 8.4.3-8.4.9.

12

Ibid., 8.4.8.

13

Ibid., 8.4.9.

14

Ibid., 8.4.11.

138
Ratiocinatio introduces “in one place and produces its effect in another; so that
one thing is magnified in order that another may be corroborated; and thence we arrive by
reasoning at that which is the object of our amplification”15:
This is done by Cicero, when he said, These are but trifling charges against such a
criminal. The captain of a vessel, from a most honorable city, purchased
exemption from the terror of scourging with a sum of money; to allow him to do
so was humanity in Verres. Another, that he might not be beheaded, sacrificed
also a sum of money; this was but an ordinary occurrence.16
Here, a captain from a most honorable city purchasing the safety of a vessel is heralded
as virtuous and highly praised. This magnification in one context then strengthens the
assertion that the crime under discussion is both trifling and ordinary.
Congeries is the “accumulation of a number of words or thoughts having the same
signification; for though they do not ascend by steps, yet they are heaped up, as it were,
by coacervation”17:
What did your sword do, Tubero, that was drawn in the field of Pharsalia? At
whose body was the point of it aimed? What was the object of your appearance in
arms? To what were your thoughts, your eyes, your hands, directed? What ardor
inspired your breast? What did you wish or desire?18
Determining Tubero’s intent when using his sword is amplified by heaping sentence upon
sentence and accumulating a mass of interrelated questions clustering around the main
question of Tubero’s motives. Quintilian also suggests that ratio minunendi is similar to
congeries “for there are as many steps when we go up as when we go down.”19
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Hyperbole can and does operate in these ways, but Quintilian also distinguishes
amplification from hyperbole as trope suggesting that amplification is a species of
hyperbole as well as placing hyperbole in his discussion of tropes.
Christopher D. Johnson interprets Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole suggesting that
there are three characteristics of hyperbole: creating pathos where it is expected, using
nature as an objective basis for exaggeration, and pointing to the conceptual and
allegorical promise of hyperbole.20 Rather than offering these three characteristics, it is
sufficient simply to say that hyperbole is a linguistic vehicle of transcendence.
Hyperbole creates pathos in order to transcend the bounds of a given context, e.g.,
“nature” or language, by comparatively employing exaggeration to offer a new insight.
This is perhaps the main reason the Romantics offer hyperbole as a vehicle for/towards
the sublime. Hyperbole is that which attempts to transcend the ordinary and express the
inexpressible.
In addition, Quintilian offers five types of hyperbole, which Johnson divides into
two categories.21 The first three are tropological – hyperbole by simile,22 comparison,23
and metaphor. The last two are figures of thought – hyperbole by exaggerating the facts,
i.e., saying more than the truth,24 and by “certain signs.”25 Quintilian also suggests that
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“one hyperbole is increased by the addition of another”26 (later theoretically extended by
the copia of Erasmus)27 noting that each type of hyperbole can be used in combination
with other types as well as other tropes, which suggests both the contextual flexibility and
adaptability of hyperbole. For my purposes, each of these “species” of hyperbole may be
considered topoi from which I will draw when discussing each form and function of
hyperbole in this chapter. In all of the functions I will discuss, I am assuming, as does
Quintilian, that hyperbole is not excess beyond all measure but a purposeful measure of
excess for effect/affect.
For Quintilian, hyperbole is both objective and subjective. It is an objective
exaggeration of quantity or quality, and it is subjective in how it is received, which
depends largely on the disposition of the audience toward hyperbole. Johnson suggests
that one might view hyperbole in Quintilian’s theory as the linguistic means to achieve
excess corresponding to affectus.28 Unlike Isocrates and Aristotle who assign only the
role of exaggeration to hyperbole somewhat distancing it from excess, though the
excessive deviation from moderation is still a vital concern, Quintilian maintains the
connection between objective exaggeration and subjective excess within the scope of
hyperbole. Excess is the order, and hyperbole is the genus. This view, as shown in the
last chapter, is quite significant for those like the Church Fathers who are obsessed with
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the effects of excess, i.e., vices, on the individual. Thus, born out of Quintilian’s theory,
hyperbole’s structure is twofold: the objective linguistic exaggeration of hyperbole is
subjectively received and internalized as excessive affectus, e.g., perhaps as embodied
hyperbole. The two are not separate but interrelated. Quintilian’s radical move thereby
gives hyperbole both an epistemological and an ontological justification for its use.
Rather than dismissing hyperbole, Quintilian offers it as a critical rhetorical trope that
engages and/or exploits significant rhetorical issues such as ethos and pathos.
Hyperbole’s effectiveness, more than other tropes, is based on the audience’s
predisposition for exaggeration and excess, its very tropological function. Because
hyperbole is a particularly risky trope, this means that ethos and pathos are important for
hyperbole’s reception more than other tropes. In Quintilian’s framework, hyperbole as
trope and as “sophisticated, discursive figure of thought”29 interacts with, extends, and
alters other tropes and perspectives by carefully maintaining an appropriate ethos with the
audience so that pathos might be employed effectively. As Johnson says, “The
hyperbolist constantly puts his ethos at risk, as he depends on the reader’s good will and
ability to decide how his inventions are received.”30 Hyperbole relies on ethos and
pathos more than other tropes and figures because of the common accusation of
kakozelia: “Cacozelia…encompasses every fault of excess caused by insincerity,
pretence, ambition, or faulty judgment. It signals a distortion of the relation between
subject and style, between things and words.”31 The very nature of hyperbole as a
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tropological representation of excess as well as hyperbole’s penchant for privileging
affectus over ratio places it in an equivocal relationship with decorum and the
hyperbolist’s ethos and use of pathos. This puts hyperbole precariously at the mercy of
the audience’s predisposition for both hyperbole and the hyperbolist.
As one tactic against hyperbole’s failure, Quintilian suggests that hyperbole’s
daring may require the “proleptic blame of remedium.”32 As Quintilian quotes “a very
elegant Greek saying,” one should be “the first to blame [one’s] own hyperbole.”33 Not
simply blame however, remedia, as remedies or cures, are meant to be employed as precautionary and/or recovery tactics when using hyperbole in order to prevent its failure
and dismissal, and Quintilian’s caution against debasing one’s ethos through “exorbitant
affectation”34 (kakozelia) is vital when hyperbole is used. As this anticipatory tactic
indicates, the risk of hyperbole heightens the need for its justification.
Confirming my observations in the previous chapter, Johnson argues that for
Quintilian there are two main justifications for hyperbole: 1) a speaker is moved in some
extraordinary manner and 2) some incredible subject calls for expression.35 The first is
psychological, and the second is phenomenological, and both “motives depend upon the
existence of an outrageous or extraordinary res.”36 Either psychologically or
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phenomenologically, these justifications are premised on hyperbole’s response to an
extraordinary exigence. An unusual psychological or phenomenological exigence can
justify the use of hyperbole, but only if it remains decorous. Hyperbole risks violating
decorum even as it pushes common notions of decorum to the limit. The extraordinary
exigence demands an appropriately disproportionate response, which is negotiated
through one’s ethos as well as one’s use of pathos. While Aristotle says that hyperbole is
“too risky” in relation to decorum, Quintilian posits that hyperbole necessitates risking
decorum. Establishing a binary of excess, a decorous hyperbole is an “elegant”
hyperbole while an indecorous hyperbole is “extravagant,” i.e., an “exorbitant
affectation,”37 and this extravagance leads to accusations of kakozelia.
To be hyperbolic is to risk, e.g., pathos, and to be at risk, e.g., ethos. The
“incredible” risks violating decorum even as it attempts to stay within its bounds.
Whether a stylistic or ethical risk, hyperbole exists in the space between the decorous and
indecorous. Residing within a certain liminal decorum of excess, hyperbole can be
justified, or “pardoned,”38 when the subject matter demands an exceptional response, i.e.,
“when the res ‘surpasses the ordinary limits of nature,’”39 or language. To clarify, one
might say that the exigence (res) as well as the end (the re-presentation of a res), justifies
the means (verba) within the precarious space of a decorum of excess, and this decorum
is maintained through ethos and pathos.
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The hyperbolist creates a considerable tension between the ideal and the real, the
word and the world, the figurative and the literal, and this means “strong demands are
made on judgment as well as taste.”40 These strong demands require the use of hyperbole
to seem appropriate, justified, and necessary, which places a significant burden on the
hyperbolist. The deft use of both pathos and ethos is thus crucial when hyperbole is
employed. Whether hyperbole as trope or figure of thought, each is governed by ethos as
well as pathos, which, shown in the previous chapter, those like Longinus and Augustine
posit. Discussing the sublime or the things of God, respectively, the need to invoke
subjective intensity outweighs the objective limits of language, even decorous language,
which creates a playfulness with meaning.
For Quintilian, hyperbole engenders a certain playfulness with extremes, and in
this play with extremity, hyperbole expands the range of what is considered “truth” and
decorous. For Quintilian, truth is fluid. It is not absolute or fixed,41 and this is important
for the functions he ascribes to hyperbole. He writes, “It is an elegant surpassing of the
truth [superiectio] and is used equally for exaggerating and extenuating.”42 Hyperbole
can reveal by surpassing the truth, but it must remain appropriately disproportionate to do
so. It must not venture “beyond belief,”43 or beyond all reason, but it may go “beyond
reality”44 and “say more than the facts” since “no one is contented with the exact truth.”45
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Indeed, Quintilian suggests that departure from the truth may be “pardoned” if the
departure does not affirm the false.46 That is, a hyperbole may be pardoned if it is elegant
and believable, but if hyperbole goes too far or affirms what is false, then it is
extravagant. This hyperbolic binary aids in governing the excessive impetus of
hyperbole and gives it effective/affective rhetorical direction and force, which decorously
maintains its epistemological playfulness without devolving into “absurdities,” i.e.,
kakozelia.
Highlighting this playfulness, Quintilian offers one of his most complex and
paradoxical assertions: “It is sufficient to remark that the hyperbole lies, but not so as to
intend to deceive by lying, and we therefore ought to consider more carefully how far it
becomes us to exaggerate that which is not believed.”47 Just as Seneca suggests, “The
purpose of all exaggeration is to arrive at the truth by falsehood” and that through
hyperbole “what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought to be as much
so as possible,”48 Quintilian makes the same claim. The lie of hyperbole is not a deceit
but a falsehood intended to reveal because the exact truth is never enough.
Compensating for this lack, hyperbole offers a different type of lie – a hyperbolic lie that
brings epistemological abundance rather than lack.
Paradoxical in the extreme, Quintilian and Seneca imply that hyperbole operates
through a different kind of logic that is not bound to linguistic or epistemological norms.
It marks the disproportionality between the word and the world. Hyperbole is described
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as more than exaggerated or even decorative language, which might be partitioned off
into the grand style or dismissed as bombast. It offers a different kind of speech where a
lie that is not a deception can be employed on the side of a truth that necessitates the use
of excess “because [reminiscent of Gorgias of Leontini’s maxim] the exact truth cannot
be said, and language is more efficient when it goes beyond reality than when it stops
short of it.”49 This hyperbolic lie allows for a copious play with meaning via extremity
that ventures, not beyond belief, but beyond the strict limitations of language, knowledge,
or facts. Thus, the purpose of hyperbole for Quintilian, as for Seneca, is to reveal more
than is stated, accepted, or commonly believed. There is a stylistic and epistemological
playfulness created by hyperbole that not only stretches conventions, decorum, and the
value of truth claims but also, perhaps especially, that which cannot be believed without
the use of the extraordinary.
Quintilian suggests that the excessiveness of reality itself requires the use of
hyperboles on a regular basis and that humans have a “natural propensity” to
exaggerate.50 He notes that when one speaks of something that transcends the normal
limits of nature, it is better to go too far and risk saying too much than not enough since,
as noted above, “no one is contented with the exact truth.”51 Paradoxically, he posits that
hyperbole is risky while also implying that the audience is already predisposed to
hyperbole because it is in common use. Even if it not well received, it may be pardoned
or recovered through remedia. One begins to wonder, then, what might cause hyperbole
49
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to be so risky. The answer is that, in as much as Quintilian’s discussion is a remedium
itself, the use of elegant hyperbole all hinges on its response that is demanded or
necessitated by a specific contextual situation, and this response must force one beyond
the literal into the figural. Despite hyperbole’s common use, which may or may not be
recognized as hyperbole, it must seem appropriate and not be interpreted literally. Thus,
the risk of hyperbole is the accusation of kakozelia.
A particular phenomenological exigence requires a psychological response that
cannot be offered in any other way except through hyperbole: “Hyperbole is a beauty
when the thing of which we speak is extraordinary in nature. For we are then allowed to
say a little more than the truth.”52 The psychological or phenomenological justifications
of hyperbole, then, both fall under the purview of kairos, which is implied by Quintilian
when he suggests that “wit” may easily turn to “folly.”53 The decorous use of hyperbole
requires the hyperbolist to make the forceful assertion at an opportune moment. Justified
by exigence or not, if the hyperbole is not offered at the right moment, it will easily be
accused of folly. Indeed, a kairotic moment (psychological justification) that is tied to a
particular exigence (phenomenological justification) is the overall justification for
hyperbole. One’s verba must seem timely and appropriate when describing and moving
one towards the believability of a res.
From this discussion, what is important to highlight is that the objective use of
hyperbole facilitates a subjective response. This means that one’s ethos as well as pathos
are significant considerations when employing hyperbole, which may easily be accused
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of kakozelia. Whether hyperbole as trope or figure of thought, ethos and pathos govern
hyperbole’s departure from conventions and the “truth.” In Quintilian’s case, the elegant,
decorous use of hyperbole is effective while the extravagant hyperbole is of little use.
When hyperbole is a “beauty” it becomes a linguistic vehicle of epistemological and
ontological transcendence that may come in various forms, and these forms paradoxically
reach beyond reality, but not beyond belief, in order to effect perceptual and emotional
change. The change fostered through hyperbole is justified phenomenologically and
psychologically, and this justification is the crux of hyperbole’s success or failure. To
facilitate the justification of hyperbole, a decorum of excess is required where the
appropriate response is a disproportionate response only hyperbole can offer.
Quintilian negotiates a more fluid conception of decorum for hyperbole at every
turn. The binary of excess between elegant, i.e., beyond reality, and extravagant, i.e.,
beyond belief, hyperbole is perhaps his most overt attempt at accommodating decorum
for hyperbole, and implying that a hyperbolic lie is distinct from a conventional lie is
another attempt. He also suggests that hyperbole maintains its decorousness through its
justification. Objectively justified by an extraordinary exigence or subject matter and
subjectively justified by the need for extreme pathos, a fluid decorum of excess provides
the hyperbolist with the necessary means to exert hyperbole’s full force upon the
audience at a particular kairotic moment. In a decorum of excess where excess,
hyperbolic lies, and exaggeration are the norms, hyperbole seems entirely appropriate and
may be offered forcefully at the opportune moment.
In sum, hyperbole is a trope and figure of thought that facilitates transition
through the mode of contradiction, e.g., a lie that is not a lie. The motive of hyperbole is
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change or transformation, and its function is to serve as the axis of transition upon which
contradiction is balanced, which is only fully effective within a decorum of excess.
By re-visiting Quintilian’s theory of hyperbole these important observations
constitute the foundation upon which I will construct a theory of hyperbole. These are
also the central issues hyperbole must face and the ones, which, paradoxically, make it so
effective. Hyperbole pushes all boundaries of notions of rhetorical decorum, and it risks
extraordinary heights to accomplish its goals. Avoiding kakozelia, of which it is so
readily accused, is the burden the hyperbolist and hyperbole must bear above all tropes,
and Quintilian offers these strategies to negotiate the tension between elegance and
kakozelia. As I will show, these tactics offered by Quintilian are what can save
hyperbole from its own excessive nature.
I will now proceed to an explication of hyperbole’s functions, and I will begin
with impossibility and possibility.
THROUGH IMPOSSIBILITY, TOWARDS POSSIBILITY
The contradictory, dialogical assertion that impossibility transitions towards
epistemological and ontological possibilities is one function of hyperbole that is offered
by those such as Seneca, Quintilian, and many rhetorical theorists in the Renaissance.
This connection of hyperbole to impossibility and possibility, so important for earlier
rhetorical theorists, is now disconnected from hyperbole in contemporary rhetorical
theory. In the current context of postmodern and poststructuralist thought with its
pension for deconstructive criticism and abandonment of moderation and aesthetic
proportionality, this is an important function of hyperbole that should not be dismissed.
Indeed, the possibility of impossibility and the impossibility of possibility are oft used
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phrases within current poststructuralist discourse in the areas of, for example, theology,
literary criticism, and philosophy, which shows that hyperbole can be a useful critical
trope for current theoretical discussions. This function is particularly highlighted within
epideictic, which I will discuss after explicating the impossibility/possibility function of
hyperbole. Unfortunately, some theories of hyperbole overemphasize impossibility to the
detriment of its transitional movement towards possibility.
THE IMPOSSIBLE IMPOSSIBILITY OF HYPERBOLE
I begin with Demetrius because he offers a concise view of the relation between
impossibility (adynaton) and hyperbole. Although one can easily view Demetrius’s
discussion of hyperbole negatively, as I did in the last chapter, his insights do offer
important demarcations for impossibility that broaden hyperbole’s scope. Demetrius
describes hyperbole as “frigid,” i.e., indecorous, but he insists, as Johnson notes, that
“hyperbole is essential in the task of expressing the impossible.”54 For my purposes,
Demetrius’s demarcation of impossibility is a helpful heuristic for parsing out
hyperbole’s connection to the impossible. Demetrius writes of hyperbole:
The most frigid of all figures is hyperbole, which is of three kinds. It is expressed
either in the form of a likeness, for example “like the winds in speed”; or of
superiority, for example “whiter than snow”; or of impossibility, for example
“with her head she reached the sky.” Admittedly every hyperbole is an
impossibility. There could be nothing “whiter than snow,” nothing “like the
winds in speed.” But this last kind is especially called impossible. And so the
reason why every hyperbole seems particularly frigid is that it suggests something
impossible.55
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For Demetrius, hyperbole is always connected to impossibility. Whether through
likeness (hyperbolic simile), superiority (hyperbolic metaphor), or impossibility
(hyperbolic allegory), they all suggest impossibility, which makes hyperbole the chief
trope of excess since an impossible assertion is always excessive or in excess.56
Demetrius goes on to suggest that hyperbole is chiefly used by comic poets to create
laughter, and given that hyperbole attempts to surprise, to shock, and to seek out the
novel, this is not an unwarranted connection. Despite Demetrius’s failure to make the
bridge from impossibility to possibility, he does show how hyperbole can be employed in
different contexts, i.e., epic, lyric, and comic drama, and use various other tropes, i.e.,
simile, metaphor, and allegory, for its surprising effect/affect.
In a more contemporary example of hyperbolic impossibility, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, as discussed in the previous chapter, place hyperbole within an
argument of unlimited development, which gives hyperbole an argumentative form but
severely limits its use since this is seemingly the only instance where it might be
employed. An argument of unlimited development posits an ideal term that is always
impossible and unrealizable. Assertions about the ideal come close to the ideal, but it
remains inaccessible:57 an “always receding…term in a given direction.”58 The role
hyperbole plays in this argument is to promote “a certain behavior.”59 It gives “direction
to thought, to guide it toward a favorable evaluation of this direction, and only by a return
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shock is it intended to give an indication of the significant term.”60 The risk of unlimited
development is that it can be refuted by the accusation of absolutism or incompatibility,61
which is somewhat mitigated by the direction hyperbole gives to the argument.
Hyperbole “draws the mind in a certain direction” and then descends back
towards the “extreme limit of what seems…possible.”62 However, while hyperbole may
bring one in proximity to possibility, its purpose in this type of argument is always to
buttress the unlimited development of the impossible term. It does not lead to possibility
through impossibility. Rather, it leads to impossibility through descriptive and
exaggerated possibilities, i.e., “stepping-stones.” The argument insists on the “possibility
of always going further in a certain direction” and “continuing…passing beyond, in the
direction indicated by two or three stepping-stones,”63 e.g., incrementum and/or
congeries. The goal is always impossibility. Thus, hyperbole is given only the function
of moving towards impossibility by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. These authors argue
that hyperbole always supports an impossibility, which effectively occludes hyperbole’s
transitional movement back towards other epistemological and ontological possibilities.
Richard M. Weaver and Kenneth Burke call these impossible ideals “god terms.”
Weaver’s conception of these terms is that the structure of the argument is a “hierarchy
leading up to the ultimate good…links in a chain stretching up to some master link which
transmits its influence down through the linkages.”64 In Perelman and Olbrechts-
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Tyteca’s view, hyperboles are these “links,” or stepping-stones, stretching up to the ideal
term, which Frances N. Teague suggests puts hyperbole “at the service of existing
hierarchies.”65 On the other hand, Burke allows for the possibility that a reverse direction
is possible in which these links are viewed as “emanating” or “radiating” from the ideal,
which he calls the “spiritual source.”66 In this view, the ideal term is emptying itself out
rather than filling itself up through the so called “links.” There is a move back towards
possibility. Burke argues that in the drive towards god terms, words, which are to things
as spirit is to matter, stretch and expand language and meaning only by moving back
towards possibility from impossibility.
In contradistinction to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Burke sees how an
impossible ideal might lead to other possibilities of meaning and being. Although Burke
does not reference hyperbole, his logological argument about god terms offers one a view
as to how a movement through impossibility might “emanate” or lead one towards other
possibilities. One might even suggest that Burke’s logological project is an extended
hyperbolic figure of thought moving towards perspectival possibilities of meaning and
being through excessive incongruity. That is, he reveals how the contradiction between
impossibility and possibility can produce transitional epistemological and ontological
possibilities, which is precisely the function of hyperbole. Thus, whereas Weaver’s view
of god terms moves only in the direction of impossibility, Burke’s framework offers the
unintentional insight that the shocking impossibility of hyperbole can lead towards
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possibility via excess, but this is only implied. It is also uncertain as to whether Burke
sees the movement towards or away from god terms as more important
As I will show below, the transition towards possibility is vital for hyperbole. In
the epideictic genre, for example, one might say that “this person was like no other
person who ever lived,” and one hyperbole may be built upon another.67 It is not that the
one being praised is literally the greatest person who ever lived, but what is being
communicated is the possibility that this person was truly exceptional. Or, in the
grotesque, one might bring two disparate and impossible things or concepts together
through hyperbole as do the novels of Flannery O’Connor68 and H.P. Lovecraft, the
music of Richard Wagner, David Alfaro Sequeiros’s Echo of a Scream (1937) or
Hieronymus Bosch’s The Garden of Earthly Delights (1510).69 In each instance a
grotesque impossibility is asserted, but the impossibility always has the purpose of
revealing some truth, some other possibility, through different hyperbolic expressions of
impossibility.
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In Echo of a Scream, one can see the wretched scream shrieking from the
distorted and disproportionately large head of an infant that is melded to rubble and metal
on a battlefield. Emerging from the infant’s mouth as a tongue is the same infant in
smaller bodily form, and this other/same child is also screaming. Sitting atop the
dismantled battle scene, this juxtaposed impossibility is a shockingly grotesque
hyperbolic metaphor. Immediately disorienting, this image portrays a variety of
dialogical interpretations, e.g., the effects of war on innocent life or the distorted sense of
reality war creates, and this occurs hyperbolically by moving through the impossible
image towards other perspectival possibilities.
In the opening lines of At the Mountains of Madness, Lovecraft writes, “Doubt of
the real facts, as I must reveal them, is inevitable; yet if I suppressed what will seem
extravagant and incredible there would be nothing left.”70 Lovecraft relies on incredible
and impossible grotesqueries of hybridity in his novels, and here, he reveals how
important this grotesque exaggeration is for Madness. Without hyperbolic impossibility,
there is nothing to write and no story to tell. Grotesquely aligning doubt with facts and
suppression with extravagance, the impossible for Lovecraft is the impossibility of facts
and language itself to express what can only be expressed through the incredible and
grotesque excessiveness. For him, the truth itself is a hyperbole, and it always leads
towards an infinite array of possibilities.
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HYPERBOLE AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF IMPOSSIBILITY
It is Seneca who completes the circuit from impossibility to possibility. In On
Benefits, Seneca writes, “Exaggeration never hopes all its daring flights to be believed,
but affirms what is incredible, that thereby it may convey what is credible.”71 Through
exaggeration one asserts “what could not possibly be in order that they might be thought
to be as much so as possible.”72 Seneca posits that hyperbole is well suited to express the
inexpressible, which leads to a realization of what is possible. Seneca, like Quintilian,
asserts that hyperbole must affirm what could not possibly be, i.e., that which is beyond
reality but not beyond belief. Pushing the bounds of belief for the purpose of transition,
Johnson suggests that, for Seneca, “In the larger pursuit of ‘truth,’ hyperbole’s
provisional violence against belief and reason becomes necessary and fitting,” and the
extraordinary becomes a “driving cognitive force.”73 Through a momentarily violent
teleological suspension of belief and reason, one is able to convey and even alter what
seems credible and possible, and the brutal contradiction between reality and ideality
fosters an epistemological and ontological change or transition from one perspective to
another.
The danger of hyperbolic impossibility is the intense, contradictory strain it places
on normative conventions and accepted truths. It “both invites and distances the audience
from the height of an apparently unreasonable position.”74 Hyperbole maintains, even as
it frustrates, the tension between the ideal and the real, and the movement through
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impossibility towards possibility is the hyperbolic disruption of conventional belief and
reason. Noel Malcolm writes, “It [hyperbole] makes reference to impossible things not
because it is trying to describe an impossible world…but as a rhetorical figure, to
emphasize and dramatize impossibility itself.”75 For Malcolm and Seneca, extraordinary
impossibility is a driving cognitive force dismantling normative assumptions about reality
through its inconceivable idealized heights. The unattainable ideal is not an absurdity but
an epistemological tool that fosters real phenomenological and psychological transition.
Malcolm stresses that the importance of hyperbole is not to offer an “impossible world”
but, as a heuristic device, to (re)present a world re-imagined through impossibility.
Impossibility both undermines and reveals the limits of possibility in order to disclose
other possibilities.
Through the contradictory double-dealing of hyperbole, a revealing transition
occurs, and this transition, noted by Goran Stanivukovic in the previous chapter, is the
place where “an incredible, exaggerated utterance interrupts the language and logic of the
existing argument,” by shifting “one level of meaning to another, re-invented meaning.”76
Hyperbole reveals the implications that impossibility may have for meaning itself by
disrupting reality and offering other possible (re)interpretations of that reality. As Katrin
Ettenhuber asserts of Peacham’s insight into hyperbole, “By highlighting the limits of
figuration and productively destabilising [sic] the reader’s views of linguistic norms and
conventions, it encourages active reflection on the different ways in which meaning is
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constructed and communicated.”77 Disrupting the “normal,” hyperbolic impossibility
shocks and disturbs, and this achieves “the conceptual effect of suggesting the
insufficiency or inexhaustibility of meaning.”78 The epistemological play of hyperbole
can foster transformations of both meaning and being by transcending the meaning of a
given context while still remaining bound to it. Hyperbole offers, sometimes subtly and
sometimes forcefully, what could be. It presents the possible through the difficult
challenge of the impossible.
In a simple example, if one says, “It’s hotter than hell,” then, assuming hell exists
and that it is in fact hot beyond the bounds of reality, this impossible assertion as
hyperbolic allegory forces one to conclude that it is extremely hot, which is not beyond
the realm of the credible. In popular culture, nothing is hotter than hell. It is an
impossibility used to convey the given hotness of a particular context. Or, if one says,
“Obama is Hitler,” then this impossibility is a departure from the normative view of the
President that leads to the possibility that Obama possesses certain characteristics or
tendencies of Hitler. In each case, an epistemological, even enthymematic, leap is made
from impossibility to possibility. Without moving back towards possibility, these
impossible assertions cease their productive figural work and end in absolutism whereby
one may simply refute the statements by pointing out their literal impossibility.
A significant risk of hyperbolic impossibility, and hyperbole in general, is that the
sign might be taken for the thing itself. However, the extraordinary as a driving cognitive
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force attempts to counter this impulse by interrupting the logic of literality long enough
to, if only partially, disrupt one’s literal interpretation of the hyperbole and figurally
move from one level of meaning to another. Hyperbole, as Ettenhuber says, encourages
active reflection on meaning, and this active reflection is premised upon hyperbole’s
reception.
For example, Jacques Derrida is sometimes interpreted literally and dismissed out
of hand, or his language is mocked for its impossible obscurity. Derrida’s hyperbolic
language is not literally true, but if taken in this way, then his insights may cease to be
effective. However, his hyperbolic disruption of reason and the logic of language
attempts to force one into a moment of interruption where belief is violently suspended
through the (il)logic of the extraordinary. Even producing disturbing affectus through
vertige de l’hyperbole, Derrida’s hyperbolic heights take one away from the ordinary
world of rationality, reason, and language. Though it may only be momentary, Derrida’s
hyperboles resist the closure of impossibility as he risks obscurity in order to generate
epistemological insight, even clarity.
When he paradoxically asserts that the “supplement” is both abundance and fills a
lack or when he posits the impossibility of possibility and/or the possibility of
impossibility, these hyperboles forcefully depart from epistemological norms and the
convention of “writing.” He shifts one level of meaning to another. “The hyperbolic
situation, according to Derrida, creates the necessity of interpretation – a necessity which
different people respond to in different and (equally) contingent ways.”79 Out of his
hyperbolic language of contradictions that offers provisional violence against
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interpretation, belief, and reason, come other epistemological and ontological
possibilities. Derrida’s impossible hyperboles also reveal the complexity of impossibility
itself, i.e., that the impossible holds possibilities in its grasp and that the possible is at the
same time a purveyor of impossibilities. He risks being misunderstood in order to
communicate his complex ideas. Derrida’s conceptual insights, as well as his language,
are equally hyperbolic, and for this reason, his contradictory hyperbolic language is often
resisted and accused of kakozelia. This resistance is lessened within Derrida’s decorum
of excess where both language and thought are excessive and all is disproportionate, one
might even say grotesque, but if the force of hyperbole still fails to move one beyond the
literal into the figural, then remedia may become necessary to guard against accusations
of absurdity.
For Derrida, he seems not to offer any remedia, and the magnitude of his
hyperbole is thus often lost on his audience; yet, his “writing” within a decorum of excess
is what can save the hyperbole. In other cases where a decorum of excess is not
established, remedia are necessary. In defense against accusations of kakozelia, one
might say, for example, “Of course Obama isn’t Hitler. That’s impossible.”
Preemptively, one might say, “Obama is Hitler, so to speak.” The force of the hyperbole
is mitigated by specifically pointing out that the assertion is impossible and is not literally
true and that the hyperbolist did not intend it to be taken so. If one’s audience does not
take the hyperbole figuratively, then its excess may need to be pardoned through the
tactic of remedia. The risk of hyperbole, however, becomes more tenuous when it exerts
a more forceful disruption of beliefs, and the offering of remedia must be more
discursively complex.
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Inasmuch as all theology is a type of apologetic, it is also a copia of remedia.
One might even say that all theologians are highly skilled hyperbolists making their
theological arguments within a decorum of excess. Through a series of “is” statements,
e.g., “Salvation is…,” “God is…,” or “Christ is…,” theologians attempt to describe
something that is presumably indescribable. The “is” makes an impossible assertion that
must somehow move towards other possibilities of thought, but the figurative nature of
theology is often obscured by the veil of the literal. A decorum of excess aids in
squelching hyperbole’s mis-interpretation, but despite theology’s reliance on hyperbole,
and figurative language in general, the literal often prevails. Even though theology’s
extraordinary subject and copious language offers what is beyond reality in order to
communicate multi-perspectival truths, it is often perceived as beyond belief. This leads
to accusations of kakozelia.
As such, there is an implied “but” at the end of theological assertions – “God is
omnipotent, but…” – and this “but” is the anticipation of objections and the prelude to a
remedium. The idealizations theology posits are impossible hyperbolic figures of thought
that must be qualified in order to move towards other (re)interpretive possibilities. They
are impossible possibilities, which even “literal believers” realize, though perhaps
unwittingly. Christian literalists, for example, typically accept that it is impossible to
describe God, but they then proceed to do so. The impossible assertion is not enough.
There must be possible descriptions and interpretations about God’s indescribability,
which is also the acceptance that assertions about God are figurative in nature.
Interpreting a hyperbole too literally is also a form of excess, i.e., absolutism, but failing
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to recognize a hyperbole qua hyperbole is its failure since hyperbole cannot exist in the
literal realm.
The literal can and does end in impossibility and absolutism, which signifies the
failed reception of hyperbole. However, the project of theology, even fundamentalist
theology, is thoroughly dependent on the tropological and figural functions of hyperbole
in order to operate at all because hyperbole (literally?) offers theology the possibility to
figurally conceptualize “God” as extraordinary and beyond reality, which it does
voluminously. If this hyperbolic movement is not received or perceived by the audience,
then the assertion ceases its figural movement, and this effectively ends the task of
theology to persuade through its unending array of verba pointing to an extraordinary, reimagined res, i.e., “God.” The “but” of hyperbole is the disruption of the “is” of the
literal, and the movement beyond reality is a resistance to positions that are beyond
belief. Thus, wittingly or unwittingly, most theological discussions are remedia in
defense against accusations of kakozelia, and this tactic is used to ensure the positive
reception of one’s position. By moving through impossibility towards theological
possibilities, the work of hyperbole is a necessary theological trope and figure of thought,
but it is still a fragile rhetorical move necessitating careful employment by the
hyperbolist.
For example, one might assert that “God is omnipotent” (a hyperbolic metaphor).
This hyperbolic impossibility is extremely risky and is indefensible if taken literally. It
can result in the absolutism of unlimited development and be dismissed as impossible.
Indeed, this risk is explicitly acknowledged by theologians, and “God is omnipotent” is
extensively qualified because it brings up problematic issues such as theodicy, salvation,
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and free will. In reference to theodicy, for example, one might say “God can stop evil but
allows it to happen, and it is not up to us to judge the ways of God because no one can
know the mind of God.” Implicitly an argument for the figural, the problematic assertion
that “God is omnipotent” is thereby somewhat alleviated in the minds of the audience,
and the impossible assertion “God is omnipotent” then becomes a possibility for
conceiving of theodicy in different ways. This is just one remedium offered in defense of
“God is omnipotent,” but there are certainly other capacious and unending arguments
offered. Various remedia from differing theological positions are necessary to ensure
this hyperbole’s positive reception.
Hyperbole’s effectiveness is based on the disposition of the audience, and it is
thus extremely contextual, which is why there are a surfeit of theological positions.
Johnson writes, “Hyperbole acquires immense dramaturgical subtlety from the context in
which it is spoken, from the ethos of those who speak it, and from the way it is heard by
others.”80 The hyperbolist must choose carefully when hyperbole’s force will be most
suasive, especially since hyperbole is such a surprising and disturbing trope. This,
however, places the burden on the hyperbolist to employ the hyperbole effectively,
appropriately, and at the opportune moment. The overall motive of the hyperbolist is
transforming one’s perspective or emotional state, and the main impetus of hyperbole is
to serve as a transitional axis upon which contradiction balances. The hyperbolist is in a
precarious, duplicitous position and must maintain the tension between impossibility and
possibility without seeming ridiculous.
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Hyperbole marks a fine line between wit and folly, wisdom and absurdity, and the
hyperbolist must artfully negotiate this tight rope with his or her audience. Hyperbole,
above all other tropes, can quickly fall prey to accusations of kakozelia, but through its
figurative force and its decorous excessiveness, its impossible heights can lead to
transformative possibilities. This is particularly evident in epideictic where the
impossibility of hyperbole is employed to offer transformation or renewal to a
community or individual based on re-invented or re-invigorated creations of reality.
HYPERBOLE EXEMPLIFIED IN THE EPIDEICTIC GENRE
Historically, hyperbole is placed within the epideictic genre. From Quintilian to
Puttenham, the “elegant” and “discrete” use of hyperbole when epideictically praising or
blaming is hesitantly viewed as a “beauty,” or at least tolerated. Puttenham places
hyperbole, the lowd lyer, within epideictic even as he cautions against its liability to
sabotage what is being praised.81 Ben Witherington III asserts, “Dramatic hyperbole…is
customary in epideictic rhetoric,”82 and he also notes in another work, “Epideictic
rhetoric is…the rhetoric of hyperbole and the ongoing appeal to the deeper, more visceral
emotions like love and hate, fear and faith/trustworthiness.”83 Of the Middle Ages, Ernst
Robert Curtius asserts, “[The panegyric’s] chief trope is the hyperbole,”84 and Simon
Gaunt also asserts that in medieval rhetorical manuals where the panegyric is given
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utmost importance, “Hyperbole was thought to be particularly appropriate to
panegyric.”85 Despite this historical connection between hyperbole and epideictic, it is
currently not mentioned in epideictic literature,86 but epideictic is a representative
example of how hyperbole functions through impossibility and possibility.
Current epideictic theory in general tends to focus on a contextualized communal
function based on the referencing of shared values and the offering of an alternative or reformulation of those values with the purpose of renewing and/or transforming communal
identity, though some suggest that all epideictic is mainly for the purpose of
transformation.87 In order to “increase the intensity of adherence to certain values,”88
these re-formulated values are posited in contrast to the current situation and positioned
in relation to a new version of reality. Shared values are referenced (as virtuous), altered
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or re-formulated, and put into conflict with present contextual values that are excessively
blamed (as vices), which (re)constitutes communal identity.89 Robert Danisch writes,
“Practicing epideictic rhetoric…involves telling the history of the present so that one can
understand how subjects are constituted in a given historical moment and so that one can
begin the project of self-creation.”90 Beginning the project of self-creation occurs by repositioning the re-formulated values in relation to an impossibility through auxesis as
“any kind of amplification of the context.”91
Noted above, Quintilian suggests that auxesis is a species of hyperbole, and
Erasmus writes in his development of copia, “Speech is varied by auxesis, i.e., by
amplification, when in order to render something more effectively we put in place of an
appropriate word a stronger one [comparatio].”92 In epideictic, the auxesis of an ideal
occurs chiefly through incrementum, comparatio, and congeries. Incrementum may
proceed by one step, by several, or at once. Comparatio increases a lesser thing’s
importance by implying a logical connection with a greater thing, and congeries heaps
one word or sentence atop another in order to produce copia. These species of auxesis
magnify “the importance or gravity of something by referring to it with a
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disproportionate name.”93 In response to an extraordinary exigence and in order to
highlight the importance of a transformed or renewed sense of reality, an impossibility is
offered within a decorum of excess at an opportune moment in order to transition towards
this new or revivified creation of reality by heightening and amplifying its significance as
well as the critique of a given context.
In epideictic, impossibility is most notably expressed through auxesis as some
idealization of thought intended to heighten the critique of a given context. This
disproportionate assertion occurs after shared values are referenced and then reformulated. In light of the re-formulation, a new or renewed version of reality is offered
as an “invented great,”94 or a “greater beauty” as Aristotle says,95 which is then praised to
promote adherence to these altered values. Just as in an argument of unlimited
development, “The ideals it [epideictic] describes are rarely actually attained…a speaker
confidently praises values in hopes that the audience will work to implement them.”96
The praise of re-invented or re-invigorated values through auxesis amplifies the
importance of the “invented great” as well as a critique of the present moment with the
purpose of implementing a transition. As Cindy Koenig Richards argues, “[Epideictic
promotes] identification with a new or different vision of community through the
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veneration of an ‘invented great,’”97 and she continues, “By venerating a figure that
integrates known history, established beliefs, and imagined possibilities, epideictic can
subvert some elements of the existing social order while affirming others.”98 The reassessment and re-formulation of values is thus also the positing of another
disproportionately idealized version of reality for the purpose of communal or individual
transformation and/or renewal.
Although auxesis is now largely disconnected from epideictic theory, it is the
operative function of hyperbole within epideictic discourse, though it is not limited solely
to epideictic. Timothy Long states that auxesis is “a major technique of ancient
epideictic oratory,” and it “calls upon the orator to conjure an imaginary object or state,
desirable or abhorrent, for detrimental comparison with an opponent’s proposal.”99
Within epideictic, idealized conceptions of language, thought, community, or even
critical terms are buttressed by hyperboles through auxesis that “conjure” an imaginary
invented great in order to compare it to an opposing version of reality. Furthermore, the
epideictic genre is structured around hyperbolic gestures of “amplification and
enhancement,”100 as “activities that lend themselves to heightening and tend to draw the
speaker into excesses.”101 In other words, hyperbole offers an imaginary,
disproportionate name meant to emphasize or exaggerate its importance within epideictic
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rhetoric, and overall, its effect is intended to lead to transformations of meaning and
being.
HYPERBOLIC IMPOSSIBILITY IN EPIDEICTIC FORM
When Anselm suggests that God is that than which nothing greater can be
conceived in identical language to Quintilian – incrementum may “proceed at once to
something than which nothing greater can be named”102 – Anselm is using hyperbole in
his epideictic argument for the ontological proof of God’s existence to refute the nonexistence of God. Using shared theological values, re-formulating them, and using
auxesis to posit an impossible ideal, Anselm uses hyperbolic logic to assert his
impossibility that nevertheless leads to other theological possibilities. Aquinas is doing
the same when he argues that there is no excess in the worship of God, i.e., there is
nothing but excess in worship. Zizek makes the same move when he posits the theophilosophical statement that in Christ’s appearance, “It becomes clear that God is
NOTHING BUT the excess of man, the ‘too much’ of life which cannot be contained in
any life-form, which violates the shape (morphe) of anthropomorphism.”103 In each case,
hyperbole is forcefully employed to make an epideictic argument for alternative
possibilities of perceiving reality, which is arrived at by moving immediately to and
through impossible idealizations.
In these cases incrementum is used to proceed at once to a hyperbolic position. In
a more gradual example, Lincoln builds his hyperbolic argument incrementally in “The
Gettysburg Address,” but the effect of his epideictic speech is the same:
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It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they
gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these
dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new
birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth.104
Lincoln uses hyperbole to heighten the gravity of the situation and offer a vision for the
future. Using incrementum, Lincoln suggests that there is a “great task remaining before
us,” and “we take increased devotion” from those who “gave the last full measure of
devotion.” Culminating, Lincoln concludes that this government has “a new birth of
freedom,” which “shall not perish from the earth.” As he epideictically creates his vision
of the future to stir the audience’s pathos, he invokes the past battle, connects it to the
present, and increases the importance of the situation as well as his “greater beauty” for
the future. His speech, in fact, hinges upon his use of hyperbole. Without it, he may not
quite make the transition from a nation being tested by war, which might not endure (the
opposing view), to a nation that will not perish from the earth. An impossible
responsibility, leading to an impossible vision, only hyperbole is equal to the task of
epideictically moving through impossibility towards a possibility for the future.
As discussed, hyperbole is justified by a phenomenological or psychological
situation, and this justification is achieved largely based on exigence, pathos, and ethos.
In these examples, it is the exigence that justifies the means. Proving God exists is
certainly a monumental task, and hyperbole is perhaps the only trope adequate for
Aquinas’s defense of worship as well as Zizek’s disruption of the signified “God.”
Certainly the exigence of the Civil War calls for an extraordinary response, and Lincoln
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cannot move his audience through impossibility towards possibility without the pathos of
hyperbole, i.e., affectus as/in excess. Each example is also dependent upon ethos for the
positive reception of hyperbole. Anselm’s and Aquinas’s status as venerated theologians,
Zizek’s theoretical prowess, and Lincoln’s position of president contribute to the
audience’s reception of hyperbole. Extraordinary situations and subject matter require an
extraordinary response, which is delivered through hyperbole.
Another example of hyperbole used within epideictic is that of Derrida. In a type
of epideictic form105 within a decorum of excess, Derrida writes:
By escaping it [the project of thinking]: that is to say, by exceeding the totality,
which – within existence – is possible only in the direction of infinity or
nothingness; for even if the totality of what I think is imbued with falsehood or
madness, even if the totality of the world does not exist, even if nonmeaning has
invaded the totality of the world, up to and including the very moments of my
thought, I still think, I am while I think. Even if I do not in fact grasp the totality,
if I neither understand nor embrace it, I still formulate the project of doing
so…This is why, by virtue of this margin of the possible, the principled, and the
meaningful, which exceeds all that is real, factual, and existent, this project is
mad, and acknowledges madness as its liberty and its very possibility. This is
why it [the project of thinking] is not human…but is rather metaphysical and
demonic.106
In epideictic terms, the project, or exigence, is (re)thinking the “self,” the Cogito or “I,”
which necessitates an epistemological and ontological transition. These positions, which
are possible “only in the direction of infinity [incrementum and/or congeries] or
nothingness [ratio minunendi and/or litotes],” are the impossibilities Derrida attempts to
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move through towards other possibilities. Philosophically, this is the history, or “myth,”
of the “self” from Descartes to the present, and by referencing these shared myths,
Derrida establishes a type of ethos with his readers allowing for a believable critique he
soon offers. The “margin of the possible,” i.e., the project of exceeding this totalization,
is a duplicitous impossible possibility. It is a moment of undecidability that is also a
hyperbole, which serves to heighten the critique of one’s interpretive conception of the
historical “self” or “I” as the “real, factual, and existent.” This hyperbole and/as a
critique of the present philosophical moment leads to a (re)interpretive stance regarding a
future, though absent, possibility.
The lie, i.e., “falsehood or madness,” is the “opening” for a moment of
(re)formulating the “truth” of the project of exceeding, and the repetition of “still
formulat[ing] the project of doing so” is the work of errant hyperbole. Through auxesis,
Derrida builds one hyperbolic statement upon another with “even if” clauses: “Even if
the totality of what I think…even if the totality of the world…even if nonmeaning…Even
if I do not in fact grasp the totality.” Each “even if” statement builds on the previous one
until finally culminating in madness and the demonic, which are positive terms of
possible impossibility for Derrida.
Derrida considers demonic hyperboles to be “marvelous transcendence,” which he
translates from “daimonias hyperboles,” and he describes his project as the “attempt-tosay-the-demonic-hyperbole from whose heights thought is announced to itself, frightens
itself, and reassures itself against being annihilated or wretched in madness or in
death.”107 One may be annihilated in the impossibility of madness, i.e., an excess of
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affectus, but it is madness that is the impossible possibility within his project of possible
impossibilities. Derrida writes of demonic hyperbole:
This demonic hyperbole goes further than the passion of hybris [and]…Assuming
that it is deranged and excessive, it implies the fundamental derangement and
excessiveness of the hyperbolic which opens and founds the world as such by
exceeding it. Hybris is excessive and exceeds only within the space opened by
the demonic hyperbole.108
The demonic hyperbole is hyperbole functioning to open and found the world by
exceeding it. Opening and founding the world by exceeding it is the impossible task
Derrida must move through in order to move towards madness that is the “very
possibility” of the project of thinking. Out of the undecidability, the “doing so,” i.e., the
decision to begin that is madness and “always hyperbolical,”109 is the repetitive auxesis of
hyperbolic impossibility. To attempt this project of madness is an impossible possibility
facilitated through the hybris of “demonic hyperbole.”
In sum, moving through impossibility towards possibility is one contradictory
transitional function of hyperbole. Demetrius and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca focus
on the impossibility of hyperbole while Seneca and others focus on its use of
impossibility to transition towards possibility. Through this transition, the
epistemological and ontological importance of hyperbole is highlighted for its play and
expansion of meaning and being. Moving through the difficulty of impossibility,
hyperbole disrupts and reveals the limits of possibility so that other avenues of meaning
and being may arise. In the example of epideictic, hyperbole operates through auxesis in
108
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order to accomplish the task of moving from impossibility to possibility. An impossible
future or revivified ideal is asserted in order to critique the present and move one’s
audience towards a possible transformation and/or renewal. Through hyperbole, a
contradictory transition from impossibility to possibility occurs. This transition is also
the case in the next function of hyperbole, which is a lie on the side of truth(s).
A LINGUISTIC LIE ON THE SIDE OF HERMENEUTICAL TRUTH(S)
Hyperbole is often accused of being simply a lie, kakozelia, or a lowd lyer, but its
history often reveals another relationship between lie and truth. As Johnson states, “To
hyperbolize is to tell and not to tell enormous truths in one eloquent breath.”110
Unfortunately, this link between truth and lie within hyperbole’s overall function is now
replaced by only one side of its function – to lie. Hyperbole is not to be trusted or
believed. Easily open for attack of being only a lie for its seeming insincerity and
violation of decorum and moderation, hyperbole is often lambasted for its bombastic and
artificial ornamentation, but there is another side to hyperbole repeatedly overlooked – a
lie on the side of truth(s).
Hyperbole offers one a lie that paradoxically does not intend to deceive but to
productively de-stabilize and surpass a particular truth, a given interpretation of a truth, in
order to offer the possibility of re-interpreting one’s perception of that truth. Without
negotiating and moving through the tension between truth and lie, however, hyperbole’s
power is diminished or even undone. That is, hyperbole forcefully attempts to radically
disrupt one’s given interpretation of reality through the shocking and de-stabilizing effect
of a heuristic conceit. Hyperbole is duplicitous and offers a lie that is a double-cross. A
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hyperbolic lie both is and is not a lie, and this duplicity is the attempt to compel one to
see beyond the lie that is offered not to deceive but to create a moment when assumed
truth(s) might be re-interpreted and foster a transition from one meaning to another. If
this process is mis-apprehended or resisted, if the hyperbolic lie is not recognized as such
in order to heighten the suspicion that more is being communicated than what is actually
stated, then the re-interpretive work of hyperbole fails, which is why the positive
reception of hyperbole is so vital for its effectiveness.
Related to but also distinct from hyperbole’s impossibility/possibility function,
e.g., a lie need not be an impossibility, the truth/lie function is more specifically designed
to intentionally create epistemological playfulness. Hyperbole’s truth/lie function selfconsciously and brazenly exaggerates a falsehood, which may not be an impossibility, in
order to force one to self-reflexively re-evaluate one’s perspective in regard to meaning.
A hyperbolic lie presents one with such a radical contradiction, e.g., Obama is Hitler, that
one’s attention is arrested and not allowed to resolve the conflict immediately or easily.
The suspicion that something more is being said is heightened, but one may not instantly
see any particular truth(s) in the lie or even apprehend what is occurring perceptually. In
the face of such a shocking or surprising contradiction, one is forced to look beyond the
deceit for other truth(s) or perspectives that might be indicated by the hyperbolic lie.
It is the purpose of this section to explore the productive contradictory connection
between truth and lie as a hyperbolic function, which one might view as an objective,
linguistic lie transitioning towards subjective, hermeneutical truth(s). In a
poststructuralist context, truth is shown to be subjective and perspectival rather than
objective and enduring. Nietzsche’s essay, “On Truth and Lie,” which influences much
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poststructuralist thought, is one example of this occurrence. He argues that objective
truth is actually a metaphorical construction that is forgotten to be a subjective
convention, which means that what one holds to be a truth is a lie in that there is no
absolute truth. Conversely, a lie is also the truth. More precisely, a lie masquerades as
the truth. Truth is a figural expression, not a literal reality.
Despite hyperbole’s attempt to force one to see beyond its literal assertion to other
figural revelations, this endeavor can and does fail. Rather than seeing some other
truth(s) or insights through hyperbole’s falsehood, one may simply see the lie as a lie. In
this sense, hyperbole is a heuristic device inviting one to explore the possibilities for
expanding one’s conception of truth(s) beyond its conventional bounds. It is a heuristic
that produces real, contextual change by leading to an epistemological insight. A
blindness to this insight robs hyperbole of its power. Just as one might “forget,” as
Nietzsche says, that a particular truth is premised upon one’s (re)interpretation and
perception of that truth, one might also mis-perceive that a hyperbolic lie always points
beyond itself. Hyperbole attempts to guide one through the lie in order to allow for a
(re)interpretation of a given perception of reality or assumed truth.
For example, many Christians today privilege interpreting scripture literally rather
than figuratively. Despite a centuries old tradition at least beginning with Origen and
moving through Augustine, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, the figurative
exploration of scripture is often abandoned by those like Fundamentalist Christians who
prefer an inerrant and literal view of scripture. Here, the (re)interpretation of truth is
devalued in two ways. First, it is interpreted literally, which denies its rich
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transformative, even transcendent, power. Second, the ways that Christians might
perceive truths within scripture as revealed through rhetorical means is all but lost.
On the first count, those like the Fundamentalists might benefit from the
corrective of Nietzsche’s insights. On the second count, they might also benefit from the
insight of hyperbole. It is not that hyperbole, or rhetoric in general, is an outright lie.
Rather, the epistemological double-cross precludes a revealing observation, which is a
subjective hermeneutical revelation. Through this duplicitous paradox, a destabilizing
transition occurs from one given to another, which must then be repeated in order to
foster further (re)interpretive development. Hyperbole is the “maximization” of the
literal, which is non-literal, at the limit. “It marks the literal (in excess) as figure through
a certain impersonality. It suggests a kind of figure without a face, a mask that is one
with the masked.”111 Hyperbole unmasks the truth by putting on a mask-as-lie in order to
merge with the truth-as-masked and move beyond it. The linguistic deceit of hyperbole
is forceful and shocking but only temporary, and it is employed in the service of a
disruptive hermeneutical transition from one way of perceiving the world to another.
For example, when Demetrius says something is “whiter than snow,” which he
considers an impossibility, this is not actually true. What this hyperbole signifies is that
something is extremely white. It is not a true statement, but it is one that offers the truth
of the “whiteness” of something, which alters one’s perceptual field on two levels. It
forces the hearer to recall their given perception of snow, and it then requires the hearer
to apply that perception to the present context. On these subjective and objective levels,
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hyperbolic metaphor surprises the hearer with its deceit thereby forcing one beyond the
literal statement into a figural hermeneutic realm.
Taking this simple observation to a more theoretical level, the lie of hyperbole is
not a falsehood intended to deceive but a concerted effort to destabilize perceptions of
meaning in order to reveal alternative conceptions of truth and knowledge. Hyperbole is
not simply a lie, but an excessive figural distortion on the side of truth. For those like
Quintilian, it is an exaggerated mis-recognition that leads to recognition and a theoretical
method of epistemological inquiry that highlights the fragility of meaning through excess.
In this theory of excess, affirming a falsehood through exaggeration in the pursuit of
knowledge is necessary because the known is not capable of expressing the as yet
unknown, the as yet unrealized within knowledge itself.
QUINTILIAN’S ELEGANT SURPASSING OF THE TRUTH
Quintilian offers a detailed and profound explication of this function of hyperbole.
Implied in Seneca’s discussion of the impossibility/possibility of hyperbole, Quintilian
explicitly suggests that hyperbole is an “elegant [i.e., decorous] surpassing of the truth”112
(superiectio). Or, as Longinus says, hyperbole is a “strain on the facts.”113 On an
epistemological level, Quintilian defines hyperbole stating, “It is sufficient to remark that
the hyperbole lies, but not so as to intend to deceive by lying, and we therefore ought to
consider more carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which is not

112

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 8.6.67, trans. Lee Honeycutt,
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (2 November 2009).
113

[Longinus], On the Sublime, 285.

179
believed.”114 Quite plainly, Quintilian makes his claim: hyperbole lies but not to
deceive. On its face, this claim is a complete non sequitur because a lie is by definition
always intended to deceive. Paradoxically, this statement reveals two levels of
Quintilian’s epistemological theory: 1) epistemological enquiry cannot survive on truth
alone and 2) a hyperbolic lie is different from a lie in its general sense of the term.
In order to explore questions regarding the truth, a rhetorical deception is
necessary to push the truth beyond normal ways of perceiving it, and hyperbole is
particularly effective at engaging in this task. Within the realm of hyperbole, a lie is not
necessarily a lie, which is true of all tropes and figures. Yet, Quintilian gives the
hyperbolic lie a pride of place above other tropes and figures because hyperbole is
specifically given the paradoxical role of a lie that does not deceive. Duplicitous
hyperbole must surpass the truth through a deceit in order to reveal other truths about and
beyond conventional truth claims, a double-cross, but this tactic must be used with
caution.
After suggesting that hyperbole might elegantly surpass the truth, Quintilian then
goes on to suggest that one must consider its use – “We therefore ought to consider more
carefully how far it becomes us to exaggerate that which is not believed” – and this
statement can be interpreted in two ways. It does become a rhetor to exaggerate what is
not believed. Or, it does not become a rhetor to exaggerate what is not believed. In the
context of his overall treatment of hyperbole, both interpretations are correct. Avoiding
kakozelia is of utmost importance, but moving the audience beyond their given reality is
often necessary based upon subject matter defined by the exigence.
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Hyperbole is already in excess, so it is already prone to kakozelia, which is why
he advises caution and moderation against “extravagant” hyperbole.115 The “wit” of
hyperbole may easily become “folly,”116 and hyperbole’s triumphant reception may
easily turn to dismissal. On the other hand:
Hyperbole is a beauty when the thing of which we speak is extraordinary in
nature. For we are then allowed to say a little more than the truth, because the
exact truth cannot be said, and language is more efficient when it goes beyond
reality than when it stops short of it.117
An extraordinary subject matter that defies ordinary description demands a response
worthy of it, which makes hyperbole such an important trope because of its excessive
epistemological nature, as well as the affectus it invokes. It is hyperbole that
purposefully pushes the bounds of prosaic, ordinary language and decorum in order to
risk the force of excess and exaggeration that can describe the abnormal, the unusual, and
the marvelous.118 Within a decorum of excess, hyperbole moves along the margins of
language and attempts to describe what cannot be articulated through normal linguistic
and psychological means, which is worth the risk of kakozelia. The abnormal and
unusual demand a different use of language and heightened speech.
In Quintilian’s example, “Vomiting, he filled his lap and the whole tribunal with
fragments of undigested food.”119 Here, the astonishing nature of this scene requires the
lie of hyperbole to describe the indescribable amount of vomit ejected from one’s body
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and to evoke the pathos associated with it. The deceit is necessary to achieve one’s
subjective means, which is objectively justified by the exigence. Beyond belief, without
hyperbole, normal means of description are inadequate. If one does not risk hyperbole,
then the assertion may fail. If one does risk hyperbole, then the assertion may also fail,
but its success is worth the risk. One must risk being misunderstood in order to
communicate an extraordinary res. Thus, an extraordinary response must be employed,
and it is better for this hyperbolic response to go beyond reality than fall short of it.
While caution may be advised by Quintilian, he lands firmly on the side of risking
accusations of kakozelia to makes one’s point.
Further explicating the lie of hyperbole, Quintilian writes:
It is in common use, as much among the unlearned as among the learned, because
there is in all men a natural propensity to magnify or extenuate what comes before
them, and no one is contented with the exact truth. But such departure from the
truth is pardoned because we do not affirm what is false.120
Not only is hyperbole given the task of lying on the side of truth, hyperbole is privileged
over the truth itself. It is the universal nature of both “unlearned” and “learned”
humanity to hyperbolize because the exact truth is not enough. One must use a
hyperbolic, decorous lie to move beyond a particular assumed truth towards other
hermeneutical truths, which are also not enough – alleged “truth” is infinitely deferred
and disrupted. To risk hyperbole is to risk epistemological boundaries in the pursuit of
knowledge. All the more reason to risk hyperbole is that if it does fail, then it may be
“pardoned,” e.g., through remedia or the pathos it creates, for its appropriate
disproportionality.
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The linguistic lie is thus worth the risk in order to communicate more profound
hermeneutical truth(s) as well as the truth that the “truth” is an unsatisfying deceit. A
given truth is not enough, and one must employ hyperbole to throw beyond this truth and
reality through the paradoxical task of offering a deceit that is not deceitful in order to
arrive at a more expanded conception of a particular truth. There is a significant tension
operating in Quintilian’s argument between falsehood and truth, and this tension, he
asserts rather explicitly, can only be maintained through the duplicity of hyperbole, which
forces the hearer beyond their epistemological limits.
Going back to the example of Nietzsche for a moment, his Overman
(Ubermensch) or his assertion of the death of God, which are both beyond the reality of
good and evil, can be interpreted as hyperbolic lies on the side of other (re)interpreted
truth(s). The Overman is not an actual being but a surpassing of the truth of humanity.
The death of “God” is also not the actual death of “God” but a hyperbolic lie intended to
excessively disrupt normative, i.e., classical theistic, conceptions of “God” and put them
to rest. These lies are hyperbolic figures of thought with the purpose of dismantling
conventions of meaning and being. Nietzsche writes, “Facts are precisely what there is
not, only interpretations.”121 He puts a strain on the facts, and just as for Quintilian, the
truth is never enough. Language, in fact, is more efficient when it goes beyond reality
rather than stopping short of it.
Nietzsche “re-mystifies” the truth through his hyperbolic lies. As Allan Megill
writes:
[Nietzsche] wants to say that there is no such thing as a thing – that every “thing”
is only a mask for some other “thing,” which in its turn will be seen to be only a
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mask as well…the process of interpretation itself [is] a process infinite in its
unfolding, for the ground is never reaching, the “original” or “transcendental”
signified never uncovered.122
Nietzsche offers linguistic lies in order to present alternative hermeneutical truth(s). He
does not offer hyperbole as beyond belief but beyond the reality of deeply held beliefs.
The affectus this causes in the audience is often extreme, and he is often misinterpreted
and accused of kakozelia. Indeed, until Walter Kaufmann’s rather recent re-interpretation
of Nietzsche, this accusation was commonplace. Yet, through Nietzsche’s use of a
decorum of excess, those like Kaufmann eventually see the truth in the lies of Nietzsche’s
hyperbolic logic – what Nietzsche might call “the magic of the extreme.”123
Webb notes two rather obvious hyperboles in Nietzsche’s discourse that are worth
quoting. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche writes, “No one has ever had more of the new, the
unheard-of, the really new-created in artistic means to squander…before me one did not
know what can be done with the German language” (EH, 74-5). He later writes, “I am
not a man I am dynamite…I am by far the most terrible human being there has ever
been” (EH, 127).124 In these statements, Nietzsche presents his audience with objective
lies in order to reveal subjective truth(s) about himself and his Overman. Out of a
“fragmented individuality” that he sees as a crisis of representation, he (re)presents his
audience with a “mythos of the future,”125 which he often does through affectus rather
than ratio.
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Nietzsche’s objective justification for his hyperbole is the crisis of representation,
and as Webb suggests, “Nietzsche’s hyperbole is intended because he thought he was
responding to a crisis, which could only be overcome in the most extreme terms.”126
Nietzsche thought he must excessively disrupt the normative values of society and
philosophy to force subjective transition of meaning and being. The crisis for Nietzsche
is the common belief in rigidified Apollonian ideal illusions as transcendent knowledge,
and in response, he risks a hyperbolic Dionysian interruption as critique.127
Responding to the crisis of representation at a kairotic moment, Nietzsche
engages in a type of epideictic form by referencing common values, e.g., good and evil,
as “myths that will be useful in the present,” which are propagated by “history.”128 He
then re-formulates or transvalues those values in light of an impossible hyperbolic lie,
e.g., the disproportionate Overman, described through auxesis, which heightens the
critique of his present (philosophical) situation. The hermeneutical truth(s) his linguistic
lies create within a decorum of excess offer errant insights of transformation in the
present as well as into the future.
In sum, hyperbole can elegantly surpass the truth because: 1) no one is content
with the exact truth, 2) the exact truth can never be stated, 3) language is more efficient
when it goes beyond reality, and 4) it is better to say too much than not enough.
Hyperbole radically resists the closure of presumed absolute truths and disrupts through
its duplicity to both lie and not lie. It is these observations by Quintilian that play out
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time and again within the history of rhetoric and, as shown in Derrida’s and Nietzsche’s
discourse, within the history of philosophy as well.
THE INFLUENCE OF QUINTILIAN’S THEORY OF HYPERBOLE
Much ado is made during the Renaissance about appearance and reality. New
hermeneutical theories are developed and the relation between truth and artifice as well
as impossibility and possibility are produced. Regarding hyperbole, however, most
discussions are redundant and even exact copies of Quintilian’s views of hyperbole. John
Hoskyns, for example, suggests that hyperbole’s articulation “beyond the truth” will
descend to the truth, or that the “flat impossibility” of hyperbole may highlight “the
unspeakableness than the untruth of the relation.”129 As for Quintilian, Hoskyns posits
that hyperbole’s moving beyond the truth does not lead to a deceit but to another yet
unrealized truth through the paradox of contradiction. Bernard Lamy also practically
plagiarizes Quintilian in his The Art of Speaking.130 On the other hand, Baroque writers
do extend, and even diverge from, some of the typical suggestions made about hyperbole.
Baltasar Gracian, for example, makes a distinction between “witty exaggeration” and
rhetorical hyperbole,131 but these excursions do not affect my overall argument. The
main functions of hyperbole remain intact.
One summary statement of Renaissance hyperbole, confirming my own
assertions, is offered by Stanivukovic who writes, “A lie, expressed in linguistic terms,
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becomes truth on a hermeneutical level. Hyperbole thus acts as a generator of
meaning,”132 and he continues:
The significance of hyperbole here lies in the particular use of the referential
meaning it contains. The writer draws on a concrete reference from a familiar
myth, evoking particular expectations, which are betrayed by relating the mythical
story to a new literary reality. The hyperbolic form suggests this deviation from
the expected to the newly created reality.133
These statements about Renaissance hyperbole are a concise summary of Quintilian’s
theory of hyperbolic truth and lie as well as my observations about hyperbole within that
framework. Offering a copia of meaning, hyperbole betrays the conventional and the
normative in order to deviate from accepted truths and perceptions of reality.
Reminiscent of an epideictic form, the hyperbolic form references familiar truths and
shared values, re-formulates them, and offers new (re)interpretive possibilities through a
linguistic deceit. For Stanivukovic’s interpretation of hyperbole in the Renaissance as
well as for Quintilian’s theory, hyperbole offers a deceit that is not a falsehood, which
generates meaning by moving beyond the reality of accepted truth(s).
In a more contemporary context, similar assertions as Quintilian’s about excess
and hyperbole are offered, but the bounds of the hyperbolic are also expanded. Suzanne
Guerlac, for example, writes of hyperbole:
The expression exceeds the thing expressed. The signifier outreaches the
signified, remarking the enunciation within the utterance, keeping alive its force.
The excess of the signifier marks a redundancy that renders the signified a
signifier in its turn – a signifier of excess. It renders the signified a kind of proper
name that designates excess – itself in excess.134
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Her statement is evocative of Quintilian’s descriptions of hyperbole as a necessary
surpassing of the truth, though she translates it into a poststructuralist context. Guerlac’s
assertion highlights the epistemological playfulness Quintilian ascribes to hyperbole.
Hyperbole’s figural expression exceeds the literal thing expressed. She also pushes
Quintilian’s theory forward by explicitly suggesting that hyperbole throws beyond the
signified “truth” but also renders the signified a signifier, which signifies excess itself.
Combining Guerlac’s and Quintilian’s insights, no one is content with the exact
truth, and more than that, the truth is a hyperbolic lie that comes to signify excess itself.
Not only does hyperbole carry a signifier beyond the signified, but the signified also
relies upon hyperbole because the exact truth is not enough: “It [hyperbole]…both
oversteps the limit of the signified and constitutes the signified through the limit.”135 The
signified must be thrown beyond the limit even as it always already transgresses the limit
through the deceit of impossibility. As Weiss states, “All signifieds are…figures and
tropes,”136 and this is the promise of hyperbole: that it will bludgeon with hammer blows
the literal into figurality and move one beyond the literal in order to force a deeper
(re)interpretation. It resists, disrupts, transgresses, double-crosses, and undermines truth
through errant137 repetition in order to keep open the fluctuating gap between the signifier
and the signified.
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Guerlac’s observations are premised upon much of Derrida’s thought, and his
views about hyperbole are equally illuminating in light of Quintilian’s discussion on the
hyperbolic tension between truth and lie. In a significantly similar manner to Quintilian,
Derrida writes, “The economy of this writing is a regulated relationship between that
which exceeds and the exceeded totality: the différance of the absolute excess.”138
Although Quintilian and Derrida are operating from considerably different
epistemological assumptions, their insights are nevertheless related, or at least parallel.
For Quintilian, a hyperbolic lie is that which exceeds beyond reality through the
efficiency of exaggerated language. The process of this exceeding is never complete
because the truth never satisfies, and hyperbole must repetitively move elegantly beyond
reality (already in excess) but never extravagantly beyond belief. For Derrida, différance
as repetitive hyperbole is the regulating position of deconstruction that exceeds the
always already exceeded totality, which is and is in absolute excess. Again, the truth
never satisfies.
Derrida’s connection to Quintilian becomes more apparent when he offers his
most extended and explicit observation about hyperbole:
At its height hyperbole, the absolute opening, the uneconomic expenditure, is
always reembraced by an economy and is overcome by economy. The
relationship between reason, madness, and death is an economy, a structure of
deferral whose irreducible originality must be respected. This attempt-to-say-thedemonic-hyperbole is not an attempt among others; it is not an attempt which
would occasionally and eventually be completed by the saying of it, or by its
object, the direct object of a willful subjectivity. This attempt to say, which is
not, moreover, the antagonism of silence, but rather the condition for it, is the
original profundity of will in general.139
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He also asserts, “I maintain [that hyperbole] cannot be enclosed in a factual and
determined historical structure, for it is the project of exceeding every finite and
determined totality.”140 This is a dense definition of hyperbole, which needs explication,
and there are many similarities to Quintilian’s thoughts about hyperbole. First, Derrida
uses hyperbole to make his argument. Through incrementum, he builds his praise of
hyperbole through two “it is not” statements and one “This attempt to say” statement.
This incrementum culminates in suggesting that hyperbole is the “original profundity of
will in general.” Thus, using hyperbole tropologically, at a linguistic level, already
shows Derrida’s inclination towards hyperbole.
Second, as a figure of thought, Derrida invokes the “attempt-to-say-the-demonichyperbole” as the overall project of uneconomic expenditure and “exceeding every finite
and determined totality.” Although hyperbole is always re-economized even “at its
heights,” it attempts to surpass the “truth” in its duplicitous movement towards “original
profundity,” which it will never attain within an economy of reason, madness, and death.
The heights of hyperbole always descend back into re-economization. This highlights
two characteristics of “demonic hyperbole” for Derrida: 1) its infinite deferral within a
system it attempts to exceed and 2) its necessary force of repetition.
The double-dealing demonic hyperbole ceaselessly attempts to exceed that which
it can never exceed. Derrida is not content with the truth, and he speaks the lie of
exceeding economy in order to emphasize the repetitive necessity of making the attempt,
i.e., to push the “truth” beyond is limits, “because the exact truth cannot be said.”141
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Through this repetition, the signifier exceeds the signified and, as Guerlac states above,
“Marks a redundancy that renders the signified a signifier in its turn,” which reveals that
the signified is already in excess. “Language is more efficient when it goes beyond
reality.”142 By attempting-to-say-the-demonic-hyperbole, a type of cleaving occurs that
binds and keeps separate, a “holding open the differential interval of the between”143
through hyperbole’s errant, duplicitous repetition that will never be completed but is
always necessary and always in excess. Thus, Derrida’s overall assessment of hyperbole
is positive as both trope and figure of thought. Like Quintilian, it is a deceit that leads to
other truths; a duplicity that leads towards epistemological transition.
Re-interpreting the Hegelian dialectical process, Slavoj Zizek contends, “The
excess of ‘exaggeration’ is the truth which undermines the falsity of the balanced
totality.”144 Like Quintilian, what Zizek’s (hyperbolic) assertion suggests is that
hyperbole’s deceit leads to another view of truth by surpassing it in a “paradox of truthin-exaggeration.”145 Zizek argues that the alleged “balanced totality” is the actual
falsehood and the hyperbolic lie as the excess of exaggeration, the excess of reality
within a fantasmatic narrative of/as a spectral event, is the truth: “‘Truth’ resides in the
excess of exaggeration as such.”146 That is, hyperbole can reveal the epistemological
insight that every attempt at a fixity of meaning is excessively disrupted or (re)interrupted
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through forceful exaggeration, and this truth about symbolization is the undermining of
radically contingent symbolic fictions posing as a totality.
The truth never satisfies, e.g., the anxiety of desire, and hyperbole must move
beyond this reality. Every “truth” offered is a hyperbolic deceit that is the truth about a
balanced totality masquerading as the truth. The truth(s) revealed through the lie of
hyperbole is that the signified is always already in excess as an empty signifier, and this
duplicity exposes the fact that, as Taylor says, “The floating signifier invariably doublecrosses.”147 The “excessive fixation” on an empty signifier is double-crossed by the
exaggeration of symbolization that resists the closure of the balanced totality through this
“disruptive ‘exaggeration’ which disturbs its [the balanced totality’s] poise”148 and allows
for adaptation and a radical change in self-perception.149
The indeterminacy of such empty signifiers – indicating the plasticity and
contingency of meaning and symbolization – can, therefore, only emerge through the
violence of interpretation and/as the efficiency of exaggerated language: “a violent act of
disfiguring the interpreted text.”150 In short, the excess of exaggeration is what allows for
a perspectival shift/mobility where limits, norms, order, and conventions are battered
with hammer blows through a disfiguring (re)interpretation that is (re)constituted through
thought and language itself. As Weiss states, “Overdetermination is…the basis for all
interpretation and exegesis, including philosophy.”151 The excess of exaggeration, the
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hyperbolic lie on the side of truth, is the objective expression that forces one into the
violence of subjective (re)interpretation. As Zizek states when combining Badiou and
Hegel, “The subject emerges in the event of ‘exaggeration’, when a part exceeds its
limited place and explodes the constraints of balanced totality.”152 Through its duplicity,
hyperbole disfigures, destabilizes, and unmasks a given truth through the force of its
deceitful assertion, which pushes hermeneutical limits to the breaking point in order to
foster epistemological and ontological transition and insight.
Another example of this function of hyperbole to speak a lie on the side of truth as
the excess of exaggeration occurs through the hyperbole embedded within the epideictic
form of Michael Moore’s films. Moore relies on a nostalgic American past in order to
gain ethos with his audience and re-formulate shared values like individualism, active
citizenship, and patriotism. He then critiques the present moment based on these reformulated values. Much as the “Spanish hyperbolists” did, Moore implements
hyperbole as an ethical response to the exigence of greed (codicia), despondency
(desaliento), and a precipitous descent leading to disastrous collapse (despenamiento),153
and this ethical response is embedded within his epideictic form. Through auxesis, he
offers a “greater beauty” of what America might once more become when the greed of a
corrupt government is squelched.
For Moore, a corrupt government is his exigence that demands an extraordinary
response, which is the objective (phenomenological) justification for using hyperbole.
His ethos is established through his persona of being a regular, though intelligent,
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individual who is passionate about defending America from corruption. From his dress
to the “dumpy” way he presents himself, he plays on a “Joe the plumber” persona that is
often respected by his audience, e.g., in his movie “Slacker Uprising.” This aids in his
task of implementing forceful pathos that is the subjective (psychological) justification
for the use of hyperbole. His hyperbole is certainly not well received by all in his
audience, and he is often accused of kakozelia whereby his “wit” seemingly turns to
“folly.” Yet, as Quintilian notes, it is better to attempt too much than not enough.
Moore’s attempts can always be “pardoned” when the falsehood is not affirmed but the
insight expands perspectival limits.
Here, the success or failure of hyperbole is shown again to be contingent upon its
reception. Some may accuse him of kakozelia, but others will readily accept his
hyperbole as pushing the truth to its limits, though it is uncertain as to whether his
hyperbole is intentional. One might suggest that a hyperbole cannot be a hyperbole if it
is unintended; however, the function of hyperbole and its effects are still operative
whether it is intended or not. The structure of the argument remains hyperbolic, and the
emotional effects it produces are quite real as hyperbole moves the audience primarily
through affectus rather than ratio. The possible reception of hyperbole as revealing
alternative interpretations about the truth also occurs whether the hyperbole is intended or
not.
In his most recent film, “Capitalism: A Love Story,” as well as in his previous
films, “Sicko” and “Fahrenheit 9/11,” he builds his argument from beginning to end
incrementally through affectus rather than ratio. In each film he stacks one hyperbole
upon the next, i.e., one “strain on the facts” to the next. Each time, the emotions of the
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audience are stirred until they presumably move into outrage. As Moore says about
“Capitalism,” “The film will blow their minds,”154 which implies both a transition in
thinking as well as heightened emotion when these new realizations are subjectively
(re)interpreted and integrated into one’s worldview. Stirring the audience through pathos
and strengthening his ethos, he strains the facts in order to surpass the truth. His
hyperbolic heights always move in a descent back towards a political reality where his
falsehoods are intended to duplicitously transition towards other revealed truths.
In a statement about the health care bill that is related to the issues he raises in
“Sicko,” he says, “To My Fellow Citizens, the Republicans: Thanks to last night's vote,
that child of yours who has had asthma since birth will now be covered after suffering for
her first nine years as an American child with a pre-existing condition.”155 This type of
exaggeration (hyperbolic metaphor) is intended to reveal what he believes to be hidden
truths about American corruption: “They [the viewers of “Capitalism”] will see things
and learn things about the economic calamity we are in that have not been shown to them
on the evening news.”156 In Zizek’s terms, the excess of Moore’s exaggeration is the
truth undermining the appearance of a balanced American economic totality. The empty
signifier becomes greed itself, and Moore can violently (re)interpret that greed filling it
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with whatever signified he deems appropriate, e.g., governmental and corporate
corruption.
One scene in “Capitalism” has him standing before the New York Stock
Exchange holding a moneybag asking for America’s money back. His objective gesture
is a hyperbolic lie, and the conceit reveals Moore’s subjective truth that America has
been robbed by the government in league with corporations. This hyperbolic sign
signifies the entirety of the film’s message (as well as the message of his other films):
corporate and governmental greed has exploited and taken the common American
citizen’s money and freedom. As Moore says, “Track the crime of the century from Wall
Street to your street.”157 Whether capitalism is the crime of the century or not
(comparatio), his objective exaggeration leads his audience to their own subjective
conclusions about capitalism, which, for Moore, is that the government has sold out to
Wall Street. This statement in itself is a hyperbolic figure of thought transcending both
films, and it is parallel to Derrida’s discussion of demonic hyperbole.
These two individual’s contexts are quite different, but the impetus is the same.
In Derrida’s case, the truth-as-totality is what must be repeatedly exceeded through
hyperbolic différance because hyperbole will always be re-economized into the system of
totality it attempts to disrupt and transgress. This exigence requires the response of
demonic hyperbole in order to crack the walls of the tower of truth-as-totality and reveal
the project of madness that lies beneath. In Moore’s case, the alleged truth about the
American government and capitalism as totality is a lie, which can only be revealed
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through various hyperbolic deceits that will lead to the possibility of de-stabilizing this
perception.
For both Derrida and Moore, the project of thinking the demonic hyperbole is a
repetitive necessity in order to disrupt conventional assumptions. Moore’s films are
always re-economized, literally within a market economy where he makes large
quantities of money, but his films attempt to move beyond the accepted truth of
capitalism to reveal other truths about this economic system. By making multiple films,
and repeating the gesture of madness, he is repetitively chipping away at the façade of
conventional norms. One film is not enough. The attempt to hyperbolically reveal must
always be (re)attempted.
In sum, the contradiction between truth and lie leads to an epistemological
transition through the work of hyperbole as trope and as figure of thought. The
epistemological heights of hyperbole transform thought in its descent back towards
reality, and the truth that is the lie is double-crossed by the lie that reveals other truths.
Hyperbole can elegantly surpass the truth because: 1) no one is content with the exact
truth, 2) the exact truth can never be stated, 3) language is more efficient when it goes
beyond reality, 4) it is better to say too much than not enough, 5) the project of thinking
must attempt to exceed its bounds for epistemological transformation to occur, 6) the
excess of exaggeration is the truth that disrupts the presumed balanced totality, and 7) the
signified is already in excess and must be pushed beyond itself through the destabilizing
hyperbolic signifier. Through objective and subjective use, objective and subjective
justification, exigence and ethos, auxesis, and duplicitous transition, hyperbole is seen as
a complex and important rhetorical device.
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CONCLUSION
The two functions of hyperbole discussed in this chapter are important for
constructing and understanding an overall theory of hyperbole. They are the functions
historically ascribed to hyperbole, and they also enrich one’s understanding of hyperbole.
Simply viewing hyperbole as an impossibility or a lie is a deficient interpretation of
hyperbole. For those like Seneca and Derrida, it is moving through the difficulty of
impossibility towards possibility that signifies the significance of hyperbole. For those
like Quintilian and Nietzsche, it is viewing hyperbole as a deceit on the side of other
truths, and the undermining of the “truth” itself, that allows its epistemological and
ontological force to be perceived. Transgressing and constituting signifieds at the limits
of signification, hyperbole reveals the excess of meaning and being contained within the
abundance of the signifier that signifies and constitutes excess itself. Indeed, the
economy of signification itself operates within a decorum of excess that reveals both the
insufficiency and inexhaustibility of language and meaning.
Within a decorum of excess, hyperbole is shown to operate appropriately and
effectively. Hyperbole balances on the edge of kakozelia more than other tropes, and its
reception is paramount. Offering a hyperbole risks misunderstanding, and its subjective
and objective justification is the responsibility of the hyperbolist. Providing
phenomenological and psychological transition out of contradictory epistemological and
ontological positions places a strain on language and perspectives, and the burden a
hyperbolist bears requires a complex feat of rhetorical dexterity. Negotiating ethos and
pathos at every figurative turn, the hyperbolist must both prepare and astonish the
audience at an opportune moment in order to move them beyond the literal and into the
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figural, which can move the audience into a position of transition. The contradiction of
hyperbole is easily viewed as folly rather than wit, and an effective transition can only be
maintained within a decorum of excess where the excess of exaggeration is the norm and
disproportionality is entirely appropriate and timely.
Through auxesis, hyperbole duplicitously resides within a realm of copious verba
and stylistic excess that guides one towards the re-presentation of a res through
contrariety and paradox, but the interpretation of the hyperbole is left entirely in the
hands of the audience. The double-dealing hyperbole risks its position of elegance for
the sake of the audience who is seemingly eager to dismiss it, but the astonishing res
hyperbole can re-present is worth the risk. Its risk is worth it because the alleged truth is
never enough. The “truth” can only be meaningfully explored and disrupted by moving
beyond its own presumed reality-as-totality, and hyperbole shatters the absolute closure
of assumed truth thereby allowing for shocking and forceful epistemological and
ontological transition. The surprising and baffling errant logic of hyperbole disrupts and
dismantles normative epistemological frameworks with hammer blows.
Exemplified in the epideictic and grotesque genres, hyperbole moves within an
alternate reality of logic and reason where an impossibility can but might not lead to
other possibilities and a lie can but might not lead to other hermeneutical truths. Used
intentionally or unintentionally, hyperbole bludgeons the literal and forges it into the
figural, and this ambitious project can only be accomplished through an excess of affectus
and the exaggeration of reality. Paradoxically moving between one extreme and the
other, hyperbole both tells and does not tell. It both reveals and re-veils. It both
disorients and re-orients in one eloquent breath.
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CHAPTER 4: THE DISORIENTING RE-ORIENTATION OF HYPERBOLE
All visions of what is not are hyperbolic and therefore, from within the “economy” which
they transgress, appear in the aspect of monstrosity (or madness) – some actually are.
Jean-Pierre Mileur
The road to excess leads to the palace of wisdom.
William Blake
INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter I explored the impossibility/possibility and truth/lie functions
of hyperbole that serve to facilitate phenomenological and psychological transition
through epistemological and ontological disruption. These two fundamental functions of
hyperbole are mainly established by Quintilian and are carried forward in the historical
discussion. The two functions together constitute a third meta-function, which I derive
from two unelaborated statements by Paul Ricoeur. In this chapter I will explicate the
meta-function of hyperbole to re-orient perspectives and interpretations of a given
context or reality through disorientation. That is, it is now clearer that each function of
hyperbole re-orients through disorientation. Furthermore, while the first two functions
have a clear historical grounding in rhetorical theory, this meta-function has no explicit
ties to previous theories of hyperbole. Thus, this chapter aids in reviving and revivifying
hyperbole as a critical trope by offering a new contribution to the theory of hyperbole.
The disorientation/re-orientation meta-function comes from two somewhat
problematic rhetorico-theological statements made by Ricoeur, which I will significantly
expand upon since they are left unexplored by him in any meaningful way. His
statements suggest what I suspected all along about hyperbole, but I was unable to
articulate it succinctly. As such, Ricoeur’s insight is the inspiration for this function, and
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the main statement I will focus on is offered by Ricoeur regarding parables in the New
Testament. He writes, “[Hyperbole] reorients by first disorienting [the law of paradox
and hyperbole]…[and] makes the extraordinary break forth in the ordinary [the law of
extravagance].”1 Specifically indicating the paradoxical extravagance of hyperbole,
Ricoeur unintentionally highlights the overall function, or “law,” of hyperbole. This
disorientation/re-orientation function Ricoeur posits is crucial for hyperbole because it
operates at a meta-theoretical level guiding the first two functions. The overall purpose
of hyperbole as trope or figure of thought is to disorient through contradiction and reorient towards a transition in meaning and being. Hyperbole can teach and move its
audience and offer them what they already desire – epistemological and ontological
expansion – and this is exemplified in the grotesque genre.
As in the previous chapter I will use the epideictic and grotesque genres as
examples that reveal this forceful demand of hyperbole. I will focus mainly on the
grotesque genre, but epideictic will sometimes come into play. The disorienting function
of hyperbole as a double-dealing gesture of duplicity that creates vertige de l’hyperbole
coupled with the re-orientation hyperbole facilitates is pervasive and typified in the
grotesque.
The grotesque is certainly a disorienting genre, and it achieves this disorientation
by bringing disparate elements together in paradoxical and contradictory combinations
through hyperbole’s impossible deceits. Using hyperbole, the grotesque also re-orients
the audience towards other perspectival and (re)interpretive possibilities. The grotesque
specifically highlights Gerard Genette’s statement about hyperbole I quoted in the
1
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previous chapter: “One may call hyperboles the effects by which language…draws
closer through contrast and discontinuity, as if by burglary, realities naturally farremoved.”2 This is, in fact, an excellent summary statement about a main characteristic
of the grotesque genre to fuse contrarieties into hybridities of thought and language. As
is already evident from the last chapter, precariously holding discontinuities in tension is
a significant function of hyperbole, and this errancy fosters as yet unrealized
epistemological and ontological possibilities.
I will begin with a discussion of Ricoeur’s insight into hyperbole’s
disorientation/re-orientation function, and I will also note some difficulties with his
observations. I will then proceed to offer a more detailed discussion than in the last
chapter regarding a decorum of excess where kairos and decorum work in tandem to reorient through disorientation. Next, I will use the grotesque to highlight this aspect, or
operation, of hyperbole, and I will specifically show a decorum of excess operating
within the grotesque genre. Finally, I will offer two variations on the theme of hyperbole
in a grotesque key: 1) paradoxical verba and the insight of res and 2) transgressive deformation and errant transformation. These variations serve the same function, but they
each reveal different ways of conceptualizing the meta-function of hyperbole to re-orient
through disorientation. This is how I will construct the final meta-function of hyperbole,
which is epitomized in the grotesque genre, and further reveal hyperbole’s critical
contributions to rhetorical theory and criticism.

2
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HYPERBOLIC DISORIENTATION AND RE-ORIENTATION
RICOEUR’S HYPERBOLE
The operative impetus of hyperbole to re-orient through disorientation is, as I
said, not one historically ascribed to it. It is implied but never fully articulated. Ricoeur,
then, offers a keen insight into hyperbole, but he does not elucidate his statements in any
detail. As noted above, Ricoeur posits that hyperbole paradoxically “reorients by first
disorienting [the law of paradox and hyperbole]…[and] makes the extraordinary break
forth in the ordinary [the law of extravagance].”3 Ricoeur also suggests, “Hyperbole, like
paradox, leads us back to the heart of existence.”4 In these two statements, a world of
possibilities is opened for hyperbole. To this end, I will explore these statements in order
to establish disorientation and re-orientation as a meta-function of hyperbole, and I will
examine kairos and decorum to reveal their importance for this function, as they are
imperative for all functions of hyperbole. I will then show how the grotesque exemplifies
this “law” of hyperbole.
The first observation to re-iterate is that disorientation/re-orientation is an
umbrella function of hyperbole that also buttresses the previous two functions of
hyperbole. It is not overt but causes overt emotional responses and consequences. It is
always operating within hyperbole, and it pervades every aspect of this trope’s functions.
When one asserts a hyperbolic impossibility or a hyperbolic lie, the intention is to
disorient one’s audience by shocking them and disrupting previously held assumptions
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about reality. Once this disorientation occurs, the audience is ready for a re-orientation; a
paradoxical movement leading towards transition.
Almost as sensory deprivation (attenuation) or overload (accumulation or
incrementum) prepares one for indoctrination or brainwashing, hyperbole disorients the
hearer in order to de-stabilize their thoughts and perspectives. Only when this
disorientation is invoked is the hearer then ready to be re-oriented to another way of
thinking or being. To be clear, I am not suggesting that hyperbole brainwashes, but the
momentary shock of hyperbole can induce a similar psychological effect or experience,
e.g., when Longinus uses hyperbole to “transport” the audience into the realm of the
sublime.
The second observation to highlight is Ricoeur’s subtle detour from Quintilian’s
theory of hyperbole. Ricoeur’s departure is also distinct from every other rhetorical
theorist examined thus far. For Ricoeur, hyperbole forces the extraordinary to break into
the ordinary – a transcendent movement into immanence. For other theorists, hyperbole
is an extraordinary break from the ordinary – a movement from immanence towards
transcendence or a transcendent movement across immanental boundaries. This is, in
fact, the novelty of Ricoeur’s claim, and it is an important distinction to make. In the
latter instance, hyperbole is simply a deviation from the conventional and normative, a
rhetorical hyperbole. In Ricoeur’s case, hyperbole ushers the extraordinary into the
ordinary as if from some other realm, a theological hyperbole. It appears as a type of
onto-theological metaphysics of presence where one receives a pre-packaged hyperbole
from some extraordinary realm, but this is antithetical to rhetorical hyperbole because the
purpose of rhetorical hyperbole is to use as well as to respond to the extraordinary.
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However, Ricoeur’s theological hyperbole that leads one back to the heart of existence
nevertheless highlights the transitional effect of hyperbole, which still reveals interesting
hyperbolic movements within discourse.
For example, Flannery O’Connor’s grotesque novels engage hyperbole from a
rhetorico-theological perspective. Theorists of the grotesque often reference O’Connor
as exemplifying the “literary grotesque,” and their characterizations accentuate Ricoeur’s
understanding of hyperbole as a disorientation leading one back to a re-orientation that
reveals the essence of existence. James Goodwin suggests that to convey matters of faith
O’Connor uses “exaggerated and overdetermined methods,” and he quotes O’Connor in
Mystery and Manners, “You have to make your vision apparent by shock – to the hard of
hearing you shout, and for the almost-blind you draw large and startling figures.”5 The
prevalence of hyperbole is perhaps obvious in these statements. Exaggeration,
overdetermination, and shocking visions are all evident references to hyperbole, and the
shocking, shouting, and startling figures in O’Connor’s novels disorient through
hyperbole. Her use of hyperbole is a disorienting break from the ordinary, but the reorientation also occurs from a vision that breaks into the ordinary revealing “the heart of
existence.”
Goodwin suggests that O’Connor’s literary grotesque discloses “intrinsic truths,”
and again quoting O’Connor, “Reveals what we are essentially.”6 Through hyperbole,
these intrinsic truths and what we are essentially are seemingly extraordinary insights that
break into the ordinary. O’Connor employs hyperbole as a deviation from the ordinary,
5
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but it then rebounds back allowing the extraordinary to break into the ordinary. The
insight this brings is the “truth,” one’s essential nature, or the heart of existence. In this
sense, Ricoeur’s claims are not completely different from other rhetorical theories of
hyperbole, which suggest that the heights of hyperbole always descend back into a
contextual reality revealing a transitional insight regarding meaning and being. Yet, his
metaphysical assumptions remain distinct from rhetorical hyperbole. Operating within a
Christian context, O’Connor and Ricoeur share the same presuppositions about reality
that perhaps guide their perceptions about hyperbole, but despite Ricoeur’s superb insight
into hyperbole’s disorienting/re-orienting function, his claims remain somewhat
rhetorically problematic.
Out of his Christian context, Ricoeur’s definition of hyperbole is inexorably tied
to kairos, or a kairotic moment, as Paul Tillich puts it. Kairos, theologically speaking, is
interpreted as “the time of God” or the “fullness of time” when the in-breaking of the
kingdom of God can occur and reveal or bring one to the “heart of existence.” It is a
moment where chronos time is radically disrupted and transcendence and immanence
coalesce. Rhetorically, kairos is the “timely” or “opportune” moment when the most
suasive force might be implemented in order to affect some type of change. Ricoeur’s
claim is thus premised upon a metaphysics of presence whereas rhetorical kairos is
premised upon a more socio-political context. Theological kairos assumes a revelation of
some essence of being, while rhetorical kairos makes no such presupposition. These
difficulties with Ricoeur’s understanding of hyperbole aside, his statements about
disorientation and re-orientation reveal two important aspects of hyperbole I wish to
explicate: kairos and decorum.
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Kairos is an important part of rhetorical theory in general, and it is particularly
crucial for hyperbole. Kairos is implied throughout each function of hyperbole discussed
thus far. Whether advising the caution of timely moderation or the encouragement of
timely exaggeration, kairos surges as an undercurrent guiding the uses and abuses of
hyperbole. Most significantly, kairos largely determines the effectiveness of hyperbole
since the reception of hyperbole is almost entirely dependent upon its timely use by the
hyperbolist. While Ricoeur’s statement about hyperbole emphasizes kairos, most other
theories of hyperbole discussed thus far stress decorum, but these are interrelated
conceptions. Concisely, Ricoeur makes kairos explicit and decorum implicit while other
rhetorical theorists of hyperbole make decorum explicit and kairos implicit.
The issues of decorum and kairos have emerged throughout this overall project,
and it is now time to explore these issues. I save this discussion for the final section for
two reasons. First, these rhetorical concepts operate at a meta-hyperbolic level, and
hyperbole’s disorientation/re-orientation function does as well, which means that this
function exemplifies the use of kairos and decorum. They are always present and always
crucial, but they are never quite overt, though the effects they create will hopefully
become obvious and tangible.
Second, I posit that, within a decorum of excess, kairos facilitates hyperbole’s
disorienting function and decorum facilitates hyperbole’s re-orienting function. As a type
of dialogical counter-balance, the initial shock of hyperbole is forced onto the audience at
a kairotic moment through kairotic speech, and the ensuing disorientation is mitigated by
a decorous re-orientation. Kairos and decorum are the churning inner conflict of
hyperbole. Derrida’s characterization of hyperbole in terms of the “demonic” thus seems
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appropriate. Hyperbole has hidden depths that are in constant turmoil and are not
revealed all at once, but it is this turmoil that makes hyperbole so effective at disturbing
one’s audience enough to make them re-consider their initial positions.
A hyperbolic assertion may seem shocking and “all at once,” but the forceful
implications of hyperbole are often unrealized until after the initial encounter. A
seemingly distasteful violation of decorum, one may not be initially prepared for the
kairotic moment of hyperbole’s force. This is one reason why hyperbole and decorum
appear to have a love-hate relationship. To take the personification further, hyperbole
and decorum are at once intimately wedded as well as bitter enemies. Hyperbole is
always pushing, de-stabilizing, and risking decorum, fighting for its chance to shock and
disrupt, and decorum is always attempting to contain and tame hyperbole even as it
damns hyperbole’s nature to exceed every boundary.
A DECORUM OF EXCESS: KAIROTIC DISORIENTATION AND
DECOROUS RE-ORIENTATION
Decorum, as a balance or propriety that “becomes the measure for assessing the
rhetorical quality for expression,”7 is an important issue to address in terms of hyperbole
because hyperbole may easily fall victim to accusations of kakozelia. It is, in fact,
through decorum that hyperbole is often condemned as unnatural, disorderly, and
tasteless. This indictment is offered despite the fact that even in nature harmony and
balance are often disrupted through the brutal force of “natural” disasters such as
earthquakes and typhoons, which, like hyperbole, often strike without warning. As
evidenced by Quintilian’s difficult, though dexterous, negotiation between hyperbole and
7
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decorum, maintaining a decorous approach to extraordinary subject matter is risky and
uncertain. As Johnson writes, “Hyperbolic amplification proves a means of exhausting or
mocking received ideas, including the idea(l) of decorum.”8 Hyperbole is often more
effective when it pushes decorum to its limits and offers the audience the unexpected,
even the impossibility of moderation itself.
Historically, rhetorical theorists arbitrate this issue of violating moderation and
decorum by offering a more fluid conception of decorum regarding hyperbole. For
example, Quintilian separates a more decorous elegant hyperbole from extravagant
hyperbole, and Erasmus largely rejects the strictures of decorum within his system of
copia. Or, rhetorical theorists accommodate hyperbole by re-constituting a separate type
of decorum where hyperbole might operate, e.g., Tertullian’s “Christian ornamentation,”
Longinus’s elevated or sublime style, and Renaissance rhetorician’s conception of
“sacred rhetoric.” The issue of violation is also mitigated through one’s ethos, e.g., in
Augustine’s framework as well as Quintilian’s. As discussed in the previous chapter,
ethos is critical for the reception of hyperbole, and it, combined with pathos, becomes a
subjective justification for the use of hyperbole. Decorum, defined by its exigence, offers
both an objective and subjective justification for hyperbole. Adjusting decorum for
hyperbole is thus one strategy that is beneficial for its justification and its eventual
reception, which is why it is a common move for theorists of hyperbole, and it seems that
decorum is as flexible as hyperbole is unaccommodating.
Michael Leff suggests that decorum is adaptive and adjusts the structure of a
given discourse in relation to its specific context. It is a “flexible standard for assessing

8

Johnson, Hyperboles, 12.

209
the intrinsic merit of a rhetorical product,”9 and Robert Hariman argues, “Failure to adapt
indicates to observers that either the actor or the code is too rigid to warrant continued
respect [i.e., one’s ethos] in a changing world.”10 Conceiving of decorum as flexible
based on its context as well as influencing one’s ethos directly based on this flexibility
allows for the (re)constitution of a type of decorum of excess,11 which heightens
hyperbole’s effectiveness and is not contradictory to the notion of decorum overall.
Decorum is contingent, and it alters over time and among styles of oratory.12 Johnson
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even suggests that “decorum is best illustrated by the juxtaposition of the most ingenious
and atrocious examples. To arrive at a notion of decorum (or taste), the negative and the
extreme are necessary starting points.”13 In this view, hyperbole is a necessary element
of decorum in general.
A decorum of excess is here conceived as a type of errant decorum that
emphasizes the poetic within the oratorical; a style of plus ultra. It is a decorum where
exaggeration is an appropriate disproportionate expression regarding that which exceeds.
Within this errant decorum, the vividly disproportionate response to an extraordinary
exigence or subject matter is the appropriate “right action” that achieves suasive effect.14
This decorum highlights the justification for hyperbole. “Hyperbole does not merely say
the ‘something more’; it does so for a purpose.”15 Where exaggeration is demanded, only
a decorum of excess – where the economy of the decorum is excessive and the risk of
heightened speech is appropriate (to prepon) – will suffice. In this decorum, the pathos
used, the exigence, the magnitude of subject matter, and the result of hyperbole’s force
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can function as remedia that pardon and/or justify the extraordinary means employed, but
the possibility for the accusation of kakozelia remains acute.
The allegation of kakozelia is perhaps the most significant reason hyperbole is
dismissed as a critical trope, which is why a decorum of excess is vital for hyperbole to
function effectively. Psychologically and phenomenologically disrupting appeals to
harmony and proportion, e.g., aesthetically and ethically, is a perilous rhetorical move,
and the vice of excess is often resisted and rejected. A decorum of excess is thus
characterized overall as risky even as its risks can bring variety, vividness, and clarity of
insight to the rhetorical situation.
One contemporary example of using a decorum of excess is offered by Joshua
Gunn in his article “ShitText: Toward a New Coprophilic Style.” Using a decorum of
excess while arguing for his excessive new style is his goal, though he does so
unintentionally and without reference to hyperbole. He argues that this style links the
biological (“shit”) to the rhetorical (“speech”). He writes, “This style of public address
must be akin to street shitting! This style must truly be risky and creative…The new
style must counter the strategies of the anti-diarrheal with the diarrheic.”16 Unwittingly
resuscitating the Cynic practice of defecating in the middle of the street before
declaiming, i.e., “street shitting,” “prideful overproduction” is the risk of this style, which
is also its justification. Within a decorum of excess, shitting and countering the antidiarrheal must be disproportionately appropriate and occur at an opportune moment.
This shocking gesture is the risk of hyperbole in Gunn’s argument where all is
exaggerated for a disorienting effect/affect.
16
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Gunn’s decorum of excess helps him create effective exaggeration within a
disorienting economy of affectus. A coprophilic style hyperbolically posits shitting as
both biological and rhetorical excess, and in doing so, it comes dangerously close to
kakozelia. From the root kakos meaning “bad” and related to kakke (Lt. cacare) meaning
“excrement” or “feces,” perhaps a kakozeliac style is a more appropriate name for his
essay. Yet, Gunn’s shockingly hyperbolic argument is mitigated within a decorum of
excess where his excess is “pardoned,” i.e., it is published in a scholarly journal. He even
offers a remedium at the beginning of his essay in the form of a letter written to the
editors of the journal explaining the shocking nature of his article.
His argument is a hyperbolic lie intended to reveal other truths about rhetoric in
general thereby re-orienting one’s perspective towards what rhetoric might mean through
the (re)interpretive lens he presents. Much as those in the “second sophistic” might do,
Gunn argues for kakozelia even as he largely avoids accusations of kakozelia by
maintaining a decorum of excess.
Overall, a decorum of excess is a decorum that is in excess, i.e., in copia, and
engenders a style of plus ultra. It adapts to the unexpected risk of exaggeration – to the
point of violation – required to facilitate transformation within a given context. It is an
expansion of decorum that risks and pushes decorum to its fluid limits in order to
accommodate excess and/as exaggeration. In a sense, hyperbole feigns violating
decorum for rhetorical effect while remaining within the bounds of decorum. Like the
grotesque, hyperbole “forcibly joins the decorous with the unexpected,” and this joining
occurs in the ambiguous space between virtuous form and rebellious content, which
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becomes a “scene of transformation.”17 A decorum of excess offers a nebulous, tenuous
space where appropriate form is melded with disproportionate content for the purpose of
a transition in thought and emotion, which relies on pathos and/or ethos to insure its
transitional effects. In the end, this decorum contains or manifests a suitable, though
often unexpected, response to the magnitude of the subject/situation under discussion,
and its effect is the shattering insight of hyperbole that must be offered at the opportune
moment. That is, kairos is an important element of a decorum of excess.
Appropriating a hyperbolic risk within a decorum of excess is marked by a certain
kairos as a moment of timeliness able to be infused with potent rhetorical power.18 John
Poulakos suggests that kairotic speech is necessary “to create an impression of timeliness
in the audience,”19 and Scott Consigny defines kairos as “momentary ‘openings’ or
opportunities to which the skilled artisan must respond accurately and forcefully.”20
These “openings” for hyperbole in particular are the narrow gaps within discourse when
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hyperbole can exert its full potential. If the opening is missed, then hyperbole is likely to
fail miserably. As a response to a particular exigence, the use of kairos aids in creating a
forceful pathos deemed necessary by the hyperbolist. If kairotic speech fails to appear
timely, then pathos will seem unnecessarily extravagant and artificial, and hyperbole will
fall flat as “folly” and be misunderstood as kakozelia. As Longinus says, hyperbole can
overshoot its mark: “Overdo the strain and the thing sags, and often produces the
opposite effect to that intended.”21 A decorum of excess attempts to regulate this
overshooting and harnesses the force of kairos to insure that disproportionate hyperbolic
power appears appropriate and occurs at the opportune moment. Kairos disorients, and
the elegant use of hyperbole moves the audience decorously towards re-orientation by
highlighting and justifying the appropriateness and necessity of the assertion.
The gravity of extraordinary situations requires extraordinary risks, and this risk
only functions effectively within a decorum of excess where hyperbole and kairos work
in tandem. As Poulakos argues about kairos, “Extraordinary circumstances and
unprecedented conditions compel one to resort to kairotic speech, that is, speech that
risks violating established norms of propriety and decorum,”22 and Longinus argues that
hyperbole is also most effective when it is employed at a time of crisis.23 In this sense,
hyperbolic speech is kairotic speech that risks violating norms and decorum in order to
respond appropriately to a particular exigence defined by extraordinary circumstances.
The crisis may be such an “overwhelming threat” and an “intensity” that “achieves
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psychotic proportions”24 that only a disproportionate hyperbolic response is appropriate.
The pre-Socratic ethic, especially in the Pythagorean school and Gorgias’s thought, of
“Know the opportunity” (kairon gnothi) is thus vital for the functioning of hyperbolic
risk.25
In order to accomplish this risky task, Poulakos argues (via Gorgias) that one
must use kairotic speech to “avoid employing what is normatively typical because the
typical in the form of the expected is the exact opposite of the unique in the form of the
timely”26 in order to “dislodge a generally held view by means of new and surprising
arguments,” which recasts “common belief in a new light.”27 Within rhetorical theory,
there is nothing more capable of casting beyond reality or more unexpected or atypical
than a hyperbolic shock “fired with brutality,”28 and this disorienting disruption must rely
on the audience’s perception of timeliness and decorousness if it is to be received as wit
instead of folly. The risk of hyperbole is the risk of kairotic speech operating within and
as a part of a decorum of excess, and the risk effects a re-orientation of thought or reality
that results in perspectival transition. This is often seen when hyperbole is used within
epideictic.
Expanding on Poulakas’s conception of kairos, Dale L. Sullivan argues that
epideictic rhetoric itself is kairotic in nature,29 and with Rosenberg, posits that epideictic
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operates as a “suprarational rhetoric that goes beyond the rational capacity to confront an
individual’s being with the radiance of Being.”30 Within epideictic discourse, the
epistemological and ontological disruptiveness of hyperbole functions as a response to an
exigence by forcefully throwing beyond one’s perception of a rational economy, i.e., a
given interpretation of reality, and highlighting circumstantial contingency. This
disorienting ambiguity is only momentary, but employed at the right moment, it dislodges
one’s interpretive lens long enough to re-orient a given perspective and effect
transformation/renewal. In tandem with kairos, embedded within a decorum of excess,
and grounded in pathos and/or one’s epideictic ethos,31 hyperbole functions effectively in
all of its paradoxical and excessive ambiguity within epideictic.
FOUCAULT’S HYPERBOLE
A philosophical example of a decorum of excess used in epideictic is offered
through Allan Megill’s analysis, in Prophets of Extremity, of Foucault’s discourse.
Although Megill never references hyperbole, his argument is based entirely on analyzing
the use of hyperbole within Foucault’s discourse. I will not trace the intricacies of
Megill’s analysis of Foucault’s “discursive formations,” “subversive discourses,” and
“discourse as praxis.” I will simply draw attention to Megill’s unwitting insight into
Foucault’s use of hyperbole. Additionally, and without knowing it, Megill also argues
that Foucault’s work takes the form of epideictic, which Robert Danisch asserts as well.32
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Commenting on Foucault’s use of epideictic, Danisch argues that Foucault’s
discourse “does not seek to get the past right, nor does it seek to establish policy
proposals for future courses of action…it seeks to reveal and transform the present, and
this is precisely what makes his rhetoric epideictic.”33 Danisch asserts that Foucault
attempts to “uncover what lies hidden” and “play on the dominant values of his audience
and show what makes various communities cohere.”34 Danisch makes a convincing case
that Foucault’s work is epideictic, but what he misses, and what Megill unintentionally
emphasizes, is that Foucault also uses hyperbole throughout his arguments asserted at
opportune openings within discourse and philosophical thought. As Mileur asserts,
“Foucault locates hyperbole at the heart of philosophical language,”35 which is to say that
hyperbole is necessarily at the heart of his critiques. Foucault uses a decorum of excess
within epideictic to errantly assert hyperbolic impossibilities that are duplicitous in order
to arrive at other possibilities.
Megill argues that the impossible task of attempting to say too much in order to
say what must be said but is never fully articulated is precisely what Foucault is pushing
the exploration of “truth” towards, of “changing the way things are.”36 Disrupting literal
sense through hyperbole “to communicate what could not have been otherwise
communicated,” Foucault, as a hyperbolist, wants the audience to believe an
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“extraordinary ‘idée,’”37 a re-imagined res. In this sense, the very basis of Foucault’s
writing is premised upon hyperbole.
In particular, Megill writes, “It can be argued that Foucault is engaging in a
legitimate rhetorical tactic, telling us lies about the past in order to open our eyes to the
reality of the present,” and he continues, “Despite its inadequacies or even its outright
falsehoods, such an account is justified insofar as it enables us to see more clearly the
reality of this disciplinary society.”38 As if re-appropriating Quintilian’s theory of
hyperbole for a Foucauldian context, Megill emphasizes Foucault’s tactical, i.e.,
opportune, use of hyperbolic lies, which are “pardoned” because of the purpose they
serve to elegantly surpass the truth. The justification Megill offers for Foucault’s use of
excess is the exigence of the present extraordinary political/historical reality, Foucault’s
“crisis orientation.”39 Objectively and subjectively justifying Foucault’s hyperbole,
Megill offers his reader the (re)interpretation of Foucault’s discourse as disorienting and
disproportionate. His “fictioning” of the past and present results in a decorous surpassing
of the truth, which re-orients one’s perspective “to see more clearly the reality of this
disciplinary society.”
In Megill’s understanding of Foucault’s “fictioning,” he notes that there is an
“odd interplay between truth and lie: a lying history is legitimized by the existence of a
‘true’ political reality; a lying politics is legitimized by the existence of a ‘true’
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history.”40 With Quintilian, Megill sees a distinction in his analysis of Foucault’s writing
between a lie intended to deceive and a hyperbolic lie intended to push epistemological
and ontological limits. For Megill, Foucault’s “‘fictioning’ of the past is at the same time
a fictioning, and a mystifying, of the present”41 in a disorienting display of hyperbolic
force that pushes truth beyond its bounds. That is, he fictions the past and uses a given
interpretation of the present that is a “useful tool” intended to mystify and “disorder
order.”42 Foucault “seizes upon an interpretation already in place, ‘which it must upset,
overturn, shatter with hammer blows.’”43 The truth is the hyperbolic lie, i.e., the excess
of exaggeration, on the side of truth(s) that disorients and disorders order with hammer
blows at a kairotic moment, which then leads to a re-ordering or re-orientation that is a
revelation of what lay hidden.
Foucault’s kairotic speech (what he might call the fearless speech of parrhesia)44
is shocking, disproportionate, and risky, but it is necessary to alter given interpretations
of reality, which Foucault sees as extraordinarily oppressive and skewed. He risks being
mis-apprehended in order to create moments of apprehension. Historical scholars note
the inaccuracy of Foucault’s work suggesting it is folly, but in doing so, they miss the wit
of his hyperbolic (re)interpretations made within a decorum of excess.
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What Megill suggests these scholars miss, for example, is that The Archaeology
of Knowledge is a parody. Parody and hyperbole are distinct from each, but they share
similar functions and characteristics, e.g., they each exaggerate and position oppositional
impossibilities against each other as falsehoods, which might lead to other possible
alternative truths.45 In this hyperbolic parody, Megill suggests that Foucault is attacking
Cartesianism as “the whole subjectivist emphasis that allegedly underlies modern science
and technology.”46 Foucault accomplishes this goal by offering The Archaeology of
Knowledge as a parodied response to the Discourse on Method that posits the
impossibility of Descartes’s “method” against Foucault’s own elusive anti-method.47 The
hyperbolic parody results in disorientation that is meant to lead to a perspectival reorientation.
In contrast to Descartes, Foucault attempts the Dionysian project of “smashing
science altogether” by the “grotesque parodying of an Apollonian scientific formalism.”48
In this sense, Foucault is “engaged in undermining a whole structure of thinking, a whole
approach toward ‘reality’ that he sees as oppressively uncreative.”49 If this is indeed
Foucault’s risk in Archaeology, then he is using hyperbolic lies within a disorienting/reorienting decorum of excess to make his hyperbolic argument of smashing science
altogether. With the hammer blows of hyperbole, Foucault offers Archaeology as a

45

For example, see Simon Dentith, Parody (Routledge, 2000) and Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and
His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
46

Megill, Prophets of Extremity, 228.

47

Ibid., 229.

48

Ibid., 231.

49

Ibid., my emphasis.

221
hyperbolic lie intended to reveal the impossibility of Descartes’s method as well as the
truth that his subjectivist views underlie all of science and technology. Although
Foucault’s Archaeology may be misunderstood as folly, the disorienting and “grotesque”
force of his kairotic speech is managed within a decorum of excess where his witty
hyperbole may be successfully employed.
What this discussion reveals is that a decorum of excess is necessary for the
effective implementation of hyperbole. A disorienting hyperbolic assertion, i.e., vertige
de l’hyperbole, is made at a kairotic moment within a decorum of excess where a
disproportionate response to an extraordinary situation is the appropriate one, which
facilitates a re-orientation towards meaning and being. Operating as a meta-function, the
disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole exerted at the opportune moment is
when a hyperbolic lie can be a beauty and an impossibility can lead to other possibilities.
This is particularly evident in the grotesque genre.
HYPERBOLE EPITOMIZED IN THE GROTESQUE
Jean-Pierre Mileur and Christopher D. Johnson both suggest that there is
something monstrous about hyperbole, and Johnson posits that hyperbole can go in either
of two directions: the grotesque or the sublime. Obviously, monstrosities immediately
leap to the mind when the grotesque is mentioned, but this is perhaps not true of
hyperbole. From the Latin monstrare – meaning to indicate itself, or something beyond
itself, so that it is a sign of things to come50 – both the grotesque and hyperbole indicate
something beyond reality and are phenomena at the limits of philosophical articulation
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always pushing epistemological and ontological limits.51 As trope or figure of thought,
hyperbole is always present in the grotesque – “the monstrous is one of the hyperbolist’s
most characteristic subjects”52 – and this genre exemplifies the disorientation/reorientation function of hyperbole.
First, I will offer an initial look at hyperbole’s absent presence in theoretical
grotesque literature, which will reveal hyperbole’s prevalent but unacknowledged
presence in the grotesque. It will also show hyperbole’s disorientation/re-orientation
function operating within the grotesque. Next, I will examine specifically how the
grotesque operates through a decorum of excess of disorientation and re-orientation. I
will then offer two variations of disorientation and re-orientation on the theme of
hyperbole in a grotesque key: 1) paradoxical verba and the insight of res and 2)
transgressive de-formation and errant transformation. These variations serve the same
function, but they each reveal different ways of conceptualizing the hyperbolic function
of disorientation and re-orientation in discourse.
It is important to emphasize at this point that hyperbole does re-orient through
disorientation, but the re-orientation is not necessarily a synthesis or resolution. As
Mileur says, “The curve of hyperbole appears as the path of desire,”53 and this desire as
errant re-orientation is never satisfied and always unfinished. Hyperbole offers a
transition that reveals some other way of thinking or being in the world, which is never
fixed or stable. It leads towards other possibilities and other perspectival truths, and the
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re-orientation out of disorientation may, in fact, be a res that is disorienting. This is
particularly evident within the grotesque where all is uncertain and may feel like
“walking on the edge of a precipice from which one might fall at any moment.”54
When discussing the grotesque and using it to show hyperbole’s function, one
difficulty that arises is its definition, which is quite stupefying itself. As Wolfgang
Kayser states, “The creator of grotesques…must not and cannot suggest a meaning.”55 It
is difficult to give form to an expression of ambivalent meaning and formlessness. In a
particularly well crafted grotesque passage of hyperbolic eloquence, Kristen A. Hoving
writes:
The grotesque is a slippery idea. Like slime mold, it is difficult to grasp, sliding
first one way, then another, only to ooze through clutching hands and splatter to
the ground…It undoes form, picking away at beauty, rationality, harmony, and
shape like fingernails worrying a scab. By means of parasitic prefixes it sucks its
life from what it is not, becoming misshapen, deformed, unfocused, indistinct,
disintegrated, and antithetical.56
A quite disorienting contiguous amalgam of congeries, Hoving reveals the problematic,
elusive notion of the grotesque while also offering some of its tentatively agreed upon
characteristics such as being elusive, undermining form, and operating through
contradiction. Even conceiving of the grotesque as a genre is a slippery theoretical move
because it oozes across linguistic, formal, and generic boundaries and categories. This is
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why the examples I offer in this section may not seem immediately “grotesque” but are,
in fact, grotesque expressions.
For this reason, some suggest the grotesque might be a particular style, an
aesthetic category, a form, an operation, or an incongruous image. Others simply create
their own thematic, generic, or historical category for the grotesque, e.g., the mystical
grotesque, the science-fictional grotesque, grotesque realism, the literary grotesque, the
grotesque-absurd, the satiric grotesque, the tragicomic grotesque, the carnivalesque
grotesque, the romantic grotesque, or the modern grotesque. Referential inferences are
made, but no theorist succeeds in definitively naming the grotesque. The grotesque, each
theorist asserts, suggests no particular form or meaning, but although theorists of the
grotesque often avoid the project of formal definition, they do offer “characteristics” or
“operations” of the grotesque.
One concisely culminating attempt at summarizing the characteristics and
operations of the grotesque is offered by Dieter Meindl:
The grotesque emerges as a tense combination of attractive and repulsive
elements, of comic and tragic aspects, of ludicrous and horrifying features.
Emphasis can be placed on either the bright or the dark side (or pole) of the
grotesque. But without a certain collision or complicity between playfulness and
seriousness, fun and dread, the grotesque does not appear to exist.57
A contradictory creature, the grotesque brings contrarieties together and makes the
familiar strange. It is a “semi-exotic” space where the strange and the familiar meet,58
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e.g., in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Masque of the Red Death.”59 No matter the differing
characteristics enumerated across the literature of the grotesque, the one unifying concept
is that of disorienting contradiction, paradox, or incongruity,60 e.g., Kenneth Burke offers
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the grotesque as a perspective by incongruity.61 Olga Muller Cooke writes, “It is in that
admixture of extremely heterogeneous elements, embracing such polarities as the horrific
and the humorous, the ludicrous and the absurd, that the grotesque resides.”62 The main
hyperbolic function represented by the grotesque, then, is its disorienting contradictory
nature, which always leads towards some transition of thought, emotion, experience,
insight, or psychological state. Its excessive verba inevitably leads to the re-presentation
of an extraordinary res. The subversive force of the grotesque is to excessively
(re)present contradiction, and this occurs through the disorientation and re-orientation
function of hyperbole.
Geoffrey Galt Harpham asserts that the grotesque is a fusion and co-presence of
something that is “illegitimately in something else,” which creates a “distinct feeling of
repulsion.”63 This uneasiness, whether extreme or mild, can be stirred by overtly
hyperbolic combinations of bodily distortion. In the Renaissance grotesque, for example,
this fusion occurs by blending animal and vegetable together in an impossible grotesque
amalgam of illegitimate and deceitful hybridity that creates a feeling of repulsion, a
repulsion that nevertheless fascinates and exploits curiosity.64 Yet, the disquietude of the
grotesque may also be a disorienting hyperbolic figure of thought such as when two
conflicting philosophical and/or theological combinations are melded together, e.g.,
61

Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1984).
62

Olga Muller Cooke, “The Grotesque Style of Belyj’s Moscow Novels,” The Slavic and East
European Journal 32, no. 3 (1988) : 399.
63
64

Harpham, On the Grotesque, 11.

See Summers, “The Archaeology of the Modern Grotesque,” 26-28 and Kari E. Lokke,
“‘Bluebeard’ and ‘The Bloody Chamber’: The Grotesque of Self-Parody and Self-Assertion,” Frontiers: A
Journal of Women Studies 10, no. 1 (1988) : 10.

227
Thomas J. J. Altizer’s “Christian atheism,” which can cause an equally unsettling
reaction as two opposing worldviews are violently blended together, and “the deepest
foundations of our being are interfered with.”65
In either instance, a fusion of contrarieties creates pathos of excessive discomfort,
and fascination, through hyperbolic disorientation. As Webb writes of hyperbole,
“Decentering the ordinary in a horizon of limitless possibilities can draw together
disparate standpoints onto an open plane of a passionate and inclusive imagination.”66
Drawing together contradictory standpoints is the work of hyperbole in the grotesque,
which creates an affectus in the audience of excessive, errant psychological states.
Through impossibility, disorientation, and the lie of hyperbole, the grotesque brings
together incongruous elements that intend paradoxically to shock, disturb, re-orient, and
transform. As Johnson says of hyperbole in general, “Extremes converge to precipitate a
state bordering on madness and catastrophe,” and this convergence allows hyperbole to
“interrogate the immanence of superfluity and monstrosity.”67 Balanced on the edge of
madness, the grotesque offers one a (re)interpretation of reality through hyperbole. The
transition this creates may lead to the realization of disorientation itself, other
disorienting possibilities, but the transition is always an imaginative epistemological and
ontological expansion, which is facilitated by hyperbole’s phenomenological and
psychological disruptiveness.
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For example, hyperbole in the grotesque disorients by assembling a strange
conflation of disparate elements indicating something beyond itself, but these elements
need not constitute an actual monster or even something like a gargoyle, which many
grotesque theorists consider Gothic rather than grotesque. Noel Carroll, for instance,
suggests that the Left Behind series as well as clowns are grotesque.68 A grotesquerie
need only to be some disorienting amalgam of contradictory thoughts or elements, e.g., a
confusion of the real and the ideal,69 creating excessive affectus in the audience that is
disconcerting, disruptive, discomforting, and discombobulating.70 Not typically
considered grotesque, Hercules, or his modern counterpart Superman, is an example of
the contradictory fusion between mortal (the real) and immortal (the ideal) that creates a
feeling of wonderment and also fear in the audience. Hyperbolically overreaching the
bounds of mortality, Hercules’s immortality expresses itself through impossible feats of
strength within a body that is a conceit. He is not quite human or inhuman but a
“subversion of our common expectations of the natural and ontological order.”71 He is an
amalgam of the two thrown together in a mythological hyperbole. In this sense, Christ
may also be considered a hyperbolic grotesquerie.
Despite the grotesque’s reliance upon disproportionate and incongruent
exaggeration and excess to facilitate its perspectival re-orientation, the functions of
hyperbole that make the grotesque possible are often ignored by theorists of the
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grotesque. Most theorists limit the grotesque to the realm of metaphor and myth without
mention of hyperbole, but exaggerated mythic allusions and metaphoric amplifications
are ineffective, perhaps even impossible, without hyperbole. Webb even contends that
the grotesque actually operates in opposition to metaphor and in line with hyperbole. He
argues that bringing incongruent realities together is the work of hyperbole because
grotesque incongruence does not lead to the synthesis of metaphor72: “Hyperbole is a
trope that beckons but also warns; it accomplishes an intensification that does not result
in a metaphorical synthesis.”73 Webb’s assertion, however, is a bit excessive and actually
delimits the use of hyperbole while attempting to refuse metaphor access to the
grotesque. Certainly, metaphor is used extensively in the grotesque and is vital for its
expression, but grotesque theorists limit the possibilities of the grotesque, and even
metaphor in the grotesque, by ignoring the functions of hyperbole.
Hyperbole, in fact, is frequently dismissed in the grotesque as “mere” and
“extravagant exaggeration.”74 Two notable exceptions are Suzanne Guerlac and Mikhail
Bakhtin. Guerlac’s “impersonal sublime” relies on both hyperbole and the grotesque.
She suggests that the logic of excess, a “hyperbologic,”75 is what guides the grotesque
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and that the grotesque’s rhetorical figure is “accumulation, exaggeration, or hyperbole.”76
Within the grotesque, “The same and the other are held together, ‘complicated,’ by
hyperbole.”77 This is the paradoxical disorientation that is the promise of hyperbole, but
it is incomplete. Guerlac does not highlight hyperbole’s transition towards re-orientation.
On the other hand, Bakhtin argues that hyperbole is a positive figure for grotesque
realism that fosters liberation and transformation, but he downplays the disorientating
effect of hyperbole opting instead to highlight bewilderment as caused by other concepts
such as parody. Each theorist gives hyperbole an important role in the grotesque, but
their theoretical insights are deficient without using the complete function of hyperbole to
re-orient through disorientation, which is so demonstrable within the grotesque genre. In
addition, these two theorists’ acknowledgement of hyperbole operating within the
grotesque is hardly a significant contribution to the breadth and depth of grotesque
theoretical literature. However, by combining Guerlac’s and Bakhtin’s insights, the
grotesque illuminates the disorientation and re-orientation function of hyperbole.
For example, Georges Bataille’s complex and grotesque scatological project uses
hyperbole to achieve its effect. Relying on the functions of hyperbole, he explores the
grotesque world of surrealism with all of its admixtures, “heterogeneous matter,” and
amalgams of imagery that are perpetually out of joint with reality. Bataille’s hyperbolic
body imagery, much like Mikhail Bakhtin’s discussion of bodily exaggeration within
grotesque realism, emphasizes orifices and openings from which ejaculate, vomit, and
defecation spew forth. Bodily functions are exaggerated (hyperbole as trope) and
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celebrated as “sacred” animality (hyperbole as figure of thought) with the intent of
confounding, overturning, and transgressing typical distinctions between what is sacred
and profane.
Notions such as the “festival,” similar to Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque,
intrigue Bataille for its transgressively paradoxical and seemingly disparate elements of
death, abhorrence, liberation, desire, sacrifice, and eroticism, which hyperbolically
disrupt psychological states and foster heightened emotions and “sacred” experiences.78
For Bataille, the grotesque festival corresponds to the object of horror that is a “fetid,
sticky object without boundaries, which teems with life and yet is the sign of death…it is
death gorging life with decomposed substance.”79 Here, the sacred, rather than the
profane, is paradoxically aligned with the horrific, and this shocking hyperbolic sacred
that pushes boundaries and gorges life with death (hyperbolic personification) leads
inexorably to a perspectival reinterpretation through bewildering transgression.
In a telling passage that highlights his use of hyperbole in the grotesque, Bataille
writes:
The movement of the festival liberates these animal forces, but now their
explosive liberation interrupts the course of an existence subordinated to ordinary
ends. There is a breakdown – an interruption – of the rules; the regular course of
things ceases; what originally had the meaning of the limit has that of shattering
limits. Thus, the sacred announces a new possibility; it is a leap into the
unknown, with animality as its impetus.80
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Through auxesis, the “sacred” is itself described as a type of hyperbole that interrupts the
ordinary and shatters limits through the impossibility of the unknown, which leads to new
possibilities. The addling “leap into the unknown” transitions to re-orientation through
the extraordinary nature of the sacred, and homogenous impossibility leads to
heterogeneous possibilities such as the hyperbolic contrariety of the profane being sacred
and the sacred being profane. The festival is a hyperbolic lie that casts the world upside
down, and it is a moment of transgressive transition where the ordinary is made
extraordinary in order to conceive of reality differently. “Everything that ‘justifies’ our
behaviour needs to be re-examined and overturned.”81 Transposition for Bataille relies
on a hyperbolic logic operating within the grotesque, which skews the world enough to
view it awry and push epistemological and ontological boundaries towards other
grotesque possibilities, and he offers exaggerated transgressive inversions and orifices
within a decorum of excess.
The grotesque, then, highlights the disorientation/re-orientation function of
hyperbole well. The exaggeration of the grotesque is confusing and leads to an errant reorientation of thought and being. Perplexing and frightening impossibilities are offered
that disrupt order and normalcy – “the norms of common life are replaced by an ‘antinorm’”82 – and only the errant wandering that occurs after this disorientation will take
one along the path towards a possible re-orientation. This function of hyperbole
elucidated by the grotesque also reveals how a decorum of excess might function within a
particular genre.
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KAIROTIC DISSONANCE AND DECOROUS RESONANCE
Discussed throughout this chapter, the reception of hyperbole is crucial, and the
same is true of the grotesque.83 Theorists of hyperbole are at pains to accommodate
hyperbole, especially through the fluidity of decorum, to insure its positive reception, but
the notion of decorum in the grotesque is often befuddling while the importance of its
reception is quite clear. Buried within the theories of the grotesque, however, is a notion
of decorum that is a decorum of excess. Inadvertently, grotesque theorists offer an
important example of how a decorum of excess operates within discourse even as they
fail to see its use.
As I argued above, kairos and/as kairotic speech as an “opening” in thought
and/or discourse is a key factor for a decorum of excess, and it serves the function of
creating dissonance within the audience by relying heavily on pathos. The
disproportionate expression of hyperbole asserted at a kairotic moment is then mitigated
and re-directed towards a more decorous, resonant perspective that is intended to be well
received. “The hyperbolist constructs his readers as much as he awaits them,”84 and the
purpose of a decorum of excess is to aid the hyperbolist in preparing the audience for a
positive perception and reception of hyperbole, i.e., that hyperbole resonates with the
audience. Relying more on pathos than ethos, the grotesque demonstrates the operation
of a decorum of excess well.
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John R. Clark writes, “The grotesque was always understood to be excessive,
requiring boundaries and regulation lest it burgeon, ‘break out,’ or get out of hand,”85
which is precisely the problematic relation between hyperbole and decorum. Indeed,
replacing “the grotesque” in Clark’s statement with “hyperbole” still renders the
statement equally true. Quoting Victor Hugo, Guerlac notes that the grotesque is an
“irruption, an overflow, like that of a torrent that has burst its banks,”86 and Leesa
Fanning writes, “The disruptive force of the grotesque threatens to exceed containment
and rupture discrete figural form.”87 The excessive dissonance of the grotesque and its
penchant for seemingly exceeding and de-forming decorum is reiterated throughout the
literature. This apparent violation of decorum is often celebrated in grotesque literature,
but so is the resonant insight the grotesque creates in the individual. It is also
consistently implied that the grotesque does operate within its own type of decorum,
which I suggest typifies a decorum of excess.
It is the risk of hyperbole to push the boundaries of decorum that aids the
grotesque in its flight from the ordinary and the appropriate and then back towards a
certain resonance with the audience: hyperbole offers a “‘temporary, transitory’
disruption between expression and communication.”88 Without a decorum of excess, the
grotesque might always be dismissed as kakozelia thereby deflating its transitional power.
Insightful theorists of the grotesque such as Clark and Harpham do see the importance of
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decorum for the grotesque, which aids in creating an errant resonance with the audience.
Harpham writes, “The grotesque implies discovery, and disorder is the price one always
pays for the enlargement of the mind.”89 The grotesque necessitates a certain decorum to
achieve its effects in the minds of the audience, but this process must first pass through a
juxtaposing amalgam of kairotic incongruity.
John Ruskin suggests separating the noble grotesque from the ignoble grotesque.90
Whereas the noble grotesque evokes meaningful insight and emotion and is a highly
poetic means of expression, the ignoble grotesque is a ridiculous absurdity, a superfluous
decoration. A noble grotesque reveals truth(s), but an ignoble grotesque is simply a
falsehood. Ruskin is here trading in hyperboles and negotiating decorum. Just as
Quintilian separates elegant hyperbole from extravagant hyperbole in order to constitute a
more fluid sense of decorum, Ruskin does so within the grotesque.
In a different move, Michel Chaouli suggests, “The disgusting has its own
peculiar spatial logic,” and he posits that “the disgusting” is out of place and that its
effects cannot be “contained in a delimited area.”91 Yet, he then suggests that an
appropriate space for the disgusting is the abject space discussed by Julia Kristeva.92
Ascribing the disgusting its own “spatial logic” and offering abject space as a scene of
appropriateness for the grotesque, Chaouli inadvertently implies the importance of giving
the grotesque a certain space where it might operate effectively. This is the space of
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decorous excessiveness where kairotic dissonance and decorous resonance are cleaved
together in a hyperbolic logic of contrariety.
In yet another attempt at discussing decorum and the grotesque without the insight
of hyperbole, Harpham suggests that the grotesque does not violate decorum because the
system of decorum the grotesque operates within has “indeterminacy or ambivalence as
the norm.”93 Or, as Lee Byron Jennings puts it, there is an “alien chaos principle at work”
in the grotesque,94 and Bernard McElroy suggests that the grotesque can only exist in a
grotesque world.95 In each statement, these authors unintentionally describe a decorum
of excess where the principle and norm of this economy is excess itself.96 In fact,
Harpham’s description coupled with his earlier assertion that the grotesque leads to
discovery through disorder, suggests that a positive reception of the grotesque relies on a
kairotic moment when the grotesque’s insight may be revealed through decorous
indeterminacy and ambivalence.
According to Harpham, the grotesque is predominantly dependent upon its
reception and perception by the audience – “It is our interpretation of the form that
matters, the degree to which we perceive the principle of unity that binds together the
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antagonistic parts.”97 A positive perception is dependent upon the ability to eventually
interpret the grotesque, which depends on a decorous re-orientation. Harpham continues,
“The more naïve and intense our belief, the more violently will be the transition from one
interpretation to another, and the stronger our experience of the grotesque.”98 The more
intense the magnitude of a belief in a given context, the more dissonant will be the errant
transition to resonance. Exemplified in the grotesque, hyperbole discordantly and
disproportionately dislodges belief(s) and moves from one interpretation to the next
based on the contingent interpretation of the hyperbole itself. One must be receptive to
the grotesque image or discourse in order for it to be effective, and a decorous
excessiveness that gives the grotesque its power errantly re-directs the audience towards a
(re)interpretive transition. Hyperbole responds with appropriate disproportionality to the
exigence of a perceived incorrect or incomplete interpretation, and the interpretation must
be, as Foucault says, shattered with hammer blows. This hyperbolic bludgeoning must
occur at the opportune moment or opening for its full effect to be felt.
The resonance achieved through hyperbole, however, is never a firm or constant
moment but is always contingent. Likewise, “The perception of the grotesque is never a
fixed or stable thing, but always a process, a progression.”99 The objective content of the
grotesque and one’s perception of it evolves, or transitions, through time.100 The
hyperbole of the grotesque image or discourse is perpetually in transition, and the
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mutability of a decorum of excess allows for the perceptual fluidity of the grotesque,
based on contextual constraints and the changing nature of those constraints,101 to move
one errantly towards transition. From one historical context to the next, the grotesque is
always changing, taking on new meanings and shedding old ones, and no matter what the
grotesque might “mean” for one context, it always remains “occluded and imperfectly
perceived.”102 It is for this reason that the grotesque often appears as kakozelia and
thereby necessitates the use of kairos in a decorum of excess. The grotesque is a vehicle
of disproportionate hybridity that shocks through a tragicomic suddenness that arrests
thought and attention at a particular moment for the purpose of transition, not
dismissal.103
In the gap of perception, which is a perpetual interval, the grotesque erupts into
errant apprehension.104 Gilles Deleuze writes of thought in general, “Ideas swarm in the
fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming out and going back, being
composed in a thousand different manners.”105 In the grotesque fracture where an
amalgam of ideas swarm in differential composition, this gap of perception is the jarring
kairotic moment when the grotesque can exert its full hyperbolic and
emotional/psychological force. As Mileur writes, “Between the ‘madness’ of decision
and the normalcy of an articulation which can never comprehend its own origins, there is
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a gap, the space of fiction or fantasy, which only hyperbole can traverse.”106 Within the
grotesque, hyperbole is implemented in this space of fiction or fantasy. This gap is a
kairotic “space between,” e.g., an abject space, and “this mid-region is dynamic and
unpredictable, a scene of transformation or metamorphosis.”107 The excess of the
grotesque is always in transition from one interpretation to another, and it is facilitated by
the hyperbolic “act of transition” or “act of transformation” from seemingly meaningless
dissonance to meaningful resonance.108
These gaps are where the grotesque hyperbolically explodes at a kairotic moment
when all hope of resonance is lost. It is at these moments when disharmonious
grotesqueries, as form(less) and impossible representations viewed awry, are offered,
which “impales us on the present moment, emptying the past and forestalling the
future.”109 Out of the perpetual gaps between interpretation and comprehension the
“prodigious hyperbole” of grotesque ornament causes the eye to wander110 towards a
reverberating image of perception, and the duplicity of hyperbole resists absolute closure,
i.e., resonance itself is always in transition.
The subject remains in the repetition of errant hyperbolic transition that is
nevertheless an attempt to re-orient one’s perspective out of disorientation, and this
process of confusion generates new insight.111 As Mark C. Taylor posits, “Repetition
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ruptures the closed circle in which beginning and end, Alpha and Omega are one. By
holding open the time of space and the space of time, ‘repetition,’ in Lacan’s words,
‘demands the new.’”112 The repetition of hyperbole is not infinite deferral but infinite
(re)interpretation. It is in this process of repetition that the subject errantly wanders
towards a resonance of apprehension that, without hyperbole, will forever recede from
view and elusively defer both interpretation and comprehension.113
For example, when Zizek argues that an empty signifier can repetitively signify
contradictory impossibilities as alleged signifieds, he is positing a discursive hyperbolic
figure of thought in a grotesque frame, which can disrupt belief through the disorienting
recurrence of the violence of (re)interpretation. His hyperbole causes affectus as
interpretive and psychological disruption, and his hyperbolic logic relies on
disproportionality and excess as normative expressions within the economy of his
discourse. Through auxesis, Zizek uses the empty signifier as a discursive hyperbole that
is a kairotic gap of perception within discourse (the curve of hyperbole) that serves to reorient one to other subjective (re)interpretive possibilities (the path of desire). His
dissonant verba stretches discursive limits in order to reveal an always unfinished
errantly resonant res.
Zizek suggests in On Belief that a signified might be that “Alien Thing” of
science-fiction horror movies where the monstrous Thing is either wholly other – the
radical transcendental Otherness of “God” – or exactly the same with a barely noticeable
difference – the radical immanence of “Christ” that is the excessive “too much” of
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humanity that is never fully human.114 In the grotesque juxtaposition of the signifieds
“God” and “Christ,” the empty signifier holds both signifieds in a dissonant, kairotic gap
of disproportionality that can lead to a decorous resonance out of the turmoil, which may
be a re-imagined res of infinite dissonance that nevertheless leads errantly to
(re)interpretive possibilities.
The coalescence of transcendence and immanence in Zizek’s example is kairotic
in a theological sense, and the ambivalent convergence of these seemingly opposed
notions is grotesque in a hyperbolic sense of incongruity. The grotesque wholly other
“God” and wholly same “Christ” signify the excess of signification that dislodges the
presumed signified status of “God” by amalgamating “the horrific or alien with the desire
to shock by exposing repressed truths,” which “can also be aligned with Freud’s concept
of the uncanny and abjection.”115 Through auxesis in a grotesque frame, Zizek offers a
dissonant hyperbolic lie intended to disrupt epistemological and ontological
presuppositions within a resonant decorum of disproportionate (re)interpretation.
Kairotic speech in Zizek’s grotesquerie distorts the expected and makes the familiar
unfamiliar, and hyperbole channels this disillusion into an appropriate disproportionate
expression of contradiction moving towards other resonant possibilities.
The empty signifier offers a jarring tension of disequilibrium, and as in the
grotesque, “There is a recombining of the elements of experienced reality to form
something alien to it.”116 This alienating opening in Zizek’s discourse when two
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disparate theological positions, or beliefs, are placed in discord is the kairotic space when
a (re)interpretive moment occurs that might augment one’s perspective enough to err
towards resonance. The hyperbole might be rejected as kakozelia, but within Zizek’s
decorum of excess, the hyperbolic logic of his argument evokes the force of pathos to
move his audience that is predisposed to excess repetitively towards the realization that
absolute signifieds are necessarily empty signifiers within a playful and unsettling
economy of imaginative (re)interpretation.
The Icelandic musicians Sigur Ros also express the (re)interpretive dissonance
and resonance of hyperbole in a grotesque frame. Their album entitled “( )” offers a rich
expression of hyperbolic grotesquerie through their tracks that are all “untitled.” Without
words and in the perpetual interval of the space between, they express their music
through repetitively dramatic vocalizations that swirl in an amalgamation of grotesque
dissonance, imaginative tonality, and various forms of instrumentation. Even the
instruments they choose such as strings, brass, electric guitar, and drums are distorted in
intentional misuse and alteration to exploit the conventionality of typical musical
progression, which is the resonant insight of their music.
Playing on the postmodern notion of absent presence and present absence, they
crescendo incrementally towards impossible heights of disproportional dissonance that
seemingly violate all notions of musical decorum, but at the opportune moment, they
descend once again into the resonant depths of insight, even if that insight is inexorable
dissonance. Attenuation and litotes increase the ambivalence of the exaggeration, and the
pathos induced through kairotic discord resolves itself, if only partially, within a decorum
of excess where new interpretive perspectives are errantly opened to the audience.
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In their newer album, “Takk…,” they again play on the theme of hyperbolic copia
that repetitively exploits the perpetual interval between. Through the rich effervescent
Icelandic language, the thematic progression of the overall album is one of contradictory
and impossible heights and depths. Progressing slowly by augmenting and building one
voice upon the other, one instrument upon another, and blending their phraseology in a
grotesque cacophony of sound, they then move suddenly and shockingly to a hyperbolic
apogee only to alter their course abruptly and unexpectedly in a radical diminuendo.
Evoking pathos at every turn, they assert their forcefully excessive indulgences through
opportune openings in rhythm, time, and meter.
Moving along the margins of vast and monstrous vocal and instrumental
landscapes, they present tonal disharmony leading inevitably to timbre, in thought if not
in sound. In doing so, they both disrupt and prepare the audience for the positive
reception and interpretation of their hyperbolic grotesquerie, where dissonance is the
norm even as their variations on that dissonance are always shockingly unexpected. They
push and bend the boundaries of decorum by posing oppositional movements,
instruments, and vocals against one another in impossible grotesqueries of sound that
offer (re)interpretation and resist closure, and their juxtaposed phrases and themes evoke
dissonant feelings of uncanniness and fascination that lead errantly towards resolution out
of the aural gaps they exploit.
Through a decorum of excess, the grotesque moves towards an altered resonance
through the dissonance of oppositions in a decorous movement of transition. Repetitively
pushing the limits of decorum through radical disequilibrium within the perpetual interval
of the space between, hyperbole expands epistemological and ontological boundaries
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within the grotesque that leads to a resounding insight, even if that resonance is the
inevitability of dissonance. Thoroughly hyperbolic, the grotesque exemplifies the errant
movement of resonant dissonance and dissonant resonance out of which a partial insight
may be revealed.
TWO VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF HYPERBOLE IN A GROTESQUE KEY
Shown thus far, the disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole, and thus
all functions of hyperbole, relies on a decorum of excess to operate effectively. Drawing
from the example of the grotesque, this can be viewed as a type of dissonance moving
towards resonance. Furthermore, under the function of disorientation and re-orientation I
offer two brief conceptual variations on the theme of hyperbole that are revealed by the
grotesque genre. The first variation expresses itself through paradox and insight, and the
second variation arises out of the movement from de-formation to transformation. The
first operates on a more objective level. The second operates on a more subjective level,
but they each use hyperbole as trope and figure of thought to foster a transition towards
re-orientation within a decorum of excess. Each one is a hyperbolic movement of
contradiction that offers one the opportunity for epistemological and ontological
transitions, and they are both present in the grotesque. The variations are subtle
perspectival alterations of this function of hyperbole, but I offer these two perspectives in
order to elaborate upon and to show the flexibility and complexity of the
disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole.
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PARADOXICAL VERBA AND THE INSIGHT OF A RE-PRESENTED RES
Sometimes considered a species of hyperbole, especially by Baroque writers like
Gracian, paradox and hyperbole “often share the same methods and subject matter,”117
and Ricoeur posits that hyperbole is “like paradox” and even operates through the “law of
paradox and hyperbole.” Indeed, exaggeration is fundamental to both, and paradox
“represents another method of conceptualizing the impossible and the extraordinary.”118
Johnson, interpreting Gracian, says that hyperbole is haunted by the “specter of paradox,”
and Guerlac posits, re-appropriating Lacoue-Labarthe, “‘The paradox states a law of impropriety as an infinite exchange or identity of opposites’ operated through hyperbole.”119
Out of the incomprehension of paradoxical verba, hyperbole leads one towards the partial
apprehension of a re-presented res – a “paradox of truth-in-exaggeration.”120 Particularly
manifested in the grotesque genre, discombobulating juxtaposition is a hyperbolic
paradox leading to a new, yet unrealized, insight.
Paul de Man argues in Blindness and Insight, that criticism engages in a type of
paradoxical blindness that results in insight.121 Through disorienting blindness, one
moves paradoxically towards insight within the overall scope of criticism itself. In the
same sense, hyperbole also requires a certain blindness regarding its insight in order to
function effectively. As Katrin Ettenhuber’s analysis of Peacham concludes, “Hyperbole
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asserts the importance of partial blindness and functional ignorance; the notion of
complete comprehension devalues the thought or feeling that hyperbole evokes.”122
Conceptualizing the baffling heights and incongruities asserted through hyperbole are
only partially comprehended because it is only in the hazy space of “para” that one is
disoriented enough to release presuppositions about thought and reality thereby preparing
the way for a newly re-imagined res. Hyperbole’s repetitive resistance to closure is
particularly evident in the grotesque.
The grotesque, as Harpham suggests, places one into the “para” of paradox, which
is a “preludial condition that dissolves in the act of comprehension;”123 however,
Harpham later writes, “Interpretation always falls between the poles of absolute certainty
and absolute indeterminacy, but…an interpretation accompanies every act of perception
whether we want it to or not.”124 Harpham highlights the paradoxicality of the grotesque
that dissolves in the act of comprehension, but he also asserts that the comprehension it
leads towards is never complete but always in the process of (re)interpretation.
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. posits that the grotesque “obstructs the mind from
completing its effort of quick understanding, arresting it when it wishes to get on with its
routine of knowing, and forces it to learn something it is not sure it wants to know.”125
Some transition towards the re-presentation of an extraordinary res will occur out of the
confounding paradox of hyperbole, but it will never be complete and remains in ceaseless
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repetitive gestures of (re)interpretation. The obstruction of the mind in the grotesque is
the partial blindness of hyperbole functioning in that discourse. Hyperbole paradoxically
stretches the imagination, emotions, and one’s grasp of/on reality, which expands
epistemological and ontological horizons through partial blindness and ambiguous
apprehension, and this is acutely evident in Mark C. Taylor’s grotesque, hyperbolic
discourse.
Taylor’s grotesque copia of a/theological discourse demonstrates the use of
hyperbolic paradox well. Constructing his grotesque a/theological concepts, he moves
one errantly towards tentative apprehension, not comprehension, within his discursive
hyperbolic arguments. Juxtaposing incongruous concepts, Taylor offers one a world of
heteroglossia “compossibilities” where “altar-ity” and nonabsent absences (reappropriated from Blanchot) reign within a decorum of excess. His a/theological project
itself is a paradoxical notion. This disparate and opposing concept radically
(de)constructs a hybridity of theology and an un-theology of “nots.” The “not” untheology of unthought he presents is nevertheless a theological project, a postmodern
theology he has pioneered, that offers insight from the re-presentation of a theological res
through hyperbole.
Using hyperbole as trope and figure of thought, Taylor violently pulls verba apart
and re-assembles it in a disorienting amalgam of radical theo-philosophical ideas.
Speaking of Heidegger, for example, Taylor writes, “Riddles. Riddles that riddle the
Heidegarrian text. First Greek. Then Christian. Then ‘neither Greek nor Christian.’ But
first, a further delay – a supplementary deferral in which Der-rid-a again tells us what he
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is not telling us or is telling us by not telling us.”126 Undermining and riddling theology
at every turn, Taylor forcefully pushes language to its limits in his decorum of excess in
order to take one suddenly and shockingly into paradoxical heights that descend again
into the realm of insight.
Out of the radical theological tradition of Thomas J. J. Altizer and the crisis of the
“the death of God,” Taylor develops Altizer’s hyperbolic paradox of Christian atheism.
Pushing this notion beyond itself, transgressing itself, Taylor’s copious and contradictory
verba inevitably, though hesitantly, leads to a re-presented and transformed
understanding of a res. He argues that the anxiety of a/theology fosters bewilderment
that “creates seminal openings – openings that make it possible to re-examine and
reformulate established assumptions and presuppositions.”127 The labyrinthine errancy of
his discourse exploits kairotic openings that beget vertige de l’hyperbole in the reader,
i.e., an excess of affectus, which is necessary in order to disrupt conventions but
eventually re-orient one towards a new apprehension of a res.
Taylor’s intent overall is to push theology and philosophy paradoxically beyond
itself. He accomplishes this feat through the unintentional use of hyperbole in the
framework of the grotesque. Within the hyperbolic grotesquerie of deconstructive
writing that is “always paradoxical, double, duplicitous, excentric, improper…errant”128 –
“Writing that attempts to trace the border and retrace the margin can…be described as
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erring”129 – Taylor employs hyperbole as trope and figure of thought at every
a/theological turn.
In Erring, Taylor writes of the postmodern “closure of the book” by pointing
specifically to the paradoxical binaries from which he operates and also disrupts. In one
representative passage, he writes:
Along the margin of the book, opposites that Western thought traditionally
separates and holds apart appear to be confused: inside/out-side,
identity/difference, remedy/infection, purity/pollution, propriety/impropriety,
good/evil…The paradoxes that result from this interplay of opposites mark the
closure of the book and point toward erring scripture.130
These paradoxes mark the conceit of the closure of the book, but they are also the
impetus from which he (re)formulates the transition towards the re-presentation of an
unexpected res, i.e., “toward erring scripture.” The paradoxes trace both closure and
errancy, and this is the impossible grotesque space in/from which his writing is amplified.
Using paradox as a guide, Taylor explores the impossible possibility and the possible
impossibility of paradox through hyperbole.
Writing in “para” – in/through the “parapraxical imagination” that “does not seek
to heal the wound of words but keeps the mind open by refusing to mend its tear”131 –
Taylor traces these oppositional concepts along the margins of (un)thought that “mark”
the openings within discourse where an astonishing (re)apprehension of a res may be
gleaned. He does not abandon these contrarieties but fuses them together in hyperbolic
grotesqueries of thought such as the “not”: “Not is…a strange, irregular ruler that creates
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irresolvable paradoxes. Perhaps the most puzzling paradox of the not is its necessary
incomprehensibility.”132 This hyperbolic “not” emerges in Taylor’s discourse as he
“cleaves” incongruities in order to push towards the apprehension that theology and
a/theology are equally and inevitably impossible. Forging another hyperbolic
grotesquerie to aid in this paradoxical task, he develops the concept of “alarity.”
Altarity is both distinct from and similar to alterity. It is a tertium quid, a
grotesque “impossible third,” which cleaves impossibilities in a transgressive space of
disruption: “To cleave…is both to separate, divide, or split, and to adhere, cling, or
stick…This separation that joins and joining that separates transforms the tear of cleaving
into the tear of pain.”133 The hyperbolic cleaving of the tear of grotesque altarity is a
hyperbolic figure of thought that creates pathos in the audience through the anxiety
caused by the tear of cleaving – “The strife of the tear captures the duplicity of
cleaving”134 – and these tears are the “seminal openings” where the transition towards
partial insight can begin. At the “altar” itself, this hyperbole as trope is in “para” at the
rift, or Riss of Heidegger, where contradictions are bound together and also split apart.
The altar is the objective representation of hyperbole that is the impossible space of
paradoxical verba, and altarity is its subjective manifestation as a hyperbolic figure of
thought that moves towards a certain re-formulated res. The paradoxical maneuvering of
Taylor’s “nonsynthetic imagination”135 both uses and is in excess.
In a particularly disorienting passage from Tears, Taylor writes:
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The trace of the fugitive gods is the nonabsent absence of the Holy. This trace is
a different trace, the trace of difference itself, which can never be expressed
directly, revealed totally, or known completely. It is ever elusive, evasive,
excessive. Irreducibly ex-orbitant, the Holy eternally returns to interrupt the
circulation of knowledge and to disrupt every form of reciprocal exchange. To
hear the “inhuman,” “anonymous,” “uncanny” murmur of the Holy is to become
open to that which cannot be conceived, grasped, mastered, or controlled. To be
“released” or “drawn” into the un-dis-closable openness of this rending difference
is to overcome nihilism by no longer “giving a negative reading to that which is.”
Released from the need to assert self by negating other and incorporating
difference, one is free “to read the word ‘death’ without negation.”136
Amidst this teeming sea of philosophical complexities and amalgamations, Taylor’s use
of hyperbolic copia and congeries reveals a decorum of excess at work as he navigates
across an ambiguous theo-philosophical topography. Incrementally augmenting,
accumulating, and building towards the climax of death without negation, he erects one
hyperbole on top of the other in grotesque combinations, and radical verba leads one to
partial insight from an unexpected res. “To walk in the shadow of this death is to linger
in the Night. Night…an other Night…Night of the Other…Other of the Night…Holy
Night…Night beyond Night…White Night…Vigil Night…Waking Night…Night of the
Wake.”137 Certainly a disorienting goop of verba, the re-orientation towards thinking the
nonabsent absence of the Holy, which “always implies a certain excess…that is
unmasterable,”138 is achieved through a decorum of excess where his pathos of confusion
pushes one into the realm of insight.
The insight is never comprehended completely, and his stretching of language is
also a stretching of the self. Straining the facts and surpassing the truth, Taylor’s verba
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brings epistemological and onto-theological presuppositions to the margins of possibility.
His hyperbolic paradoxes remain in suspended apprehension, and his drive towards the
re-presentation of a res occurs through repetitive, errant hyperbole. In Erring, his
immense hyperbolic project builds as one massive demonstration of incrementum and
congeries driving towards the insight of a “Divine Milieu,” and this extraordinarily
grotesque concept swims in the uncanny realm of repetitive, marginal disruption.
In the Divine Milieu, “Eternal recurrence is a paradoxical movement of repetition
that itself neither begins nor ends.”139 The milieu is the impossible space “between
extremes.” It “marks a middle way that is thoroughly liminal. At this threshold,
opposites cross” in a spatical miasma of hyperbolic disproportionality. “The margin
itself, however, is not reducible to the extremes whose mean it forms.”140 Offering the
grotesque milieu as a mean between two extremes, Taylor nevertheless constitutes this
space as hyperbolic where the grotesque impossible third resides and “can never be
contained, captured, or caught by any fixed pair of terms.”141 Within the Divine Milieu,
impossible and disparate concepts are cleaved together in a grotesque monstrosity of
hyperbolic paradox where the mean itself is exploited as impossibility, and this is his
theological re-presentation of the astonishing res that theology and a/theology each
inhabit the space of impossible possibility and possible impossibility.
Taylor’s insight is that theology itself is an a/theological project that is
incomprehensible – that theology itself is, in fact, a grotesquerie expressed as a
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hyperbole. “To write beyond the end of theology is to write the lack of language…[and]
this lack of language is inscribed in and as the failure of words.”142 Revealing the
deficiency and limitlessness of language, Taylor uses hyperbole to offer the tear, which
“eludes the economy of representation,” as a lack of language through the excess of
writing. Indeed, theology and a/theology both rely on hyperbole to express the
inexpressible and the mystical. Theology is a contradictory impossibility arriving at
other incomprehensibilities through grotesque deceits that are not lies. It is a gargantuan
copia of verba that is unending. Infinitely differing and deferring, theology is a
hyperbole that cleaves and transgresses itself, which, as Bakhtin says, is “the very nature
of exaggeration,”143 and this transgression suggests both the insufficiency and
inexhaustibility of meaning.144 Not always well received by his audience and often
accused of kakozelia, Taylor’s decorum of linguistic excess still evokes a res of errant
transformative “compossibilities,” even if it is only partially apprehended by those who
are predisposed to receive it.
TRANSGRESSIVE DE-FORMATION AND ERRANT TRANSFORMATION
More subjective than objective, this variation of hyperbole shown in the grotesque
relies heavily on pathos to move its audience. In the errant movement towards subjective
transformation, transgressive exaggeration is uncontained while always already being recontained. As Derrida says, hyperbole is beyond all totalizing structures but also always
re-economized. More precisely, hyperbole does not move beyond belief but beyond
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reality in order to de-stabilize beliefs. It forces the center to the boundaries in order to
expand or annihilate one’s conception of the center. Mileur defines transgression
specifically as a hyperbolic movement: “A hyperbolical reduction of hyperbole to a point
or moment of crossing, which constitutes the limit it profanes as well as its origin and
end.”145 He sees the moment/movement of transgression as entirely hyperbolic. At the
moment of an impossible crossing that is an a/teleological teleology, a hyperbolic
suspension of the teleological, hyperbole does not destroy boundaries but repetitively
transgresses them. Transgression is both possible and impossible, and it is sustainable
only through errant hyperbolic repetition, which must be perpetually attempted, though it
is never complete. Transgressive de-formation is a hyperbolic impossibility errantly
wandering towards the possibility of transformation. It is a hyperbolic conceit on the side
of hermeneutical truth(s), and it is ever moving towards and away from these subjective
insights.
In this vein, Mileur writes, “The subject is…an errant hyperbole,”146 and the work
of hyperbole is the “extremely hyperbolic representations of the subjectivity that remains
unaccommodated in language.”147 The subject, as Peter de Bolla states is “the excess or
overplus of discourse itself.”148 Uncontained and infinitely transgressing itself as well as
epistemological and ontological boundaries, the residual, de-formed subjectivity as
excess left unaccommodated can only express itself through the excess of exaggeration,
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but it is also always errantly wandering towards and away from the margins of
subjectivity, i.e., transformative moments within thought and discourse. “The subject
becomes aware of himself as the hyperbolic, transgressive element in his language; he is
the point of disorder, the wrinkle, the fold, the source of the disquietude that he tries in
vain to eliminate from the otherwise placid surface of language.”149 Itself the hyperbolic
figure of thought for Mileur, the subject moves through the de-formation of transgression
and errantly, tentatively hopes for a glimpse of transformative possibilities. Continually
in the act of becoming, the self is transformed through repetitive hyperbolic
transgression. Bakhtin’s and Kayser’s understandings of the grotesque exemplify this
movement of hyperbole from transgressive de-formation towards errant transformation.
It is Bakhtin’s notion of grotesque realism, which is constituted through the
carnivalesque, that highlights this variation of hyperbole well. In a time of transition that
is his exigence, Bakhtin views the grotesque (in Rabelais) in entirely liberating terms.
Through the excessive transgressive de-formation of the carnivalesque, he sees the
grotesque as the “contradictory and double-faced fullness of life”150 that offers a
significant act of subjective regeneration and renewal. In much the same way as Bataille
views the festival as a transgression leading to transformation,151 the grotesque body is
the act of becoming and growth within the exaggerated carnivalesque narrative of turning
hierarchies upside down and inside out.
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In grotesque realism, all is exaggerated, de-formed, and parodied. Bodies are
gigantic and monstrous. A fusion of body parts and food are distorted and
disproportionate, and bodily functions are over-emphasized. Bakhtin writes,
“Exaggeration, hyperbolism, excessiveness are generally considered fundamental
attributes of the grotesque style,”152 and he continues, “The exaggeration of the
inappropriate to incredible and monstrous dimensions is…the basic nature of the
grotesque.”153 These disproportionate fundamental attributes that are the basic nature of
the grotesque offer one a decorum where the hyperbolic is the most appropriate
expression – exaggerating the inappropriate is the appropriate thing to do. Out of this
exaggeration comes errant transformation.
In a theological context, Wilson Yates writes of Bakhtin’s eschatological view of
the grotesque, “The grotesque can participate in human life in a transformative fashion,
even though the nature of transformation may vary markedly in extent and insight.”154
Out of the de-formation of death, struggle, and suffering, the grotesque can foster rebirth, liberation, and grace.155 Using hyperbole as both trope and figure of thought, the
grotesque “discloses the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another order,
another way of life.”156 In Bakhtin’s decorum of excess of grotesque realism where
exaggerated potentiality, i.e., the “logic of contradiction,” is the norm, the transgressive
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de-formation of the carnivalesque is performed at an opportune moment of transition that
leads to the errant transformation of the grotesque. This kairotic moment is the opening
where laughter erupts, and laughter as the “unaccommodated” facilitates subjective
liberation and errant transformation through an excess of affectus.
Out of this laughter, the residual grotesque body is always in the “act of
becoming,” which is never finished or completed. The body is transgressed and then
subject to “positive exaggeration, to hyperbolization,”157 i.e., the subject as an errant
hyperbole. This positive exaggeration leads to images of bodily life such as “fertility,
growth, and a brimming-over abundance”158 where bowels, genital organs, and anus are
the “convexities and orifices” that overcome the confines between the world and the body
through an “interchange and an interorientation.”159 The decorum of excess of grotesque
realism where the pathos of exaggeration, disproportionality, de-formation, and distortion
are the norms facilitates the “act of becoming” through a transgression of convention, and
transgressing its own limits is “the very nature of exaggeration.”160 Out of this repetitive,
hyperbolic transgression, the self outgrows itself and becomes a new, other self.
In contradistinction to Bakhtin, Kayser views the grotesque in more tragic terms.
Kayser suggests that the grotesque is still contextual and perspectival but that grotesque
realism is no longer operative.161 Instead, he sees the Romantic grotesque as a tragicomic
fusion of disparate elements that are “unnatural” combinations, which shatters coherence
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and highlights a fragmentation of historical order.162 Kayser explicates the grotesque in
terms of the tragicomic163 – what Frances K. Barasch calls a “grotesquerie”164 – but,
unlike Bakhtin, he places a heavier emphasis on the tragic. Laughter is on the fringe of
the grotesque and is bitter, cynical, and “satanic.” Rather than (hyperbolic) parody,
Kayser emphasizes (hyperbolic) satire and the fantastic, which become predominant
characteristics of the modern grotesque and are focused more on transgression and
disorder than transformation.165
Kayser suggests that the grotesque is a structure that is constituted by the
estranged and de-formed world, a play with the absurd, and an attempt to invoke and
subdue the demonic aspects of the world, which arises in times of confusion and
insecurity.166 “The ambiguous way in which we are affected by it results from our
awareness that the familiar and apparently harmonious world is alienated under the
impact of abyssal forces, which break it up and shatter its coherence.”167 From the
grotesque realism of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance grotesque to the Romantic and
modern grotesque, there is a shift from comic transformation to tragic and inward horror,
but this subjective dread and terror nevertheless seeks a transition in its attempt to subdue
the aw(e)ful de-formation of the demonic.
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Meindl suggests that this shift of liberation to horror and anxiety in the romantic
grotesque is the “consequence of the confrontation between a subjective and
individualistic outlook – as cultivated by the romantic hero and artist.”168 “The horrororiented grotesque, which plays the decisive part in bringing about the reorientation [of a
romantic epistemology], is promoted by dark or negative romanticism, which discards the
Enlightenment construct.”169 Meindl suggests, as does Bakhtin, that laughter can
liberate; however, the laughter of the romantic grotesque is filtered through fear, “an
existential, demonic sphere” that functions as a defense against and a threat to the
individual.170 For Kayser and Meindl, the kairotic moment of the grotesque is still
laughter, but it is a more threatening laughter that can both subdue the demonic and
threaten the annihilation of the individual.
Combining these two perspectives, hyperbole serves to exaggerate, de-form,
distort, fragment, transgress, and estrange. Bakhtin emphasizes folly, which is actually
wit, and bodily as well as phenomenological distortion, which leads to psychological
transformation. Kayser highlights the tragic and psychological estrangement, which
leads to phenomenological alteration. In each instance, disorienting impossibilities and
hyperbolic lies are ever present within the grotesque. The de-forming impossibilities and
deceits of hyperbole – the gargantuan, the monstrous, the absurd, and the ludicrous – all
foster transgression and estrangement from the normative and conventional, but this
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fragmentation and distortion can lead towards a subjective transformation in thought and
emotion.
Returning to the example of Lovecraft’s At the Mountains of Madness, the
hyperbolic, phenomenological de-formation of Bakhtin’s grotesque is particularly
evident. In Madness, Lovecraft joins animal and vegetable together in a tragicomic
display of force where his hybrid monstrosities stretch epistemological and ontological
limits. In Lovecraft’s novel all is stupendous, nightmarish, frightful, ultra-dimensional,
exaggerated, disproportionate, de-formed, and in the process of potential revelation.171
Describing the monstrosities discovered at the mountains, he writes, “All guesses about
its external members had been correct, and on the evidence of these one could hardly
hesitate to call the thing animal; but internal inspection brought up so many vegetable
evidences that Lake was hopelessly at sea,”172 and “It was partly vegetable, but had threeforths of the essentials of animal structure.”173 The grotesqueness of these creatures is
further emphasized through hyperbolic paradox when he describes them as both
“excessively primitive and archaic” and “the very extremes of specialized
development.”174 Using hyperbole, Lovecraft’s de-formed monsters overturn and
transgress the “natural” and/as subjectivity, but his phenomenological distortions also
offer one the transforming psychological insight that all that is normative is disfigured.
Bakhtin’s carnivalesque also suggests that conventional norms must be
thoroughly disfigured, which necessitates the grotesque process of always becoming.
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This is also true of Lovecraft. Through hyperbolic grotesqueries he creates an unsettling
affectus by resolutely undermining all conventions of “nature” and classical decorum by
crafting “hideously amplified worlds of lurking horrors which nothing can erase from our
emotions, and which we would refrain from sharing with mankind in general if we
could.”175 The “natural” is disrupted and de-formed in his imaginative descriptions of
Cyclopean cities “embodying monstrous perversions of geometrical laws and attaining
the most grotesque extremes of sinister bizarrerie.”176 His lurking horrors of
transgressive de-formation lead one through labyrinthine copia to the insight that all is
not right with the world.
The “natural” is not, in fact, natural and always in the act of becoming. The
“truth” exists in a hyperbolic realm where all is amplified, exaggerated, and frightful, but
out of his deformities, an errantly perspectival transformation emerges that can be
psychologically liberating. Relying on a decorum of excess where de-formed
disproportionality is the appropriate and the shocking is the timely, Lovecraft offers
phenomenological transgression as the conduit for psychologically transformative
errancy.
For Rudolf Otto, on the other hand, it is not anthropomorphic or naturalistic deformation that transforms, but a de-formation/re-formation of the wholly other as a
(re)conceptualization of “God,” i.e., mysterium tremendum, which often creates a feeling
of psychological estrangement and the “demonic,” a diabolic disordering. Operating
from the Kantian notion of the sublime, Otto nevertheless responds within Kayser’s
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grotesque frame to the rupture between the rational and the non-rational, and his
discussion of the wholly other de-forms/transforms one’s ontological state and
phenomenological worldview by grotesquely transgressing psychological limits and
expectations. In doing so, he presents the audience with an unsettling melding of
rationality and non-rationality effectively blurring the conventional boundaries between
two presumed rigidly oppositional extremities. Steeped in incongruity, mysterium
tremendum for Otto may be hyperbolically beyond reality, i.e., the non-rational, but it is
not beyond belief, i.e., the rational.
In a quagmire of interrelated though distinct terms, Otto argues that mysterium
tremendum evokes a horrific feeling of dread and can be summarized in two words –
“absolute unapproachability.”177 In a grotesque frame, he hyperbolically asserts, “The
‘wholly other’…[is] that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible,
and the familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of the ‘canny’, and is
contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment.”178 Initially
revealing the ominous savagery of mysterium tremendum, Otto begins to build a
description of the wholly other as that which transcends, transgresses, estranges, and
exceeds boundaries as a de-formed, demonic figure of thought. He also makes the
assertion that mysterium tremendum is fascinating (et fascinans), a fascination with
“awefulness” and “wonderfulness”179: “At its highest point of stress the fascinating
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becomes the ‘overabounding.’”180 Not only is the grotesque, “monstrous” wholly other
something beyond the usual and familiar that stirs wonder, fear, and astonishment, it is
also intensely psychologically fascinating from which one cannot quite break one’s
“numinous” gaze.
The numinous is the state of consciousness that is directed towards mysterium
tremendum,181 which contains the contradictory elements of “awefulness” and
“majesty.”182 By gazing into the impossible abyss of mysterium tremendum one’s
affectus is directed towards a “numinous experience.”183 A “‘creature-feeling’ or
creature-consciousness”184 is a response to and a result of the numinous experience
occurring at a precise moment. At this “‘mystical’ moment,” the wholly other is an
expression of a transcendent “beyond” where numinous consciousness is transgressed
and errantly transformed through a “‘Dionysiac’ element of transport and fervour” that is
“stressed to excess.”185 Through hyperbole, Otto re-conceptualizes the possibility of the
impossible, and the impossible itself, within the numinous experience.
The numinous cannot be strictly defined, but it is connected to “the holy,” which
contains a “moment” that is inexpressible, “ineffabile [sic],” and “completely eludes
apprehension in terms of concepts.”186 The “holy,” as grotesquely sublime (shadows of
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each other)187 and resisting complete comprehension, includes a feeling of “overplus,”
which equivalent words in Latin, Greek, and Semitic languages designate “only this
overplus,” and this “‘extra’ in the meaning of the ‘holy’ above and beyond the meaning
of goodness” is identified by the numinous.188 Out of the kairotic moment of the
overabounding “holy,” the closure of which is disrupted and subverted through the
grotesque and hyperbole, the numinous re-directs one’s thoughts towards an errant reformulation of the wholly other, an infinite perspectival re-orientation.
Subjectively and objectively justified, Otto constructs his hyperbolic argument
through auxesis. He also uses subjective hyperbole, creating pathos and causing affectus,
when describing that “demonic” feeling of mysterium that is filtered through the
numinous towards a new experience of “creature-consciousness,” and this affectus
exceeds all boundaries and categories within a decorum of excess. An ineffable
impossibility, hyperbole builds towards the grotesque “sublimity” of the “holy” – “The
grotesque…confounds the very distinction between grotesque and sublime through its
own duplicity [i.e., a subtraction that is also an addition]”189 – which is the kairotic
moment when this sublimity is revealed as the de-formed whereby the now dissonant
numinous is then re-channeled through one’s consciousness towards errant transition.
The hyperbole builds slowly or arrives all at once in the mind of the individual at
an apex of experience that is a horrific mystery, a “daemonic dread,” of mysterium
tremendum:
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The feeling of it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the
mind with a tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a more set
and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing, as it were, thrillingly vibrant and
resonant, until at last it dies away and the soul resumes its ‘profane’, non-religious
mood of everyday experience. It may burst in sudden eruption up from the depths
of the soul with spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strangest excitements, to
intoxicated frenzy, to transport, and to ecstasy. It has its wild and demonic forms
and can sink to an almost grisly horror and shuddering…[but] it may be
developed into something beautiful and pure and glorious.190
Here, Otto uses auxesis, which is consistently associated with the grotesque,191 that builds
towards the horrific and the glorious. Breaking from ordinary “profane” experience at a
kairotic moment, the grotesqueness of mysterium tremendum is errantly grasped by and
also creates hyperbolic effects. In impossible heights and depths of hyperbole that strains
and moves beyond “truth,” mysterium tremendum comes “like a gentle tide” (hyperbolic
simile) or a “sudden eruption up from the depths of the soul” (hyperbolic metaphor),
which both de-forms numinous consciousness and transforms creature-consciousness out
of its hyperbolic hideousness.
Through a violent movement of disrupting spasms and convulsions, one is
transported into the realm of the demonic or the realm of the beautiful, depending on how
mysterium tremendum is received and integrated into one’s numinous experience.
Juxtaposed by its “boundless awe[fullness]” and “boundless wonder,”192 mysterium
tremendum is a grotesquery of thought and a deceit where coherence is shattered and
impossible oppositions are held in tension in what Taylor calls the space of the
impossible third, i.e., a tertium quid. In this space of unnameable excess, mysterium
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tremendum evokes the affectus of a de-formed numinous monstrosity, which prepares one
for transition. Mysterium tremendum may arrive suddenly or slowly, and the
transformation it causes does so as well.
The numinous experience is an ontological, psychological movement where “I
pass over or make the transition from one feeling to another as my circumstances change,
by the gradual decrease [attenuation] of the one and the increase [accumulation] of the
other.193 Through the auxesis of hyperbole, one transitions through pathos from a deformed sense of mysterium tremendum towards a transformed conception of wholly other
that is excess and in excess. After achieving the height of hyperbole, “This process [of
psychological movement] is one of steady ‘descent’ into the interiors, into the ‘grottoes’
of being, in the hope of finding a core, but always finding more transformation.”
“Awareness is turned inward toward…contingency and change, with the added problem
that this may actually change the thing being observed [i.e., that ‘Alien Thing’ that may
be perceived as wholly other],”194 which for Otto is the inner self as object of subjective
observation. Without unity or synthesis, the wholly other is and creates a metamorphic
flux within the individual that is errant, perceptual transition in a world that is radically
mutable.
Within a Kantian framework, Otto posits that the extraordinary “sacred”
experience breaks from the ordinary “profane” experience, which issues from intuition
and towards “cognitive apprehension” whereby one’s perceptual field is altered,
supplemented, or transcended by “peculiar interpretations and valuations,” e.g. judgments
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about ethics or aesthetics.195 Beyond sense-perception, however, religious ideas and
feelings reside in the mind independently of sense-experience, and hyperbole
“precipitates a heuristic experience in which imaginative and cognitive limits are tested,”
which may cultivate “lasting ambiguity.”196 Attempting to synthesize opposites – the
rational profane with the non-rational sacred (though these reverse and bleed into each
other) – through Kantian “imagination,” Otto nevertheless presents an ambiguous
contrariety causing cognitive dissonance, creating astonishment rather than admiration,
and evading complete comprehension.197
The wholly other does not break into the ordinary, but religious ideas and feelings
break from ordinary perception creating a psychological and ontological deformation/transformation even as complete comprehension is never attained. Within a
decorum of excess, the magnitude of mysterium tremendum, which is most effectively
described through disproportionality and diabolical disruption, breaks from, or
transgresses, the ordinary at a “moment” when one’s attention is shockingly arrested and
prepared for an errant transformation of thought and emotion. The non-rational, a priori
elements of “holiness” converge to reveal “the hidden depths of the spirit itself.”198 In a
grotesque key, Otto’s mysterium tremendum can only be conceptualized through
hyperbolic force within a decorum of excess where all is monstrous, overstated, and an
overplus. Out of this transgressively de-forming experience of psychological
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estrangement, epistemological and ontological transformation emerges as a perpetual
phenomenological act of hyperbolic becoming.
The transgressive de-formation transitioning towards errant transformation is
hyperbole functioning in the grotesque to disorient and re-orient one’s given perception
and interpretation of reality. Bakhtin’s and Kayser’s conceptualizations of the grotesque
highlight this movement well. Whether a phenomenological disruption moving towards a
psychological change or a psychological de-stabilization moving towards a
phenomenological re-orientation, the de-forming/transforming theme of hyperbole’s
disorienting/re-orienting function is pervasive within the grotesque. The insight of the
grotesque reveals the function of hyperbole.
CONCLUSION
The disorientation/re-orientation function of hyperbole is a complex one. Implied
in the two foundational functions of hyperbole, this meta-function operates at a metatheoretical level encompassing both of those foundational functions. Even the intricacies
of hyperbole such as a decorum of excess are governed by disorientation and reorientation, which is why this is also the most important function of hyperbole.
Revealing the underlying impetus for hyperbole to re-orient through disorientation, this
function is the foundation upon which hyperbole succeeds or fails.
Various tactics such as remedia are employed to prevent hyperbole’s failure, but
if one cannot see beyond the literal, then the insights hyperbole can offer are forfeit. The
pathos used to move the audience, the dissonant kairotic moment and/or speech achieved,
and a decorous re-orienting within a decorum of excess are all for naught if hyperbole
suffers rejection and the condemnation of kakozelia. Impossibility and hyperbolic lies
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may achieve vertige de l’hyperbole, but if it is not well received and re-directed towards
some transition of meaning or being, then hyperbole is rendered useless and even
detrimental to one’s overall argument. In every instance, however, the primary purpose
of hyperbole is disruptive, errant transition, i.e., to teach and to move.
Exemplified in the grotesque as well as epideictic, the risk of hyperbole is the risk
of disorienting/re-orienting change or transformation. A grotesque body or a Foucauldian
panegyric, hyperbole offers the promise of transition, but its price is the movement
through disorder, contradiction, and deceit. This movement heightens the risk of being
misunderstood, and risking misapprehension in order to alter one’s perspective or
interpretation of reality makes hyperbole a particularly precarious trope. More than any
other trope, hyperbole’s shocking, surprising force is radically paradoxical and
confounding. It does not synthesize or gently compare. It does not make tentative
connections or subtly undermine. It bludgeons and befuddles. It emphatically disrupts,
rends veils, dismantles, de-forms, transgresses, and deconstructs. It brings blunt force
trauma and power (energeia), and its intent is brutality.
Re-presenting an extraordinary res, insight, transformation, and decorous reorientation is the hyperbolist’s goal, but the hyperbolist attempts this persuasive feat by
violently stretching and bending verba and decorum to its limits. The promise of
hyperbole is also its most profound danger. The hyperbolist moves the audience into the
uncertain, slippery tertium quid of “beyond reality” where hyperbole may seem “beyond
belief,” and only the audience can accept the invitation back towards a (re)interpreted
reality where norms are actively being violated and truth is surpassed in the name of new
epistemological and ontological insights.

270
Yet, even the errant res hyperbole offers may be disorienting itself, as it is with
Taylor and Sigur Ros. Resisting the confines of synthesis, hyperbole moves dialogically,
paradoxically, and discursively in between and at the margins of thought and language as
it exploits and explodes perceptual gaps where disorientation and the possibility of reorientation occurs. The insights apprehended may be disturbing and frightening, as in
Lovecraft and Otto, and it is for this reason that disorienting impossibilities and
hyperbolic lies are resisted. Not all are receptive to hyperbole’s heights, but those who
venture into the unknown of the nonabsent absence will undoubtedly return with a
transformed and more resonant apprehension of an extraordinary res. Hyperbole can
offer important phenomenological and psychological purpose to its audience, and this
purpose is the desire for transformation that is achieved through and is always already in
excess.
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CONCLUSION: THE GREATEST TROPE IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSE
The language of mystical unknowing thus circles around its God in a hyperbolic naming
which speaks the radical anonymity that sustains the soul’s insatiable desire.
Thomas Carlson
When we try to follow virtues to their extremes, vices appear from everywhere which
mingle imperceptibly with them…And vices are there in crowds at the other end. The
result is that we get lost in the vices and no longer see the virtues.
Blaise Pascal
DISRUPTING THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE

The function of hyperbole, from its attempt to express the ineffable and
extraordinary to its effect of stretching the limits of conventions and reason, makes it an
important and vital trope and figure of thought. These attempts at description and
disruption are made despite the inadequacies of language and speech to communicate
what may be perceived as an incommunicable and incomprehensible res balanced on the
edge of madness and monstrosity. Regardless of these insufficiencies, hyperbole
(re)presents the extraordinary by operating, or “throwing,” beyond reality but not beyond
belief. It joins the decorous with the unexpected and makes the unbelievable believable,
and it can strengthen pistis and point the way “beyond” as it defies the laws of ratio and
probability through its forceful use of pathos to move the audience.
One might hesitate or recoil at the use of hyperbole because our relation with
hyperbole is a difficult and strained one, but it is the chief way the inexpressible is
communicated. Hyperbole is often used to describe indescribable events in order to
communicate a departure from the ordinary that seems beyond reality. From 9/11 to
Katrina, these events can only be described through the force and contrariety of
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hyperbole. Impossible events in the mind of Americans, they are perceived as beyond
reality and almost beyond belief. Through the descriptions of these events, an infinite
array of verba, the use of hyperbole leads one to a re-imagined res within a decorum of
excess where most are receptive to hyperbole because of the magnitude of these events,
which only hyperbole can figurally push the imagination towards through a descriptive
and emotional surplus of reality. Offering impossible descriptions of psychological and
phenomenological contradictions as hyperbolic lies on the side of expanding conceptions
of truth(s), the possibilities such as altering the American consciousness from a
perception of invulnerability to vulnerability, i.e., 9/11, or bringing the cohesion of a
newly created sense of American identity, i.e., Katrina, can be constructed.
Presenting the American audience with the wounding and healing of hyperbole,
hyperbole offers a salve in response to extraordinarily traumatic events, which it also
excessively describes. Hyperbole forces one to gaze into the face of exaggerated
contradiction and intense anxiety so that one may come out on the other side of horrific
experiences. 9/11 and Katrina are literal events, but these events are duplicitously
assuaged within the festering wound of hyperbole. As a type of poison that is also
antidote, hyperbole both exploits and delimits our fear of excess.
Hyperbole is a different type of language operating within its own (il)logic of
excess. It offers a different kind of speech where a lie that is not a deception can be
employed on the side of a particular conception of truth(s), which is always lacking, that
hyperbole thoroughly disrupts through the abundance of excess. Hyperbole stirs one’s
emotions through the convergence of power and luminosity in a grandiose display of
insight that transcends or throws beyond the purview of logic and reason thereby creating
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the intensity of vertige de l’hyperbole, which threatens to dismantle the conventions of
reason and rationality. Revealing that reason is madness and madness is reason through
its “mad audacity,” this vertigo is precisely the disorienting crux of hyperbole’s function
to momentarily suspend presuppositions before they are re-oriented towards audacious
phenomenological and psychological re-formulations, though full comprehension is
effaced from view.
In an age of excess when we are struggling with the transcendent and immanent
and are emerging out of the dizzying stupor of existentialism (the impossibility of
possibility) and the disorienting promises of romanticism (the possibility of
impossibility), we are grasping errantly for something more, and it is hyperbole that aids
in this task. From the litigious discussions of impossibility and difficulty to the
conceptual (re)articulation of transgression, the unconscious, subjectivity, and the destabilization of systems of knowledge and economy, hyperbole is the most effective,
duplicitous, and (in)appropriate attempt at expressing these often confounding and
inexpressible positions.
Often accused of tastelessness and insincerity, a new aesthetic understanding of
hyperbole for an age of excess that is itself re-formulating what it means for some thing,
thought, or idea to hold aesthetic value can be significant. The grotesque and the sublime
are obvious expressions of this ambiguity as they are sometimes regarded with disdain
and sometimes revered as aesthetic vehicles par excellence. Balancing upon a precarious
marginality, the aesthetic (re)assessment of these concepts resides tenuously within the
perceptual gaps riddling notions of transcendence and immanence.
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Between one’s perception of transcendence and the residual
materiality/corporality of immanence, hyperbole resides in the perpetual interval cleaving
these two spatio-temporal (im)possibilities together by disturbing, disrupting, and
transgressing norms and conventions while hinting at new and re-imagined realities.
Signifying lack as well as abundance, hyperbole forcefully beckons the hearer to “throw
beyond” convention and risk a de-stabilizing epistemological and ontological shock of
transformation where immanence and transcendence grotesquely coalesce.
Hyperbole is a tenuous bridge between transcendence and immanence. The
immanent often fails to describe the extraordinary adequately, and it is at this moment
that hyperbole becomes vital and necessary. When language or thought must transcend
epistemological and ontological boundaries in order to describe the magnitude of a given
situation, hyperbole is the tropological formation and figure of thought that can reveal the
transcendent power to re-imagine immanence. Unlike any other trope, hyperbole
traumatically and forcefully pushes and strains meaning and being to the margins of
thought whereby one might surpass a given perspective or worldview and re-envisage the
world differently. Through paradox and obscurity, hyperbole reveals the wondrous and
the marvelous about a given context. Beyond “ordinary” language and a “given” reality,
hyperbole may be viewed with fear and suspicion, but it is the most appropriate vehicle to
think and to express the inexpressible.
The madness of demonic hyperbole, the-attempt-to-think-demonic-hyperbole,
offers “marvelous transcendence” (daimonias hyperboles) and is a redemptive figure of
turmoil revealing other truth(s) and possibilities, which are as yet unrealized
potentialities. The hyperbolist acknowledges that hyperbole’s attempts at audacity are
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never enough, but hyperbole errantly repeats itself anyway in order to shatter with
hammer blows the ossification of the literal – where not enough is too much – and move
one into the figural – where too much is not enough. Transcending temporal and spatial
perspectival realities, daimonias hyperboles exorbitantly attempt to re-present what might
be beyond one’s epistemological and ontological realities.
Hyperbole holds the real and the ideal in irresolvable tension. It reveals the
impossible distance between the ineptitude and the infinite multiplicity of language to
describe that which is indescribable. Hyperbole is a trope of and for use in the present
moment, making the distant seem immediate, even as it always points beyond itself to
something more, making the disparate seem possible. One may not fully comprehend
what that more might be, but a glimpse, a glimmer of apprehension, is offered through
hyperbole. It bridges the gap between what is spoken and what is meant and can translate
figurative language into emotional meaning. Hyperbole is the possibility of always
(re)imagining something more and other that is just beyond one’s grasp. At the far
reaches of the imagination when seeing through a glass darkly is not enough, hyperbole
shatters the glass and strains one’s perceptions to a breaking point in order to exceed
one’s given reality.
Creating significant moments of inventio as well as elocutio, the hyperbolist selfconsciously uses hyperbole knowing that it may be misunderstood or mis-apprehended.
The enormity of a particular exigence is so severe that the only trope capable of
communicating the extraordinary is the one that so adamantly risks miscommunication.
Impudent in the extreme, hyperbole prefers too much over not enough, and the
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affirmation of hyperbole is its impossible lie that must be re-directed towards and through
errant, alternate ways of perceiving meaning and being.
Hyperbole dramatizes the impossible itself and is, as Puttenham suggests, a “lowd
lyer.” The extremity of hyperbolic speech and/as kairotic speech offers disrupting
contradictions to force some type of transition onto the hearer, even if that transition is to
a place of disturbing ambiguity. Out of this ambiguity, change occurs. Slowly or all at
once, feigning subtlety or wielding brutality, the hyperbolist risks hyperbole’s own misapprehension for the benefit of the audience to see beyond itself towards as yet unrealized
horizons of (re)imagination. However, it is fear and suspicion of exaggeration and excess
that problematizes our relation with hyperbole. We are not quite certain what to do with
it or how to contain and control it, and we are often afraid of the radical disruption it
offers even as we seek psychological and phenomenological transformation that can only
occur through tenacious inordinateness.
EXCESSIVE MODERATION AND MODERATING EXCESS

The difficulty with embracing this trope of excess arises out of our problematic
relation with excess itself. Ingrained into the very fabric of our social order is an
uncertain and conflicting view of excess. To be “in excess” is to delve into the realm of
sin and vice, and we are taught from an early age to resist this excess. One must not
embody excess because one must not sin or live in vice, which violates the moderation
that is seemingly held in such high regard. The accusation of “too much” is a phrase as
profane as any curse one might utter. That one has too much money is an accusation of
greed. That one eats too much is the condemnation of gluttony. That one thinks about
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sex too much is the deplorable vileness of lust, and the list of sins and vices goes on.
Excess is not to be trusted.
Many say that America overindulges, lives in excess, and gorges itself on
consuming everything it can. For this, it is viewed as evil by some and the Promised
Land by others, though the latter deny America’s excessiveness even as they relish in it.
This is the paradox of our relation to excess. It is feared and suspect, but it is also desired
and embraced. It is this confusing relationship with excess and exaggeration that causes
our enigmatic relation to hyperbole to exist, and the contradiction within hyperbole itself
is a contradiction that both satiates and fuels the desire for excess.
On the one hand, we have embraced the golden mean as the golden rule from our
Greco-Roman and Puritan ancestors. On the other hand, the golden rule of our society is
to consume voraciously without reserve whether this is commodities, knowledge, or
religious experience. We search after prosperity and living life to its fullest while also
restraining ourselves. When one buys something “on sale,” for example, does this not
express the paradox of excess perfectly? Yes, one might have spent a lot of money, but
think of all the money saved!
Confounding in the extreme, those who live moderately are praised but also
viewed as economically, experientially, and socially poor. Those who live in excess
and/or possess a disproportionate amount of wealth are praised but also vilified and
envied (yet another excess). Embedded within the American psyche, it is said that if we
live right, in moderation, then we will be blessed. If we work hard and keep our noses to
the grindstone, then one day we will be rewarded. Karma happens, and when it does,
sacrifices made will be replaced with abundance. The relation to excess is equivocal and
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pervades every aspect of our lives. Both poison and remedy, hyperbole-as-pharmakon
evades complete comprehension.
The Puritan mindset of prudence, for example, is thoroughly entrenched within
the American consciousness, but this alleged attitude of radical moderation has its own
excesses. Puritans literally expunged excess from their midst, though this occurred
paradoxically through excessive acts such as witch-hunts, and justifications for this
excess were offered as a defense of moderation. Many even said that we did not
excessively conquer other civilizations because it was our manifest destiny, i.e., an
abundant blessing bestowed by God for our moderate, Christian living and restrictive
obedience. One might even suggest that the exaggerated restraint of prohibition is the
excessive resistance to excessive debauchery. It seems that appearance is what matters.
One’s outward self must seem prudent even as a surfeit of desires swirl within the inner
self, but as Tertullian and Augustine remind us, the inner erupts into the outer. Even as
we embody hyperbole, we also attempt to smother it beneath a façade of prudence. The
apparent self we project is the literal lie exceeding the hermeneutical truth(s) of our inner
self. Excess cleaves our outside to our inside and our inside to our outside.
Just as Greco-Roman rhetorical theorists and the “Church Fathers” wrote about
excess, those who espouse a prosperity gospel today paradoxically encourage living in
moderation in order to gain abundant blessings, e.g., wealth. For the Greco-Romans and
“Church Fathers” the blessings of state, democracy, citizenship, or God were the reward.
In this view, one is not to live excessively in vice, which leads to intemperate living or
even the gates of hell, but one is to exude austerity while at the same time spending,
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consuming, and even thinking lavishly about God, politics, or philosophy – with a nod to
moderation – which leads to success and enlightenment.
One must live moderately and “above reproach” as Paul says and not be a “leaky
jar” as Plato says, but theologically and philosophically the “good news” must be heard
and lived to the extreme. One must seize every opportunity but not appear to be an
opportunist. It is no wonder that a trope which embodies excess is resisted, enveloped in
paradox, and viewed as such a contradictory expression. It is no wonder that hyperbolists
are demonized and considered deceivers. Is not “Satan” the very embodiment and
scapegoat of what we view as all that is excessive, as the ultimate hyperbolist?
Excess is our insatiable desire never to be fulfilled but always sought, and we
have paradoxical (mis)understandings of how to deal with it or what to do with it.
Religious institutions, e.g., Christianity, presumably act as vanguards against excess, but
their stipulations and doctrinal declarations and our obedience to them are also excessive.
The “not” to one kind of excess is the “yes” to another kind. Yet, the Christian message
is itself excessive. God gives a surplus of love without remainder through Christ who
exceeds normative human boundaries. Grace and salvation are excessive concepts and
are offered excessively to forgive an excess of sin. As Paul says, “Where sin abounds,
grace much more abounds.” Christ’s sacrifice to ensure this grace and salvation is an
excessive gesture, but this excess is controlled and contained by those who espouse it. If
God as an impossible possibility actually existed, would that not be more monstrously
terrifying than our impossible conceptions of God?
Rather than operating within a type of decorum of excess, the Christian message
is tamed and toned down within a highly regulated restricted economy of religion. Grace
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and salvation are offered only to those who accept it in a particular form and a particular
way, e.g., only through baptism, only through the Eucharist, or only through the Church.
In Catholicism, access to this excess is restricted even further through the confessional
and the priesthood. Most intriguing of all, those who are “saved” often cannot accept the
grace they are promised, and they turn to an excess of shame and guilt. They suffer
inwardly for their sin because they cannot integrate excess positively into their lives. It
seems that the excessive exaggeration of “original sin” is too much and far outweighs the
promise of and the desire for infinite grace. Psychologically, the complexities of excess
are confusing, and we are confused by it. The same is true of exaggeration.
“I thought you were just exaggerating.” “That’s a mere exaggeration.” “Come
now, don’t exaggerate. Tell the truth.” These are the phrases one hears time and again,
and yet, we enjoy exaggeration, or we are at least fascinated by it. The exaggerated
grotesqueries of disasters, violence, and even terrorist acts where, say, the overabounding
incongruity of a plane flying into a building or a student assassinating fellow students
holds our attention. We cannot look away. We must see it again and again. It is
repeated on every news station at our disposal. We are psychologically bound to
exaggeration and excess as we are to its opposite.
Even in academic “disciplines,” we are to be modest in our claims and are not to
exaggerate our conclusions – because that is a lie – but what if the magnitude of our
conclusions deserves or even demands to be exaggerated? What if too much is exactly
the right amount? Or, we are taught not to deviate from our restricted economy of
writing, but what if what we need to communicate is precisely an unrestricted economy,
an excess of verba to arrive at the re-presentation of an extraordinary res? We must write
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conservatively but publish excessively. We indulge in philosophical excesses and praise
them as heralds of a new paradigm or era, but we contain them in theoretical constructs
while also explicating them incessantly. We attempt to disorder order through
epistemological and ontological excess and exaggeration – “in theory” – but we loathe
giving up our order of disorder.
Even if the exorbitant theories of academics might result in physically violent
consequences, we continue to embrace and to contain them within our conventional
modes of communication since they are only figures of thought. We argue for
exaggerated reform and even excessive revolution despite the fact that we do not actually
live out and express these thoughts in our everyday lives because we might be perceived
as an extremist. Even if we did, would it be as intense as our writings signify? Are not
revolutionaries often put to death, the ultimate excessive cessation of life? Social
movements as the excessive representations of thoughts and ideas are squelched or tamed
down into manageable, moderate, academically demarcated “moments” in history.
Academics speak of excessive “transgression,” “anarchy,” “heterology,” or “alterity,” but
we do not always act out or integrate these concepts into our lives because they are too
much. They become traumatic, and so we cover them with excessive fantasies, which are
displaced by other “theoretical” fantasies and replaced with yet other, “safer,” fantasies.
The scientific paradigm exemplifies the tenuous relation we have with excess.
Exploring and discovering, ever expanding the horizon of knowledge, are concepts
already prone to excess, and we have a seemingly insatiable desire to push them even
further. Moving along the curve of hyperbole/hyperbola science flirts with transgressing
the limits of human knowledge even as it moderates this process by categorizing and
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compartmentalizing its discoveries into constricted modes of examination. In highly
controlled experiments, the unknown and uncontrollable are harnessed by placing them
into knowable parts. Excessively capturing, violently tearing apart, and dissecting our
world, scientists paradoxically attempt to counteract and unify all that is unknowable and
mysterious while also theorizing about the inexplicable, e.g., in quantum theory and
quantum mechanics, which is also an attempt to explicate the unknown. A battle rages
within the scientific paradigm between excess and moderation.
Teetering on the fragile edge of excess, science inhibits excess with excessive
control. The physical sciences scrutinize the outer world, and neurophysiology and
neuropsychology delve into the inner world of the brain and the human psyche. Probing
and searching, the amorphous realm of the unconscious is dismantled and put together
again. The impetus to investigate is always excessive, but the impulse to restrain this
force, e.g., through bioethics and the scientific method, is equally as strong. Explaining
the literal with hyperbolic conceptual models, i.e., lies on the side of perceptual truth(s),
scientific hyperbolists move through disorienting impossibilities towards other
possibilities of thought and knowledge.
Radical in the extreme, the epistemological and ontological promises of hyperbole
are both fascinating and viewed as dangerous, and our relation to hyperbole and our
relationship with hyperbolists are dubious at best. Academics both embrace Derrida’s
scandalous re-interpretation of a res and resist his verba as “errant texts [that] graph an
infinite course at the edge of the abyss, of madness and of silence.”1 We hesitantly
meander around Heidegger’s verba seeking his re-imagined res about Being, worlding,
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and reveiling/unconcealing difference between Being and beings as a surplus and an
excess. We both praise and fear Taylor’s a/theology because it threatens the clearly
demarcated systematics of theology. We revel in the theoretically transgressive deformation of the carnivalesque, but we balk at its transformation when it is our bodies
that might be transgressively exaggerated. Praising and resisting hyperbolists like
Rabelais, Zizek, Bataille, and Foucault, disordering societal norms and conventions is
both exciting and terrifying.
Societies seek spiritual resonance, but they do not want to pass through
disorienting dissonance to achieve it. They seek societal transformation but cling to the
accepted order. The hyperbolists they praise, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., are also the
ones they destroy. Moving through impossibilities towards other possibilities is simply
too impossible, and transformation through hyperbole is stifled and dismissed. The jump
into contradiction is too inconvenient, which is another way of saying too much than one
can handle.
Religions praise impossibilities and mysteries, but it seems that only saints,
mystics, and ascetics are willing to embody hyperbole and move through this unknown
terrain to arrive at other possibilities of meaning and being in the world. One is not even
quite sure what to do with these extremists. They are excommunicated or venerated and
sometimes both. Surprising and disturbing, those who live a life of embodied hyperbole
are often excommunicated in life, which is quite an excessive gesture, but venerated after
the excessive finality of death.
A monastic life or the life of a nun is an exaggerated one, though highly admired.
We allegedly value obedience, but the very lives of hyper-obedience they lead are
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recondite. For this, they must be physically and spatially compartmentalized into
monasteries and nunneries and placed at the psychological and geographical margins of
societal and religious life. Those such as the Quakers are also both revered and placed at
the fringes of society. Amish communities are misunderstood, and their radical
separation from normative society is viewed as an excessive lifestyle. As we learn from
Otto, it is easier to accept the rational and distance ourselves from the non-rational, and
even Otto’s psychological mysterium tremendum is a defense against irrationality since
he constructs and dissects it within a rational framework.
Whatever else hyperbole may be, it is the attempt to contain our fear of excess
within a tropological expression because it exposes the inadequacy and inexhaustibility
of language and reality. Out of fear and suspicion, those who view moderation as the
golden mean of rhetorical decorum approach the excess of hyperbole as too much. Even
those who view hyperbole more positively still tend to emphasize a certain moderation
and caution its use. Stretching the limits of language, thought, and decorum, those who
see the epistemological and ontological benefits of hyperbole attempt to accommodate its
forceful onslaught of tropological force, but the risk of this hospitable view of hyperbole
is the risk of misapprehension. Perhaps no other trope creates as much anxiety or is as
psychologically disturbing for rhetors and audiences as hyperbole.
IMPLICATIONS
RHETORICAL THEORY AND CRITICISM

Rhetorically negotiating the psychological struggle with excess is a daunting task
because hyperbole is not simply psychologically frustrating but is also problematic
rhetorically. Hyperbole is a lie. It is just a deceit. It is ridiculous and foolish. It serves
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no productive rhetorical purpose. These are the typical accusations (as defense
mechanisms?) made of hyperbole. Indeed, the history and exploration of hyperbole is a
venture into contradiction, ambiguity, extremity, and paradox. Though it may be
similarly defined throughout its rhetorical history, the attitudes held regarding this
tropological representation of excess are widely divergent and even oppositional.
Largely forgotten or neglected as a critical trope in current rhetorical theory, I
explored the two functions and one meta-function of hyperbole in order to offer a
different view of hyperbole than current rhetorical scholars are used to, and it presents
hyperbole in a new light. Through my analysis of hyperbole, for example, I was able to
produce fresh insights into the epideictic and grotesque genres, tropological theory,
kairos and decorum, sophistic rhetoric, and the relation between hyperbolist and
audience. Examining the epideictic and grotesque genres, I showed that hyperbole
expresses itself in a variety of forms, and these forms reveal much about hyperbole as
well as the hyperbolist.
It seems that overall, rhetoric has a love-hate relationship with hyperbole born out
of fear, confusion, and suspicion, and the prejudices against hyperbolists can be severe.
Using a variety of remedia and relying more on affectus than ratio, the hyperbolist
negotiates the tension between unsettling transformation and the audience’s affinity for
stability, order, and normativity. Just as a prophet, the hyperbolist stands at a distance
from the audience and offers a radical message of transition. The hyperbolist stands
alone and can be judged harshly unless ethos and pathos are used effectively. Interpreted
literally, the hyperbole fails, but the instances of hyperbole’s failure are equally as
interesting as its successes. Understanding the complexities of hyperbole’s functions and
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its operations within a decorum of excess can help rhetorical critics and theorists
recognize, explore, and even re-evaluate these successes and failures. Thus, one
implication hyperbole offers for rhetorical theory and criticism concerns the question of
judgment.
For example, certain judgments made about hyperbole’s use within discourse and
who might be considered a hyperbolist can be re-considered. Are the apocalyptic
sermons of John Hagee any less eloquent than the eschatological speeches of Martin
Luther King, Jr.? Is the political hyperbolic satire of John Stewart any less sophisticated
than traditional political discourse? Is the rhetorical “street shitting” of Gunn’s essay any
less decorous than a papal encyclical or a presidential inauguration? Are the hyperbolic
lies within Foucault’s discourse to be dismissed for their historical inaccuracies? Does
not the apocalyptic message of the Left Behind series offer kairotic speech in the same
way as political activists or radical environmentalists? Should fear and suspicion truly
dictate what rhetorical theorists and critics consider eloquent or stylistically acceptable?
We are too bound to historical presuppositions about rhetoric that we often miss the art of
hyperbolic persuasion with its radically altered epistemological and ontological
perspectives, its alternative forms of inquiry, and our judgments about hyperbolic “texts”
or theoretical concepts may thus be skewed.
Considering rhetoric’s exploration of the sublime, for example, judging how the
sublime is either communicated and/or imagined successfully or unsuccessfully can be
reconsidered by more fully apprehending hyperbole’s functions and the hyperbolist’s role
in a rhetorical situation. That the sublime is buttressed by hyperbole can aid in
significantly pushing rhetorical theory’s interest in the sublime forward. As the vehicle
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for expressing the ineffable, hyperbole gives further insight into how the sublime
functions and operates effectively or ineffectively within discourse and aesthetics.
Actually constructing an aesthetic theory using hyperbole could radically alter
impressions and conclusions regarding the sublime and the beautiful.
Perhaps exploring certain aesthetic issues and transcending presumed aesthetic
categories through a grotesque hyperbolic framework or combining the sublime and the
grotesque, as Victor Hugo suggests, through hyperbole, since hyperbole tends to go in
either direction towards the sublime or the grotesque, might reveal new insights into
hyperbole, aesthetics, and our perceptions about aesthetic judgment. Or, rhetorically
constructing a theory of the Longinian sublime combined with his understanding of
hyperbole and then applying it to Kantian notions of the infinite and sublime, erupting at
the limits of human consciousness in the irreducible excess of the infinite, and the
beautiful is certainly worthy of consideration. Perhaps, as Johnson asserts, despite Kant’s
alleged aversion to rhetoric, he uses hyperbole to structure many of his arguments. This
perspective could radically alter certain judgments made about Kant’s overall discourse.
Disrupting commonly held assumptions regarding these issues, hyperbole, and the
hyperbolist is one way rhetorical critics and theorists might re-evaluate their observations
concerning various aesthetic theories.
As already suggested in the previous chapters, exploring other tropes in relation to
hyperbole is a task rhetorical theorists must examine and re-formulate. Considered by
several theorists of hyperbole to be a trope-producing trope and the master trope, an
understanding of tropological theory in general must be re-visited. The four master
tropes, so named by Vico and solidified by Burke, are now put into question and are
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effectively destabilized from their venerated pedestal. If hyperbole is indeed a tropeproducing trope and the most effective way to express the inexpressible, then it is not
simply the four master tropes that need theoretical expansion but a new conceptualization
of how tropes operate within discourse through hyperbole. Judging how these tropes
work in tandem must also be re-examined.
Re-conceptualizing hyperbolic metaphor or hyperbolic simile or hyperbolic
parody, or satire, or irony are all productive ways hyperbole might be employed within
rhetorical theory, which can foster re-interpretations of these tropes and genres. How
does a metaphor operate differently from a hyperbolic metaphor? What does it mean that
irony might function through hyperbole and produce vertige de l’hyperbole, e.g., as Hugo
and de Man suggest? In what ways does hyperbole produce and facilitate the use of these
tropes and genres? I have already shown how the epideictic and grotesque genres
exemplify hyperbole and can be re-interpreted through hyperbole. Certainly, this affects
one’s understanding of genre criticism and how it might be approached. Our judgments
about eloquence, style, kairos, and decorum must also be re-configured.
Understanding Zizek’s or Derrida’s oeuvres as using a hyperbolic style and
kairotic speech within a decorum of excess to make their arguments changes the
accusations of kakozelia, with which they are often lambasted, to praise of intricately
woven hyperbolic arguments. That is, they might be praised as adept and skillful
hyperbolists who fully embrace hyperbole’s functions. Using hyperbole to critique and
deconstruct others’ hyperboles can shed new light on various “texts” using this excessive
style as well as hyperbole itself. Already entrenched within the infinite differing and
deferring movement of signification, hyperbole seems an appropriate expression of this
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type of writing-in-excess that is already in excess and signifies excess. Always pointing
beyond itself, the differing and deferring signification of language requires a surpassing
of alleged truth(s) that is the work of hyperbole. How one approaches language itself
might be re-considered.
The excessive re-duplication of writing effaces the author/self, and the hoped for
but never attained hyperbolic transgression of writing is the process of becoming-asrepetition that embraces and also displaces transgression with transformation as errant
hyperbole. The impossibility of transgression is asserted in order to arrive at the
possibility of the author/self that can only erupt from the excessive fissures within writing
as moving beyond truth and reality itself, and the impossibility of desire doubles back
upon itself in order to perpetuate the possibility of the work of writing as a hoped for,
even eschatological, vision of what writing-the-self might one day become but never is.
Rhetorical critics might even re-explore criticism, as performance, itself as a
hyperbolic endeavor. For example, Guerlac notes, “If exaggeration was a term of
criticism, criticism is transvalued into praise through exaggeration of the critical term.”2
Or, as Mileur says, “The work is a hyperbole, the intersection of other hyperboles, and
the subject is, insofar as he can be written about at all, another hyperbole.”3 Viewing a
critical term as hyperbolic and even approaching a piece of criticism itself as a hyperbole,
one might consider this critical work as a flow of verba that stretches discursive limits
and leads one towards the re-presentation of a res; or, as an impossible lie errantly
wandering towards other truth(s). In particular, Guerlac’s statement implies that criticism

2

Guerlac, The Impersonal Sublime, 64.

3

Mileur, The Critical Romance, 86.

290
might even use hyperbole in epideictic form whereby it references the shared values or
terms of criticism, it re-formulates them, and offers a new literary reality as an invented
great through the work of auxesis within a decorum of excess. As de Man says, “The
work must become a project aimed toward an unreachable goal,”4 and this unreachable
goal is the invented great that promises attainment while at the same time defers its
presence in endless repetition.
The analysis and critical term(s) of the critic are then judged to be valid or invalid
based on the coherence of the argument, the employment of the term(s), and the critic’s
epideictic ethos. In this view, offering a profusion of praise or exaggeration of the
critical term, “text,” the critic’s conclusions, or even the critic’s brilliance itself in order
to reveal a unique insight at an appropriate and opportune moment is the purpose of
criticism. Often, impossible uses and disproportionate, daring heights are imbued upon
the critical term so that the criticism itself, the critical position maintained, may arrive at
other possible conclusions. The act of criticism itself may be judged to be a significant,
though unrealized, expression of hyperbole.
RHETORIC AND RELIGION

The second major implication hyperbole offers rhetorical studies is related to the
relationship between rhetoric and religion. The entire rhetorical approach to and
connection with religion and theology becomes more complicated through the lens of
hyperbole. If theologians are adept hyperbolists, then rhetoricians can both learn from
and explicate their theoretical constructs of remedia and affectus in inventive new ways.
4

De Man, Blindness and Insight, 43.
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Viewing apologetics or heresies from a hyperbolic perspective, even placing them into
the same category of hyperbolic discourse, is certainly an imaginative way to (re)examine
these divergent theological positions. Exploring cataphatic and apophatic rhetoric
through hyperbole is another worthwhile endeavor since via positiva and via negativa are
replete with disorienting hyperbolic lies and impossibilities and flourish within a
decorum of excess.
Viewing specific rhetorical theologians such as Tertullian, Augustine, Anselm,
Aquinas, Erasmus, and even Luther and Calvin through the lens of hyperbole
significantly alters our presuppositions about these theologians as well as how their
theologies are constructed and interpreted. A staunch dialectical Scholastic, Aquinas’s
use of hyperbole can reveal the necessity of hyperbole for rhetorical theological
discourse. Or, re-interpreting Augustine’s blending of rhetoric and Christianity through
the lens of embodied hyperbole can affect the perceptions of his inward psychological
turn and his theory of preaching within a decorum of excess.
A radical theo-philosophical re-interpretation of Jonathan Edwards is currently
underway, and a new apprehension of hyperbole certainly casts the significant disconnect
between his theology and many of his sermons in new light. Indeed, approaching
“Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” from a hyperbolic perspective completely
modifies our typical interpretations of that sermon. As Edwards was fascinated with the
psychology of “enthusiasms,” perhaps this sermon offers a heuristic through the
impossible lie of hyperbole in order to move towards other possible truths about
Christianity or the psychology of the Awakening since this sermon is highly divergent
from his theology and philosophy. One could even approach his sermon from the
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standpoint of an Augustinian psychology within a decorum of excess of worship through
preaching. Are not the sermons and revivals of George Whitefield, which induced
psychological and physical “enthusiasms,” also hyperbolically employed? Perhaps all of
the Awakenings erupted out of a decorum of religious excess where exaggerated
falsehoods were preached on the side of re-conceptualizing given truth(s).
From Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God to current
Fundamentalist rhetoric, political rhetoric, and theoretical theo-philosophical discourse,
hyperbole and its decorum of excess re-maps the theoretical field of rhetoric and religion.
Even apocalyptic discourse, with its literally figural and figurally literal expressions, that
is already widely explored in the field of rhetoric might be re-interpreted through
hyperbole since this trope has a pension to exacerbate the tension between the literal and
the figural, which is always a difficulty when examining apocalyptic rhetoric.
Hyperbole, theology, and religion all reveal the interesting interaction between the
literal and the figural. Rhetorico-theologically, one might conceive of beliefs as literal
manifestations of metaphysical absoluteness and faith as a figural disruption of ontotheological claims. Literal statements of belief may be rescued by remedia, but if not,
theological work ceases at belief before it can move into figural faith statements of more
theoretical complexity. Beyond theology, but just as “religious,” beliefs in political
ideologies can be just as powerful. Nationalism is one such ideology that holds
significant sway over humanity, and free market, neo-conservative ideology is a form of
corporate, economic power relying almost entirely on the literal. Literally believing in
and unquestioning state power is undoubtedly a failed hyperbole. Or is it?
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Beliefs certainly offer lies on side of someone’s truth, and they are impossible
conceptions that lead to other possible ways of conceiving meaning and being in the
world. These possibilities may be disastrous, but they are possibilities nonetheless.
Exaggerated speeches, propaganda, treatises, and pamphlets buttress these ideologies.
However, as I argued in chapter three, literal belief statements are often qualified with
remedia as “but” statements so they do not fail as hyperboles, and this is still true.
Propaganda, for example, offers no “but” statements. It reinforces the “is” of the literal
through the figural, rather than disrupting this “is” and emphasizing the fluidity of figural
hermeneutic truth(s) through the literal lie of hyperbole and, therefore, cannot be a
hyperbole. A movement away from the figural is a movement away from hyperbole
since hyperbole can only exist in a figural realm where its (il)logic of extremity can be
effectively employed. Literalism leads to absolutism and not hyperbole. To pursue the
literal is to deny hyperbole, and when hyperbole is denied or mis-apprehended,
epistemological and ontological imagination is stifled.
The mythological/theological imagination, for example, becomes empty and
meaningless when bereft of hyperbole and the figural because within mythic thought
everything is meaningfully figural and governed by the mediation of oppositions, e.g.,
Mircea Eliade’s “hierophany” as a “mysterious act” manifesting something of a different
order and reality.5 This movement through impossibility towards transformational
possibilities simply cannot occur in the realm of the literal. As Roland Barthes suggests,
“Myth is speech justified in excess,”6 which “aims at an ultra-signification…and stretches

5

Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard R. Trask
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1959), 11.
6

Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 130.
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to the limit the link between signifier and signified.”7 For Barthes, language itself is a
mythological system of signification, and this system is justified in/by excess itself.
The literal does not stretch the limit between the signifier and signified but
attempts to make a direct connection between a signifier and a particular signified. When
the hyperbolic movement of disrupting this connection fails, then so do new imaginative
possibilities and the act of “perpetual metamorphosis.”8 For many, it is perhaps easier to
simply proceed along the path of the normative and the familiar rather than struggle with
the difficulty of remembering that the literal is the figural. When faced with destabilizing
order and conventions, these movements may simply be too much for hyperbole to
disrupt.
Examining the mythological/theological imagination from the perspective of
hyperbole, a rhetorical theorist or critic might take up questions of the self, subjectivity,
desire, and transgression through a discussion of asceticism. Rhetorico-theologically,
asceticism can be viewed as the theological and rhetorical hyperbolic, hagiographic reinscribing of the self, i.e., a writing of the self in excess as both lack and abundance, and
the self is the exigence of subjectivity guided by the curve of hyperbole that is the path of
desire. The subject is a literal embodiment of hyperbole that is the figural enactment of
desire within a decorum of bodily and psychological excess, i.e., a theological or
a/theological re-orientation. The self becomes a spatio-temporal, phenomenological grid
where intense pathos moves one psychologically towards epistemological and
ontological transformation.

7

Ibid., 133.

8

Harpham, On the Grotesque, 77.
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Asceticism is not withdrawal from the world but a hyperbolic engagement with a
normative, reified perspective with which one is dissatisfied. It is kairotic speech and a
disorienting transforming of one’s subjectivity and symbolic universe through a
hyperbolic mode of existence. Thus, the ascetic can be viewed as a grotesque hyperbolic
self-in-transition through transgression leading errantly towards an alternate way of life –
a self watching itself transition towards an Other self. This mode of existence is guided
by desire-as-hyperbole, and its heterological intent is nothing less than absolute
transgression, paradox, and contradictory hybridity. Indeed, what I am offering in this
paradoxical ascetic “work” as a hyperbolic expression of transgressive subjectivity
traversing the errant path of desire is a hyperbole about hyperbole in epideictic, as well as
grotesque, form.

296
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achter, Paul. “Comedy in Unfunny Times: News Parody and Carnival after 9/11.”
Critical Studies in Media Communication 25, no. 3 (2008) : 274-303.
Adams, James Luther and Wilson Yates, eds. The Grotesque in Art and Literature:
Theological Reflections. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1997.
Ali, Zahra A. Hussein. “The Aesthetics of Transgression: Khalil Hawi’s ‘The Sailor and
the Dervish’ and the European Grotesque.” Journal of Arabic Literature 28, no. 3
(1997) : 219-41.
Ameringer, Thomas E. A Study in Greek Rhetoric: The Stylistic Influence of the
Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom. Kessinger
Publishing, 2006.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. 2nd ed. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999.
__________. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Translated by George A.
Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Aquinas. “Whether Ambition is a Sin.” In Summa Theologica. Christian Classics
Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS_Q131_A1.html>
(14 November 2009).
Aquinas. “Whether there can be any Excess in the Worship of God.” In Summa
Theologica. Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.SS.ii.SS_Q93.SS_Q93_A2.html?highli
ght=excess#highlight> (14 November 2009).
Bacon, Francis. “Of Love.” In Essays, Civil and Moral. The Harvard Classics.
<http://www.bartleby.com/3/1/10.html> (25 November 2009).
Badiou, Alain. Being and Event. Translated by Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum,
2007.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Translated by Helene Iswolsky.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
Barasch, Frances K. “Definitions: Renaissance and Baroque, Grotesque Construction
and Deconstruction.” Modern Language Studies 13, no. 2 (1983) : 60-67.
__________. “The Grotesque as a Comic Genre.” Modern Language Studies 15, no. 1
(1985) : 3-11.

297

__________. The Grotesque: A Study in Meanings. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.
Barnes, Timothy David. Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971.
Bataille, Geroges. “Desire Horrified at Losing and at Losing Oneself.” In The Bataille
Reader, edited by Fred Botting and Scott Wilson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1997.
__________. “The Festival, or the Transgression of Prohibitions.” In The Bataille
Reader, edited by Fred Botting and Scott Wilson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1997.
__________. Guilty. Translated by Bruce Boone. Venice: Lapis Press, 1988.
__________. Inner Experience. Translated by Leslie Anne Boldt. Albany: SUNY
Press, 1988.
__________. “The Phaedra Complex.” In The Bataille Reader, edited by Fred Botting
and Scott Wilson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
__________. Theory of Religion. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Zone
Books, 1989
Beale, Walter H. “Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New Theory of Epideictic.”
Philosophy and Rhetoric 11 (1978) : 221-246.
Bernauer, James. “Michel Foucault’s Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction to the
Non-Fascist Life.” In Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious
Experience, edited by James Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette. Burlington: Ashgate
Publishing Company, 2004.
Biester, James. Lyric Wonder: Rhetoric and Wit in Renaissance English Poetry. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1997.
Bizzell, Patricia and Bruce Herzberg, eds. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from
Classical Times to the Present. 2nd ed. Boston: Beford/St. Martin’s, 2001.
Blair, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. BiblioLife, 2009.
Booth, Wayne C. The Rhetoric of Rhetoric: The Quest for Effective Communication.
Wiley-Blackwell, 2004.
Boyle, Marjorie O’Rourke. “Chaff: Thomas Aquinas’s Repudiation of His Opera
omnia.” New Literary History 28 (1997) : 383-399.

298

__________. Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1977.
__________. Rhetoric and Reform: Erasmus’ Civil Dispute with Luther. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1983.
__________. “Rhetorical Theology: Charity Seeking Charity.” In Rhetorical Invention
and Religious Inquiry: New Perspectives, edited by Walter Jost and Wendy
Olmsted. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Brown, Norman O. Love’s Body. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
Brown, Peter. The Making of Late Antiquity. Oxford: Harvard University Press, 1993.
__________. The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 200
1000. 2nd ed. Wiley-Blackwell, 2003.
Bullock, Jeffrey. “Augustinian Innovation: A Spokesperson in a Post-Classical Age.”
Journal of Communication and Religion 20, no. 1 (1997) : 5-13.
Burgess, Theodore C. Epideictic Literature. Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2007.
Burke, Kenneth. Attitudes Toward History. 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984.
__________. The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology. Boston: Beacon Press,
1961.
Burrow, J. A. The Poetry of Praise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Cameron, Averil. Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of
Christian Discourse. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Campbell, George. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. Forgotten Books, 2009.
Caplan, Harry. Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1970.
Carlson, Thomas A. “Apophatic Analogy: On the Language of Mystical Unknowing
and Being-Toward-Death.” In Rhetorical Invention and Religious Inquiry: New
Perspectives, edited by Walter Jost and Wendy Olmsted. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2000.

299
Carroll, Noel. “The Grotesque Today: Preliminary Notes Toward a Taxonomy.” In
Modern Art and the Grotesque, edited by Frances S. Connelly. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Carter, Michael K. “The Ritual Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric: The Case of Socrates’
Funeral Oration.” Rhetorica 9 (1991) : 209-232.
Chaouli, Michel. “Van Gogh’s Ear: Toward a Theory of Disgust.” In Modern Art and
the Grotesque, edited by Frances S. Connelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Chase, Richard. “The Classical Conception of Epideictic.” Quarterly Journal of Speech
47 (1961) : 293-300.
Chin, Catherine M. Grammar and Christianity in the Late Roman World. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
Christenson, David. “Grotesque Realism in Plautus’ ‘Amphitruo.’” The Classical
Journal 96, no. 3 (2001) : 243-260.
Cicero. De Inventione. Translated by John F. Tinker. Rhetoric and Composition.
<http://rhetoric.eserver.org/categories/history/classical/genres-ofrhetoric.html#delib-part> (23 October 2009).
__________. De Oratore. Translated by James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001.
[Cicero]. Rhetorica ad Herennium. Translated by Harry Caplan. London: Harvard
University Press, 2004.
Clark, John R. The Modern Satiric Grotesque and Its Traditions. Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1991.
Clayborough, Arthur. The Grotesque in English Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965.
Clor, Harry. On Moderation: Defending an Ancient Virtue in a Modern World. Waco:
Baylor University Press, 2008.
Colie, Rosalie L. Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
Condit, Celeste Michelle. “The Functions of Epideictic: The Boston Massacre Orations
as Exemplar.” Communication Quarterly 33 (1985) : 284-299.

300
Conley, Thomas M. Rhetoric in the European Tradition. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1990.
Connelly, Frances S., ed. Modern Art and the Grotesque. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
Connelly, Frances S. “Introduction.” In Modern Art and the Grotesque, edited by
Frances S. Connelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Connolly, Joy. The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Consigny, Scott. “Gorgias’s Use of the Epideictic.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 25, no. 3
(1992) : 281-297.
Cooke, Olga Muller. “The Grotesque Style of Belyj’s Moscow Novels.” The Slavic and
East European Journal 32, no. 3 (1988) : 399-414.
Corbett, Edward P. J. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. 3rd ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990.
Croce, Benedetto. The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico. Piscataway: Transaction
Publishers, 2002.
Croll, Morris. “Attic” and Baroque Prose Style: Essays by Morris Croll. Edited by J.
Max Patrick and R. O. Evans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
Csicsery-Ronay, Istvan, Jr. “On the Grotesque in Science Fiction.” Science Fiction
Studies 29, no. 1 (2002) : 71-99.
Curtius, Ernst Robert. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages. Translated by
Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Cyprian. “On the Dress of Virgins.” Vol. 5 of Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip
Schaff. Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf05.iv.v.ii.html> (26 October 2009).
Danisch, Robert. “Power and the Celebration of the Self: Michel Foucault’s Epideictic
Rhetoric.” Southern Communication Journal 71, no. 3 (2006) : 291-307.
__________. Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2007.
Danow, David K. The Spirit of Carnival: Magical Realism and the Grotesque.
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995.

301
Darsey, James. The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America. New York:
New York University Press, 1999.
Day, Malcolm M. “’Naked Truth’ and the Language of Thomas Traherne.” Studies in
Philology 68, no. 3 (1971) : 305-325.
De Bolla, Peter. The Discourse of the Sublime: Readings in History, Aesthetics, and the
Subject. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
__________. Harold Bloom: Towards Historical Rhetorics. New York: Routledge,
1988.
De Certeau, Michel. Heterologies: Discourse on the Other. Translated by Brian
Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
__________. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven Rendall. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984.
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994.
De Man, Paul. Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism.
Vol. 7 of Theory and History of Literature. 2nd ed. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1983.
De Man, Paul. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. Columbia: Columbia University Press,
1984.
Demetrius. On Style. The Loeb Classical Library. Translated by Doreen C. Innes.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
Dentith, Simon. Parody. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Derrida, Jacques. “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of
Reason Alone.” In Acts of Religion, translated by Gil Anidjar. New York:
Routledge, 2002.
__________. “Khora.” In On the Name, translated by Peggy Kamuf. New York:
Routledge, 1994.
Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Translated by Allan Bass. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
__________. The Truth in Painting. Translated by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

302
__________. Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1978.
Detwiler, Tim. “Viewing Robertson’s Rhetoric in an Augustinian Mirror.” Journal of
Communication and Religion 11, no. 1 (1988) : 22-31.
Diller, Edward. “Aesthetics and the Grotesque: Friedrich Durrenmatt.” Wisconsin
Studies in Contemporary Literature 7, no. 3 (1966) : 328-335.
Di Renzo, Anthony. American Gargoyles: Flannery O’Connor and the Medieval
Grotesque. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993.
Domanska, Ewa and Hans Kellner, eds. Re-Figuring Hayden White. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009.
Doran, Madeleine. “’High Events as These’: The Language of Hyperbole in Antony and
Cleopatra.” Queen’s Quarterly 72 (1965) : 26-51.
Dow, Bonnie. “The Function of Epideictic and Deliberative Strategies in Presidential
Crisis Rhetoric.” Western Journal of Speech Communication 53 (1989) : 294310.
Duffy, Bernard K. “The Platonic Functions of Epideictic Rhetoric.” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 16 (1983) : 70-93.
Eco, Umberto, ed. On Ugliness. Translated by Alastair McEwen. New York: Rizzoli,
2007.
Enos, Richard Leo and Roger Thompson et al., eds. The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of
Hippo: De Doctrina and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric. Waco:
Baylor University Press, 2008.
Epps, Brad. “Grotesque Identities: Writing, Death, and the Space of the Subject
(Between Michel de Montaigne and Reinaldo Arenas).” The Journal of the
Midwest Modern Language Association 28, no. 1 (1995) : 38-55.
Erasmus, Desiderius. On Copia of Words and Ideas. Translated by Donald B. King and
H. David Rix. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005.
Erickson, Keith V. “The Significance of ‘Doctrina’ in Augustine’s ‘De Doctrina
Christiana.’” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 15 (1985) : 105-107.
Espy, Willard R. The Garden of Eloquence: A Rhetorical Bestiary. New York: Harper
& Row, Publishers, 1983.

303
Ettenhuber, Katrin. “Hyperbole: Exceeding Similitude.” In Renaissance Figures of
Speech. Edited by Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Falk, William. “Untitled.” The Week, 18 September 2009, 7.
Fanning, Leesa. “Willem de Kooning’s Women: The Body of the Grotesque.” In
Modern Art and the Grotesque, edited by Frances S. Connelly. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Ferguson, Frances. Solitude and the Sublime: The Romantic Aesthetics of
Individuation. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Ferreira-Pinto, Christina. “The Fantastic, the Gothic, and the Grotesque in Contemporary
Brazilian Women’s Novels.” Chasqui 25, no. 2 (1996) : 71-80.
Fingesten, Peter. “Delimiting the Concept of the Grotesque.” The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 42, no. 4 (1984) : 419-426.
Fish, Stanley E. Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century
Literature. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
Fogelin, Robert J. Figuratively Speaking. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
__________. “Some Figures of Speech.” In Argumentation: Across the Lines of
Discipline, Proceedings on the Conference on Argumentation, 1986, edited by
Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, J. Anthony Blair, and Charles A.
Willard. New York: Foris Pubns USA, 1987.
Foucault, Michel. Fearless Speech. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Semiotext(e), 2001.
Fox, Matthew. The Hidden Spirituality of Men: Ten Metaphors to Awaken the Sacred
Masculine. Novato: New World Library, 2008.
Fulkerson, Gerald. “Augustine’s Attitude toward Rhetoric in De Doctrina Christiana:
The Significance of 2.37.55.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 15 (1985) : 108-111.
Gaunt, Simon. Troubadours and Irony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Gentry, Marshall Bruce. Flannery O’Connor’s Religion of the Grotesque. Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 1986.
Gniadek, Melissa. “The Art of Becoming: Sherwood Anderson, Frank Sargeson and the
Grotesque Aesthetic.” Journal of New Zealand Literature 23, no. 2 (2005) : 2135.

304
Goodwin, James. Modern American Grotesque: Literature and Photography.
Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2009.
Gordon, Joan. “Hybridity, Heterotopia, and Mateship in China Mieville’s ‘Perdido Street
Station.’ ” Science Fiction Studies 30, no. 3 (2003) : 456-476.
Goring, Paul. The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth Century Culture. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Gregory of Nazianzus. “Funeral Oration on the Great S. Basil, Bishop of Caesarea in
Cappadocia.” Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207.toc.html> (3 November 2009).
__________. “Letter LI to Nicobulus.” Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207.iv.iv.viii.ii.html> (3 November 2009).
Guerlac, Suzanne. The Impersonal Sublime: Hugo, Baudelaire, Lautreamont. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1990.
Gunn, Joshua. “ShitText: Toward a New Coprophilic Style.” Text & Performance
Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2006) : 79-97.
Hardison, O. B., Jr. The Enduring Moment: A Study of the Idea of Praise in
Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1962.
Hariman, Robert. “Decorum.” In Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, edited by Thomas O.
Sloane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
__________. “Decorum, Power, and the Courtly Style.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78,
no. 2 (1992) : 149-172.
Harpham, Geoffrey Galt. The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992.
__________. “The Grotesque: First Principles.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 34, no. 4 (1976) : 461-468.
__________. On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature.
Aurora: The Davies Group, Publishers, 2006.
Harrawood, Michael. “Overreachers: Hyperbole, the ‘circle in the water,’ and Force in I
Henry 6.” English Literary Renaissance 33, no. 3 (2003) : 309-327.
Hart, David Bentley. The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth.
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003.

305

Hart, Roderick P. “The Rhetoric of the True Believer.” Speech Monographs 38, no. 4
(1971) : 249-262.
Hayes, Kathleen. “Grotesque Paradox in the Works of Karel Matej Capek-Chod.” The
Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 2 (2000) : 267-300.
Hendrickson, G. L. “The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style.” The
American Journal of Philology 26, no. 3 (1905) : 249-290.
Hermanson, Amy K. “Religion’s Rhetoric: Saint Augustine’s Union of Christian
Wisdom and Sophistic Eloquence.” In The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo:
De Doctrina and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, edited by Richard
Leo Enos and Roger Thompson et al. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008.
Hoskyns, John. “Sidney’s Arcadia and Rhetoric.” In English Renaissance Literary
Criticism, edited by Brian Vickers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.
Hovey, Craig. Nietzsche and Theology. New York: T&T Clark, 2008.
Hoving, Kristen A. “Convulsive Bodies: The Grotesque Anatomies of Surrealist
Photography.” In Modern Art and the Grotesque, edited by Frances S. Connelly.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Hume, Kathryn. “Robert Coover: The Metaphysics of Bondage.” The Modern
Language Review 98, no. 4 (2003) : 827-841.
Irving, Washington. The Legend of Sleepy Hollow. Filiquarian Publishing, 2006.
Isocrates. Against the Sophists. Ohio State University at Mansfield.
<http://english.mansfield.ohio-state.edu/writing/276files/IsocratesAgainst.htm> (5
November 2009).
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of
Political Speechmaking. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Jasinski, James. Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical
Studies. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001.
Jennings, Lee Byron. The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Post
Romantic Prose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
Johnson, Christopher D. Hyperboles: The Rhetoric of Excess in Baroque Literature and
Thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

306
Johnson, W. R. “Isocrates’ Flowering: The Rhetoric of Augustine.” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 9, no. 4 (1976) : 217-231.
Johnstone, Henry W., Jr. and Mari Lee Mifsud. “Wedge and Bridge: A Note on
Rhetoric as Distinction and as Identification.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 29, no.
2 (1999) : 75-78.
Kayser, Wolfgang Johannes. The Grotesque in Art and Literature. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1963.
Keillor, Garrison. “Guy Noir.” A Prairie Home Companion.
<http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/programs/2007/06/23/scripts/noir.shtml> (10
September 2009).
Kennedy, George A. Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from
Ancient to Modern Times. 2nd ed. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1999.
__________. A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994.
King, Peter T. “The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism.”
Vivarium 46, no. 3 (2008) : 253-274.
Kinneavy, James L. and Catherine R. Eskin. “Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.” Written
Communication 2 (1994) : 131-142.
Kinneavy, James L. “Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory.” In Rhetoric
and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, edited by Phillip Sipriora and
James S. Baumlin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.
Koester, Helmut. History, Culture, and Religion of the Hellenistic Age. 2nd ed. New
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995.
Lactantius. “Of Religion, Wisdom, and the Chief Good.” Vol. 7 of Ante-Nicene Fathers,
edited by Philip Schaff. Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.iii.xi.html> (2 November 2009).
__________. “Of Restraining the Pleasures of the Senses.” Vol. 7 of Ante-Nicene
Fathers, edited by Philip Schaff. Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.iii.ii.viii.lviii.html> (2 November 2009).
Lamy, Bernard. The Art of Speaking. The Library of Princeton University: W. Godbid,
1676.

307
Lanham, Richard A. A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms. 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1991.
__________. The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Lee, Farrell. “Grotesque and the Demonism of Silence: Beckett’s ‘Endgame.’” Notre
Dame English Journal 14, no. 1 (1981) : 59-70.
Leff, Michael C. “St. Augustine and Martianus Capella: Continuity and Change in Fifth
Century Latin Rhetorical Theory.” Communication Quarterly 24, no. 4 (1976) :
2-9.
__________. “The Habitation of Rhetoric.” In Argument & Critical Practices:
Proceeding from the Fifth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation. Edited by
Joseph Wenzel. Annandale: SCA, 1987.
Leupin, Alexandre. Fiction and Incarnation: Rhetoric, Theology, and Literature in the
Middle Ages. Translated by David Laatsch. Minneapolis: University of
Minneapolis Press, 2003.
Levin, Harry. The Overreacher: A Study of Christopher Marlowe. Gloucester: Peter
Smith, 1974.
Lincoln, Abraham. “The Gettysburg Address.” Abraham Lincoln Online.
<http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm> (14
April 2010).
Lokke, Kari E. “‘Bluebeard’ and ‘The Bloody Chamber’: The Grotesque of Self-Parody
and Self-Assertion.” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 10, no. 1 (1988) :
7-12.
Long, Timothy. “Persuasion and the Aristophanic Agon.” Transactions and Proceedings
of the American Philological Association 103 (1972) : 285-299.
[Longinus]. On the Sublime. The Loeb Classical Library. Translated by W. H. Fyfe.
Edited by G. P. Goold. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
Loraux, Nicole. The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City.
Translated by Alan Sheridan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
Lovecraft, H. P. At the Mountains of Madness: The Definitive Edition. Kindle Books.
New York: The Modern Library, 2005
Mack, Peter. Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.

308

Magee, Neal E. “Incongrunt Beleifs and the Vitality of Fantasy: The New Politics of
Religion.” In The Sleeping Giant has Awokin: The New Politics of Religion in
the United States, edited by Jeffrey W. Robbins and Neal Magee. New York:
Continuum, 2008.
Malcolm, Noel. The Origins of English Nonsense. Hammersmith: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1997.
Marion, Jean-Luc Marion. In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. Translated by
Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud. New York: Fordham University Press,
2002.
Marvick, Louis Wirth. Mallarme and the Sublime. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1986.
Mazzio, Carla. The Inarticulate Renaissance: Language Trouble in an Age of
Eloquence. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Meindl, Dieter. American Fiction and the Metaphysics of the Grotesque. Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1996.
McCarthy, Michael and Ronald Carter. “‘There’s Millions of Them’: Hyperbole in
Everyday Conversation.” Journal of Pragmatics 36 (2004) : 149-184.
McGushin, Edward F. Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007.
McKenna, Stephen J. Adam Smith: The Rhetoric of Propriety. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 2005.
McPherson, Heather. “Ingres and the Poetics of the Grotesque.” In Modern Art and the
Grotesque, edited by Frances S. Connelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Meeks, Wayne A. The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
Megill, Allan. Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
Mignon, Charles W. “Edward Taylor’s ‘Preparatory Meditations’: A Decorum of
Imperfection.” PMLA 83, no. 5 (1968) : 1423-1428.
Mileur, Jean-Pierre. “Allegory and Irony: ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’ Re-Examined.”
Comparative Literature 38, no. 4 (1986) : 329-336.

309

__________. The Critical Romance: The Critic as Reader, Writer, Hero. Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990.
Moore, Michael. “‘Capitalism: A Love Story’ House Parties this Weekend – 1,000 to be
Held across the Nation!” MichaelMoore.Com.
<http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mikes-letter/capitalism-love-story-houseparties-weekend-1000-be-held-across-nation> (16 April 2010).
__________. “The Great thing about the Health Care Bill that has Passed? It will Save
Republican Lives, Too (An Open Letter to Republicans from Michael Moore).”
MichaleMoore.Com. <http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mikes-letter/greatthing-about-health-care-law-has-passed-it-will-save-republican-lives-too-openletter-republicans-michael-moore> (16 April 2010).
Murphy, James J. Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from St.
Augustine to the Renaissance. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
__________. “Saint Augustine and the Christianization of Rhetoric.” Western Speech
(1958) : 24-29.
__________. “Saint Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric.” Quarterly
Journal of Speech 46, no. 4 (1960) : 400-411.
__________. “Saint Augustine and Rabanus Maurus: The Genesis of Medieval
Rhetoric.” Western Speech 31, no. 2 (1967) : 88-96.
Naremore, James. “Stanley Kubrick and the Aesthetics of the Grotesque.” Film
Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2006) : 4-14.
Nettels, Elsa. “The Grotesque in Conrad’s Fiction.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 29, no.
2 (1974) : 144-163.
Newman, John Henry. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Adamant Media
Corporation, 2004.
Nichols, Ashton. “‘Will Sprawl’ in the ‘Ugly Actual’: The Positive Grotesque in
Browning.” Victorian Poetry 21, no. 2 (1983) : 157-170.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Daybreak. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge:
University of Cambridge Press, 1982.
__________. Human, All Too Human. Translated by Marion Faber and Stephen
Lehmann. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.

310
__________. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Penguin Books, 1966
__________. The Will to Power. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.
New York: Random House, 1967.
Ochs, Donovan J. Consolatory Rhetoric: Grief, Symbol, and Ritual in the Greco-Roman
Era. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993.
O’Connor, William Van. “The Grotesque in Modern American Fiction.” College
English 20, no. 7 (1959) : 342-346.
Olmsted, Wendy. “Invention, Emotion, and Conversion in Augustine’s Confessions.” In
Rhetorical Invention and Religious Inquiry: New Perspectives, edited by Walter
Jost and Wendy Olmsted. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Ong, Walter J., S. J. Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue from the Art of
Discourse to the Art of Reason. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2004.
Oravec, Christine. “‘Observation’ in Aristotle’s Theory of Epideictic.” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 9 (1976) : 162-173.
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea
of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational. Translated by John W. Harvey. 4th
ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1926.
Pascal, Blaise. Pensees and Other Writings. Edited by Anthony Levi. Translated by
Honor Levi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Paternoster, Annick. “Decorum and Indecorum in the ‘Seconda redazione’ of Baldassare
Castiglione’s ‘Libro del Cortegiano.” The Modern Language Review 99, no. 3
(2004) : 622-634.
Peachum, Henry. The Garden of Eloquence: Tropes of Sentences (1593). The Perseus
Digital Library. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgibin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.03.0082%3Ahead%3D%2359> (24
November 2009).
Perelman, Ch. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation. Translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.
Plato. Gorgias. Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998.

311
__________. Phaedrus. Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1998.
Plett, Hienrich F. “Hyperbole.” In Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, edited by Thomas O.
Sloane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Podol, Peter L. “The Grotesque Mode in Contemporary Spanish Theater and Film.”
Modern Language Studies 15, no. 4 (1985) : 194-207.
Potkay, Adam. The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1994.
Poulakos, John. “Kairos in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions.” In Rhetoric and Karios:
Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, edited by Phillip Sipriora and James S.
Baumlin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.
Presley, Delma Eugene. “The Moral Function of Distortion in Southern Grotesque.”
South Atlantic Bulletin 37, no. 2 (1972) : 37-46.
Press, Gerald A. “Doctrina in Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana.” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 17, no. 2 (1984) : 98-120.
Puttenham, George. Arte of English Poesie (1569). Electronic Text Center, University
of Virginia Library. <http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=PutPoes.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/par
sed&tag=public&part=all> (17 November 2009).
Quinn, Arthur. Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase. New York: Routledge,
2009.
Quintilian. Institutes of Oratory. Translated by Lee Honeycutt.
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/quintilian/8/chapter6.html#68> (28
October 2009).
Ramsey, Paul. Basic Christian Ethics. Westminster John Knox Press, 1950.
Raschke, Carl A. “Jacques Lacan and the Magic of Desire: A Post-Structuralist
Subscript.” In Lacan and Theological Discourse, edited by Edith Wyschogrod,
David Crownfield, and Carl A. Raschke. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1989.
Rhodes, Neil. The Power of Eloquence and English Renaissance Literature. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1992.

312
Richards, Cindy Koenig. “Inventing Sacagawea: Public Women and the Transformative
Potential of Epideictic Rhetoric.” Western Journal of Communication 73, no. 1
(2009) : 1-22.
Ricoeur, Paul. Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Translated by
David Pellauer. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995.
Roberts-Miller, Patricia. “John Quincy Adams’s Amistad Argument: The Problem of
Outrage; or, the Constraints of Decorum.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 33, no. 2
(2002) : 5-25.
Rollins, Brooke. “The Ethics of Epideictic Rhetoric: Addressing the Problem of
Presence through Derrida’s Funeral Orations.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35, no.
1 (2005) : 5-23.
Rosenfield, Lawrence W. “The Practical Celebration of Epideictic.” In Rhetoric in
Transition, edited by E. E. White. University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1980.
Ruskin, John. The Stones of Venice. General Books LLC, 2009.
Saint Augustine. De Doctrina Christiana. Translated by D. W. Robertson, Jr. Upper
Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1997.
Schaeffer, John D. “The Dialectic of Orality and Literacy: The Case of Book 4 of
Augustine’s De Doctriana Christiana.” In The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of
Hippo: De Doctrina and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric, edited by
Richard Leo Enos and Roger Thompson et al. Waco: Baylor University Press,
2008.
Scherb, Victor I. “Blasphemy and the Grotesque in the Digby ‘Mary Magdalene.’”
Studies in Philology 96, no. 3 (1999) : 225-240.
Scodel, Joshua. Excess and the Mean in Early Modern English Literature. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002.
Seneca. On Benefits. Translated by Aubrey Stewart. London: George Bell and Sons,
1905.
Settle, Glenn H. “Faith, Hope, and Charity: Rhetoric as Aletheiac Act in On Christian
Doctrine.” Journal of Communication and Religion 17, no. 2 (1994) : 46-60.
Shoemaker, Peter William. Powerful Connections: The Poetics of Patronage in the Age
of Louis XIII. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2007.

313
Shuger, Debora K. “The Philosophical Foundations of Sacred Rhetoric.” In Rhetorical
Invention and Religious Inquiry: New Perspectives, edited by Walter Jost and
Wendy Olmsted. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Shuger, Debora K. Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English
Renaissance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Sider, Robert Dick. Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971.
Sihler, Ernest G. From Augustus to Augustine: Essays & Studies Dealing with the
Contact and Conflict of Classic Paganism and Christianity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1923.
Singley, Paulette. “Devouring Architecture: Ruskin’s Insatiable Grotesque.”
Assemblage 32 (1997) : 108-125.
Sipiora, Phillip. “Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos.” In Rhetoric and
Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, edited by Phillip Sipriora and
James S. Baumlin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.
Smith, Craig R. “Roman Decorum as a New Praxis for Existential Communication.”
Western Journal of Communication 56, no. 1 (1992) : 68-89.
Snipes, Kenneth. “Literary Interpretation in the Homeric Scholia: The Similes of the
Iliad.” The American Journal of Philology 109, no. 2 (1988) : 196-222.
Sonnino, Lee Ann. Handbook to Sixteenth Century Rhetoric. New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1968.
Spence, Sarah. Rhetorics of Reason and Desire: Vergil, Augustine, and the
Troubadours. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Stanivukovic, Goran V. “‘Mounting Above the Truthe’: On Hyperbole in English
Renaissance Literature.” Forum for Modern Language Studies 43, no. 1 (2007) :
9-33.
Stechow, Wolfgang. “Hieronymus Bosch: The Grotesque and We.” In The Grotesque
in Art and Literature: Theological Reflections, edited by James Luther Adams
and Wilson Yates. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1997
Steig, Michael. “Defining the Grotesque: An Attempt at Synthesis.” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 29, no. 2 (1970) : 253-260.

314
Sullivan, Dale L. “The Ethos of Epideictic Encounter.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26
(1993) : 113-133.
__________. “Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78
(1992) : 317-332.
Summers, David. “The Archaeology of the Modern Grotesque.” In Modern Art and the
Grotesque, edited by Frances S. Connelly. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
Sutherland, Christine Mason. “Reforms of Style: St. Augustine and the Seventeenth
Century.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1991) : 26-37.
Swain, Virginia E. Grotesque Figures: Baudelaire, Rousseau, and the Aesthetics of
Modernity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
Tayler, Edward. Literary Criticism of 17th Century England. New York: Knopf, 1967.
Taylor, Mark C. Altarity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.
__________. Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
__________. Nots. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
__________. Tears. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Taylor, Warren. Tudor Figures of Rhetoric. Whitewater: Language Press, 1972.
Teague, Frances N., ed. Acting Funny: Comic Theory and Practice in Shakespeare’s
Plays. Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1994.
Tell, Dave. “Augustinian Political Theory and Religious Discourse in Public Life.”
Journal of Communication and Religion 30, no. 2 (2007) : 213-235.
Tertullian. On the Apparel of Women. Vol. 4 of Ante-Nicene Fathers, edited by Philip
Schaff. Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf04.iii.iii.ii.xiii.html> (26 October 2009).
__________. On the Soul (De Anima). Christian Classics Electronic Library at Wheaton
College. <http://www.tertullian.org/anf/anf03/anf03-22.htm#P2588_854958> (26
October 2009).
Tillich, Paul. A History of Christian Thought. Edited by Carl E Braaten. New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968.

315
__________. The Courage to Be. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Too, Yun Lee Too. “Epideictic Genre.” In Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, edited by Thomas
O. Sloane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Traherne, Thomas. “Life’s Blessedness.” In The Poetical Works of Thomas Traherne.
American Libraries.
<http://www.archive.org/stream/poeticalworksoft00trah/poeticalworksoft00trah_d
jvu.txt> (18 November 2009).
Troiano, James J. “The Grotesque Tradition and the Interplay of Fantasy and Reality in
the Plays of Roberto Arlt.” Latin American Literary Review 4, no. 8 (1976) : 714.
Troop, Calvin L. “Augustine for Communication Scholars.” Journal of Communication
and Religion 28, no. 1 (2005) : 131-146.
__________. Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s
Confessions. University of South Carolina Press, 1999.
Tucker, Cynthia Grant. “Petrarchisant sur l’Horrible: A Renaissance Tradition and
Baudelaire’s Grotesque.” The French Review 48, no. 5 (1975) : 887-896.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. Beauty’s Appeal: Measure and Excess. New York:
Springer, 2007
Vaage, Leif E. and Vincent L. Wimbush, eds. Asceticism and the New Testament. New
York: Routledge, 1999.
Vickers, Brian, ed. English Renaissance Literary Criticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1999.
__________. “The ‘Songs and Sonnets’ and the Rhetoric of Hyperbole.” In John Donne:
Essays in Celebration, edited by A. J. Smith. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd.,
1972.
Vivian, Bradford. “Neoliberal Epideictic: Rhetorical Form and Commemorative Politics
on September 11, 2002.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92 (2006) : 1-26.
Wagner, Walter H. After the Apostles: Christianity in the Second Century.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994.
Walker, Jeffrey. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000.

316
Weaver, Richard M. The Ethics of Rhetoric. Davis: Hermagoras Press, 1985.
__________. Language is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric.
Edited by Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph T. Eubanks.
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970.
Webb, Stephen H. Blessed Excess: Religion and the Hyperbolic Imagination. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1993.
__________. The Divine Voice: Christian Proclamation and the Theology of Sound.
Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2004.
__________. The Gifting God: A Trinitarian Ethics of Excess. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996.
__________. “A Hyperbolic Imagination: Theology and the Rhetoric of Excess.”
Theology Today 50 (1993) : 56-67.
__________. Re-Figuring Theology: The Rhetoric of Karl Barth. SUNY Series in
Rhetoric and Theology, edited by David Tracy and Stephen H. Webb. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1991.
__________. “The Rhetoric of Ethics as Excess: A Christian Theological Response to
Emmanuel Levinas.” Modern Theology 15, no. 1 (1999) : 1-16.
__________. “The Rhetoric of and about Excess in William James’ The Variety of
Religious Experience.” Religion and Literature 27 (1995) : 27-45.
Weiss, Allen S. The Aesthetics of Excess. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1989.
Wells, Henry W. Poetic Imagery Illustrated from Elizabethan Literature. New York:
Russell and Russell, 1961.
Whately, Richard. Elements of Rhetoric. Central European University Press, 2009.
White, Hayden. Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Wilner, Joshua. Feeding on Infinity: Readings in the Romantic Rhetoric of
Internalization. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Wilson, Catherine. Descartes’s Meditions: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.

317
Wilson, Michiko N. “Oe’s Obsessive Metaphor, Mori, the Idiot Son: Toward the
Imagination of Satire, Regeneration, and Grotesque Realism.” Journal of
Japanese Studies 7, no. 1 (1981) : 23-52.
Wilson, Thomas. Arte of Rhetorique. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909.
Witherington, Ben III. 1 and 2 Thessalonians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary. Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006.
__________. Letters and Homilies for Jewish Christians: A Socio-Rhetorical
Commentary on Hebrews, James and Jude. Downers Grove: IVP Academic,
2007.
Yarbrough, Stephen R. “The Love of Invention: Augustine, Davidson, and the
Discourse of Unifying Belief.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2000) : 2946.
Yates, Wilson. “An Introduction to the Grotesque: Theoretical and Theological
Considerations.” In The Grotesque in Art and Literature: Theological
Reflections, edited by James Luther Adams and Wilson Yates. Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997.
Zizek, Slavoj. The Fragile Absolute or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting
For?. London: Verso, 2000.
__________. On Belief. London: Routledge, 2001.
__________. The Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997.

